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Die Digitalisierung verändert die Art und Weise, wie wir kommunizieren, 
und hat dadurch auch weitreichende Implikationen für die Art und Weise, 
wie wir an dem Raum teilnehmen, den wir “öffentlich” nennen. Die vorlie-
gende Studie untersucht den digitalen Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit und 
analysiert drei entwicklungstreibende Trends — Netzwerkarchitekturen, per-
sonalisierte Individualität und automatisierte Arbeitsabläufe — besonders im 
Hinblick auf Diskurs und Möglichkeit digitaler Handlungskompetenz.
Die Kernthese der Studie ist, dass sich abstrakte, monolithische Konzeptio-
nen der einen kohärenten Öffentlichkeit überholt haben, weil technologische 
Veränderungen wie die Verbreitung sozialer Medien, die moderne Wert-
schätzung des Individualismus, menschliche Tendenzen zum Confirmation 
Bias, sowie das postkoloniale Interesse an kontextueller Erfahrung, ein di-
verses Spektrum an gefilterten Teilöffentlichkeiten hervorgebracht haben, die 
für sich allein genommen jeweils nicht die Kriterien erfüllen, die mit dem 
Konzept der Öffentlichkeit bisher assoziiert wurden. Sollten wir den Begriff 
überhaupt noch benutzen? 
Indem sie Interkontextualität als Rückgrat des Öffentlichen und den Grad 
der Interkontextualität kontextueller Kommunikation als den Maßstab ihres 
Öffentlichkeitsgrades versteht, schlägt die Studie eine theoretische Schneise 
zwischen relativistischem Kontextualismus und abstraktem Universalismus. 
Sie plädiert für eine pragmatistische Spielart eines relationalen, interkontex-
tuellen und kommunikativen Universalismus, der kontextuelle Erfahrung 
ernst nimmt und wertschätzt, aber den Fokus auf spezifische Kontexte nicht 
absolut setzt und nach dem Verbindenden fragt, das über die Blasen teil-öf-
fentlicher Kommunikation hinausgeht.
Da der Diskurs über öffentliche Kommunikation maßgeblich von den 
institutionellen Formen der garantierten Freiheit der liberalen Demokratie 
beeinflusst wird, und diese selbst wiederum beeinflusst, interpretiert diese 
Studie den digitalen Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit als eine grundlegende 
Transformation der Bedingung für die Möglichkeit öffentlicher Institutio-
nen. Sie bringt theoretische Erkenntnisse aus verschiedenen akademischen 
Disziplinen, sowie empirische Analysen des Vertrauens in Institutionen in 
Anschlag, um die Diskussionen der Ethik öffentlicher Institutionen im digi-
talen Zeitalter inhaltlich anzuregen und neu zu durchdenken.
Diese Studie richtet sich einerseits an die akademische Öffentlichkeiten 
der praktischen Philosophie, der politischen Theorie und der angewandten 
Ethik, und bereichert diese Diskurse mit theoretischen Analysen der jour-
nalistischen, politischen und technologischen Praxis, die durch ihren gesell-
schaftlichen Einfluss auch die theoretische Zunft zu einer Aktualisierung ih-
res Öffentlichkeitsbegriffs zwingen. Die Studie richtet sich andererseits aber 
auch an Führungskräfte in Politik, Wirtschaft, Medien, Kirchen und öffentli-
cher Verwaltung, die auf den je eigenen Gebieten in den je eigenen Kontexten 
auf eine ethisch auskunftsfähige Gestaltung der Digitalisierung drängen und 
aus der theoretischen Reflexion Orientierungswissen für ihre Arbeit gewin-
nen wollen.
Summary - English Version 
__________
The digital revolution changes the way we communicate, and thus has pro-
found implications for how we participate in the space we call “public.” This 
thesis examines the digital transformation of the public sphere, and analyzes 
three trends driving the transformation — network architecture, personali-
zed individuality, and automated workflows — in the context of the discourse 
on digital agency. 
The core thesis of this study is that abstract, monolithic conceptions of the 
one coherent public are outdated, because technological changes like the rise 
of social media, the modern appreciations of individualism, human tenden-
cies towards confirmation bias, and postcolonial interests in contextual ex-
perience, create a diverse spectrum of filtered publics that do not fulfill the 
criteria traditionally associated with the concept of the public sphere. Can we 
even continue to use the term? 
By understanding intercontextuality as the backbone of the public sphe-
re, and the degree of intercontextuality in contextual communication as the 
hallmark for its publicness, this study seeks to find a path between relativistic 
contextualism and abstract universalism. It advocates a pragmatist brand of 
relational, intercontextual, and communicative universalism that appreciates 
context, but does not absolutize it. 
Finally, since the discourse on public communication significantly impacts 
and is impacted by the institutional forms of guaranteed freedoms in libe-
ral democracies, this study interprets the digital transformation of the public 
sphere as a significant transformation of the conditions for the possibility of 
public institutions. It uses theoretical insights from a variety of academic dis-
ciplines, as well as empirical analysis of the trust in institutions to stimulate 
the discussion on the ethics of public institutions in the digital age. 
This study is written for both theory and praxis. On one hand, it targets the 
academic publics of practical philosophy, political theory and applied ethics, 
and enriches their discourses with theoretical analysis of those journalistic, 
political and technological practices that force a conceptual update of the pu-
blic sphere through sheer societal impact. On the other hand, this study also 
targets leaders in both the public and the private sector, as well as the (pub-
lic) media, churches and civil society. The study is written for those leaders 
who work towards an ethically responsible digital transformation in their 
respective contexts and want to use theoretical reflection to distill orienting 
knowledge for their own work. 
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A. Why the Issue is Relevant 
__________
In 1808 Johann Wolfgang von Gothe published his drama Faust, in which a 
pious, innocent girl by the name of Gretchen comes to meet the protagonist 
Faust who has entered a fateful liason with the devil. As she gets to know him 
better, Gretchen asks the question that has become famous as the Gretchen-
frage: Wie hast du’s mit der Religion? What’s your take on religion? It was the 
most central question for Gretchen, the fundamental core to all other ques-
tions. What is the contemporary question that lies at the heart of all others? 
According to Neue Züricher Zeitung it is this: Wie hast du’s mit der Digitali-
sierung? What’s your take on the digital revolution? Jürg Müller writes: “This 
is the Gretchen question of the recently entered century, it divides whole na-
tions. For some, everything is moving way too slow. Others, on the other 
hand, perceive the digital revolution first and foremost as a threat. Moderate 
political forces are increasingly being ground to shreds in this field of force.”1
This question — how to evaluate and deal with the digital revolution — 
is certainly amongst the most central questions of our time. As the NZZ 
example suggests, one can see this singular question play into virtually all 
other questions of social, cultural, economic, religious, and political life. And 
indeed: “for some it is a promise, for some it is a threat.”2 Müller predicts: 
“Because of this polarization liberal democracies will struggle especially in 
this epic transformation.“3 While private enterprises and non-governmen-
tal organizations have been fairly quick to adapt, or have even been driving 
much of the technological change behind the digital revolution, public ins-
titutions have been slow to adapt, and many still struggle with the emerging 
transformations of human labor, public discourse, political organization, and 
the distribution of all kinds of content. 
1 Jürg Müller, “Aufgerieben zwischen Null und Eins,” Neue Züricher Zeitung, international 
edition, December 17, 2016, 17. If not indicated otherwise in the footnote, all translations 
from German to English are my own. If the German original expresses a nuance that 
defies translation the original passage will be provided.
2 Ibid. The German original: “Das ist für manche eine Verheissung, für andere eine Bedro-
hung.”
3 Ibid. The German original: “Wegen dieser Polarisierung wird der Epochenwechsel gerade 
westlichen Demokratien schwerfallen.”
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The transformation currently underway presents us with both dangers and 
opportunities, as Wolfgang Huber points out in his Ethics: “Technological 
progress has given us an increase in power that is profoundly ambiguous with 
regard to its possible consequences: on the one hand, we have new possibili-
ties of preserving and developing human life, and on the other, we have new 
possibilities of destroying it.”4 This applies to individual practice as much as 
to the institutional infrastructure supporting them. With the rise of decent-
ralized, mobile, flexible, and personalized tools for coordination comes a new 
temptation to dispose of the dinosaur institutions that look old, feel ancient, 
and seem outdated. This poses, I argue, a grave danger to the basic freedoms 
that liberal democracies have come to guarantee through a thoroughly ins-
titutional social structure underwriting the civil and human rights of indivi-
dual citizens. This thesis explores how exactly public institutions are challen-
ged by recent cultural and technological changes, and examines the changing 
conditions for the possibility of public institutions.
In his book The Content Trap Harvard Business School’s Bharat Anand 
provides strategies for companies trying to navigate the digital change in bu-
siness. About the philosophy behind his work he writes: “It became com-
monplace, even fashionable, to try to predict what was going to happen next.” 
Why? “It’s exhilarating to try to predict the future.” But: “It’s also draining. 
And: “the predictions are almost always wrong. So: “This sort of thing, I came 
to realize, cannot be worth very much. … Rather than making predictions, 
we tried to make sense of the ground we stood on.”5 This thesis will attempt 
a similar feat: Rather than engaging in vague tale-telling about the future of 
institutions, this study will establish a theoretical discussion of institutions on 
“the ground we stand on” by using empirical research on the changing attitu-
des towards institutions in liberal democracies and on the changing patterns 
of consumption in the increasingly digital world of media publishing.
As a business school professor, Anand’s primary target audience is business 
students, even though he claims a wider relevance for the strategies impar-
ted. With the story of a wildfire that nearly destroyed Yellowstone National 
Park, Anand develops a theory of constructive destruction: “The near-term 
4 Wolfgang Huber, Ethics: The Fundamental Questions of our Lives, trans. Brian McNeil 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 89.
5 Bharat Anand, The Content Trap: A Strategist’s Guide to Digital Change (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2016), ix.
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devastation of the park contained the seeds (literally) of future growth.” For 
the park this theory does hold up: “New, genetically diverse aspen were able 
to grow without competition from taller trees. Rare flora and fauna not seen 
in Yellowstone for decades began to flourish.” And: “Annual visits increased 
every year after the fires, amounting to more than three and a half million 
people by 2015 — 60 percent more than in 1988.”6 
Adhering to a theory of constructive destruction and allowing the healthy 
death of life for the possibility of new life might be smart policy for a nati-
onal park, and might even be a genius metaphor for an ever-changing, dy-
namic environment like business. But I challenge the notion that this can 
be applied as universal strategy to the work of public institutions. Quite the 
contrary: While, as I will show, a notion of evolution and reform can serve an 
institution well, a simplistic hope that the institutions of liberal democracies 
are easily regenerated or rebuilt as part of constructive destruction would 
be both naive and negligent. Anand Adhering to a theory of constructive 
destruction and allowing the healthy death of life for the possibility of new 
life might be smart policy for a national park, and might even be a genius 
metaphor for an ever-changing, dynamic environment like business. But I 
challenge the notion that this can be applied as universal strategy to the work 
of public institutions. Quite the contrary: While, as I will show, a notion of 
evolution and reform can serve an institution well, a simplistic hope that the 
institutions of liberal democracies are easily regenerated or rebuilt as part of 
constructive destruction would be both naive and negligent. Anand himself 
provides support for the rejection of a single theory as universally applicable 
truth when he states a “simple idea”: “the right decision is often closely tied 
to its context.”7 The following paragraphs, therefore, explore the historical 
context for our study.
6 Ibid., xxii.
7 Ibid.
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B. Why the Issue is Timely 
________
After World War II liberal democracies built a number of peace-ensuring 
institutions. The collapse of the Soviet Union catalyzed an era of increasing 
democratization8 and peace9 in the West and beyond. Data published by the 
Center for Systemic Peace shows that after 1991 the “levels of both interstate 
and societal warfare declined dramatically through the 1990s and this trend 
continues to the early 2000s, falling over 60% from their peak levels.” In the 
last few years, however, this trend has been reversing. In a commentary on the 
future of transatlantic relations for TIME magazine, Ian Bremmer remarks: 
“Few leaders in today’s world, particularly in Europe, have enough popularity 
to get anything done, and the current wave of populism sweeping through 
many E.U. countries calls into question the legitimacy of institutions and go-
verning principles in the world’s most advanced industrial democracies.”10
Similarly, Carsten Knop states in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “It is get-
ting worse and worse: The trust of the people in the political and societal 
institutions is eroding. Less and less trust is placed in politicians, managers, 
non-governmental organizations and also the media. At this point, the ma-
jority of the people believe that the ‘system’ constituted by these pillars does 
not work anymore.”11 The journalistic commentary of Knop and Bremmer 
is corroborated by research done by non-profit sources: The 2016 Freedom 
House report shows the “10th consecutive year of decline in global freedom.” 
8 For data on the long-term trends in governance and illustrations of the rise of democracy 
after World War II cf. “Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2015,” Center for Systemic Pe-
ace, accessed October, 19, 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/CTfigures/CTfig15.htm.
9 For visualizations and data on related issues cf.“Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-
2015,” Center for Systemic Peace, accessed October, 19, 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.
org/CTfigures/CTfig03.htm. For recent conflict data cf. “Conflict Barometer 2015,” Hei-
delberg Institute for International Conflict Research, accessed October, 19, 2016, http://
www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2015.pdf.
10 Ian Bremmer, “New World Order: The era of American global leadership is over. Here’s 
what comes next,” TIME, double issue, December 26, 2016 and January 2, 2017, 16.
11 Carsten Knop, “Vertrauen in Institutionen: Die Menschen trauen den Eliten nicht mehr,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 17, 2017, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.
faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/weltwirtschaftsforum/vor-dem-wef-umfragen-zeigen-niedri-
ges-vertrauen-in-eliten-14670396.html.
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This decline is not only due to armed conflicts like the one in Syria, but also 
to developments in established liberal democracies: “Whatever the under-
lying strength of their institutions, leading democracies betrayed a worrying 
lack of self-confidence and conviction during 2015.” The report concludes 
emphatically that “thus far the leaders of the free world have fallen short even 
as fundamental democratic principles come under threat in their own coun-
tries.”12 
Aside from the rise of anti-establishment movements in virtually all liberal 
democracies in the Western world and an increasingly existential identity cri-
sis in response to these movements, we see growing unease with what social 
media is doing to societies around the globe. Initially praised as one of the 
key drivers of a fully democratic, participatory and open society, social media 
has become one of the most divisive tools in the political process and displays 
its vulnerability to truth-bending bigotry every day. Social media has long 
served as an amplifier for anti-establishment agendas and is now increasingly 
complicit in fostering and feeding a broader anti-institutional sentiment.
This anti-institutional sentiment also finds expression in the 2017 Edelman 
Trust Barometer, a report compiled by the communications firm Edelman. 
The study’s summary declares frankly: “trust is in crisis around the world.” 
The researchers conclude that the “general population’s trust in all four key 
institutions — business, government, NGOs, and media — has declined bro-
adly, a phenomenon not reported since Edelman began tracking trust among 
this segment in 2012.”13 Like the Freedom House report, the Edelman Trust Ba-
rometer links challenges to institutions to the impact of populist movements: 
“With the fall of trust, the majority of respondents now lack full belief that 
the overall system is working for them. In this climate, people’s societal and 
economic concerns, including globalization, the pace of innovation and ero-
ding social values, turn into fears, spurring the rise of populist actions now 
playing out in several Western-style democracies.” Edelman concludes that to 
“rebuild trust and restore faith in the system, institutions must step outside 
12 Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, “Overview Essay: Anxious Dictators, Wavering 
Democracies,” Freedom House, accessed October 19, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/re-
port/freedom-world-2016/overviewessay-anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies.
13 It is worth noting that the Edelman study does not define religious institutions or the 
entertainment industry as “key institutions” of society. I disagree and will approach the 
concept more inclusively below.
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of their traditional roles and work toward a new, more integrated operating 
model that puts people — and the addressing of their fears — at the center of 
everything they do.”14 
Leaders in all types of institutions are faced with a difficult task, since along 
with “the largest-ever drop in trust across the institutions,” the trust in their 
leadership has been especially in peril: “CEO credibility dropped 12 points 
globally to an all-time low of 37 percent, plummeting in every country stu-
died, while government leaders (29 percent) remain least credible.” Changes 
in the media have played into the dynamic: “The cycle of distrust is magnified 
by the emergence of a media echo chamber that reinforces personal beliefs 
while shutting out opposing points of view. Respondents favor search engi-
nes (59 percent) over human editors (41 percent) and are nearly four times 
more likely to ignore information that supports a position they do not believe 
in.”15 16 As J.D. Vance points out in his best-selling Hillbilly Elegy: Memoir of 
a Family and Culture in Crisis, only six percent of American voters consider 
the media “very trustworthy.”17 Summarizing the emotions and experience of 
working-class Americans in the “hillbilly culture,” Vance writes: “To many of 
us, the free press — that bulwark of American democracy — is simply full of 
shit.” Vance considers this a dramatic problem because, given the “little trust 
in the press, there’s no check on the Internet conspiracy theories that rule 
the digital world.”18 Applying this insight to our study, it is impossible to spe-
ak about trust in institutions without considering the transformations in the 
new types of media that filter and distribute the information governing our 
lives. Analyzing recent conspiracy theories shared by conservative friends 
on social media, Vance remarks that this is not “some libertarian mistrust 
14 “2017 Edelman Trust Barometer,” Edelman, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.edel-
man.com/trust2017/.
15 “2017 Edelman TRUST BAROMETER Reveals Global Implosion of Trust: CEO Credibi-
lity at Lowest Level Ever,” Edelman, January 15, 2017, accessed January 22, 2017, http://
www.edelman.com/news/2017-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-global-implosion/.
16 The use of the singular — “a media echo chamber” — is misleading. The use of plural is 
most appropriate.
17  “Only 6% Rate News Media as Very Trustworthy,” Rasmussen Reports, accessed Novem-
ber 17, 2015, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_poli-
tics/february_2013/only_ 6_rate_news_media_as_very_trustworthy. Cited by J.D. Vance, 
Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 
2016), 192.
18  Vance, Hillbilly Elegy, 192.
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of government policy” which he considers “healthy in any democracy.” But 
rather: “This is deep skepticism of the very institutions of our society” which 
is dangerous for the civil fabric of society and “becoming more and more 
mainstream.”19 
Vance’s findings are supported by the Edelman results. By many, the me-
dia is not at all considered a check to other forms of institutional power, but 
mainly as an integral part of the one coherent institutional elite itself. Com-
menting on the study’s findings, Edelman’s CEO concludes: “The result is a 
proclivity for self-referential media and reliance on peers. The lack of trust 
in media has also given rise to the fake news phenomenon and politicians 
speaking directly to the masses. Media outlets must take a more local and 
social approach.” The importance of information for the degree of trust is 
illustrated by the fact that the “gap between the trust held by the informed 
public and that of the mass population has widened to 15 points, with the 
biggest disparities in the U.S. (21 points), U.K. (19 points) and France (18 
points).” The study, conducted with 33,000 respondents, shows that the “mass 
population in 20 countries distrusts their institutions, compared to only six 
for the informed public.”20 
19  Ibid., 193.
20 Ibid.
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C. Why the Issue Has a History 
_________
Many different metaphors have been employed to place the digital transfor-
mation into its historical context. One of those metaphors is the notion of 
digitalization as the “Fourth Revolution.” The uniformity of the language, ho-
wever, should not disguise the diversity of definitions attached to the term.
1. Hermeneutics of Consciousness
Oxford researcher Luciano Floridi, for instance, uses the term to describe 
the “infosphere” created by “the explosive developments in Information and 
Communication Technologies.” Floridi observes that the “boundaries bet-
ween life online and offline” are breaking down as we “become seamlessly 
connected to each other” and “surrounded by smart, responsive objects.” He 
points out that the personas we create on social media now “feed into our 
‚real‘ lives’ leading to a mode of living best characterized as the “onlife.” The 
historical sequence of revolutions sketched by Floridi starts with the Coper-
nican shift of how we see our planet. It is followed by Darwin’s theory of evo-
lution and Freud’s work in psychoanalysis. The “infosphere” then marks the 
fourth “metaphysical shift” in Floridi’s analysis.21 
2. Hermeneutics of Salvation
Obviously, a selection of revolutions like Floridi’s is necessarily subjecti-
ve. His choice, for instance, presupposes an approach that situates the key 
turning points in the history of ideas. It also presupposes a naturalist, evo-
lutionist scientism and a more or less overt anti-religious point of view. A 
theological vantage point might construct a very different frame of reference 
for a historical sequence of transformations: Creation (whether understood 
in evolutionary or creationist terms), Covenant (with Abraham representing 
the Israelite people), Liberation (with Moses leading his people out of sla-
very), Salvation (with Jesus as the Christ), and Kingdom (with the Christi-
an Church as the means of constant (re-)construction). In a soteriological 
21 Cf. Luciano Floridi, The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human Rea-
lity (Oxford: Univ. Press, 2014). Citations taken from: “The Fourth Revolution,” Oxford 
University Press, accessed February 20, 2017, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/
the-fourth-revolution-9780199606726?cc=de&lang=en&#.
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scheme like this, none of Floridi’s revolutions are all that revolutionary. Still, 
I wish to argue, a concept of the “Fourth Revolution” can help us grasp the 
scope and significance of the digital transformation.
 3. Hermeneutics of Political Theory
Before we turn to the concept I wish to endorse myself, I will examine how 
John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge define the “Fourth Revolution.” 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge have in common with Floridi’s approach that 
they use the framing of intellectual history. They explain “why ideas matter” 
and browse through “five centuries of history.”22 In contrast to Floridi they 
do not use information technology as the hermeneutic key, but rather take 
the vantage point of political philosophy. Fittingly, their study is called The 
Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State.23 The first revolution 
described in the book is “the rise of the European nation-state after the Pe-
ace of Westphalia.” The second one is “the late-18th- and 19th-century turn 
toward individual rights and accountable government.” The third revolution 
is “the creation of the modern welfare state.” All three revolutions attempted 
more or less successfully to “provide order and deliver vital services while still 
fostering innovation.” However, in Micklethwaith’s and Wooldridge’s narra-
tive, the state overextended itself when “democratic publics demanded more 
and more” and “the state promised more and more.” In the fourth revolution 
libertarian ideas took over the conservative parties in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, and “Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan tried, but 
failed, to shrink the state.”24 Just like Floridi’s account, this selection is neces-
sarily subjective as well, since it reduces complexity with a focus on political 
ideas under a materialist paradigm. In this view, liberalist rights and material 
welfare form the defining epistemic lens for how the revolutions are sequen-
ced.
22 Rosa Brooks, “A Call to Rally,” review of The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent 
the State, by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, New York Times, June 26, 2014, 
Sunday Book Review, accessed February 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/
books/review/the-fourth-revolution-by-johnmicklethwait-and-adrian-wooldridge.
html?_r=0.
23 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to 
Reinvent the State (New York: Penguin Books, 2014).
24 Brooks, A Call to Rally.
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4. Hermeneutics of Socio-Economic History
Both Floridi’s account of a “Fourth Revolution” driven by information 
technology and Micklethwaith’s and Wooldridge’s account of the “Fourth Re-
volution” as an ongoing matter of political philosophy point to important 
dimensions of the transformation currently underway. This thesis incorpo-
rates both dimensions into its field of study by considering the future of in-
stitutions and the future of the public sphere as one integrated whole. This 
integrated approach is best served by considering the history of information 
technology and the history of political philosophy as an integrated whole as 
well. Klaus Schwab, the founder and chairman of the World Economic Fo-
rum places the “Fourth Revolution” in a socio-historical sequence that enab-
les us to connect both: “The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam 
power to mechanize production. The Second used electric power to create 
mass production. The Third used electronics and information technology to 
automate production. Now a Fourth Industrial Revolution is building on the 
Third, the digital revolution that has been occurring since the middle of the 
last century. It is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the 
lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres.”25
The vantage point of technological history provided by Schwab opens the 
possibility to seek out the parallels with other technological transformations. 
In this view, the digital transformation becomes the fourth industrial revolu-
tion. If we study the preceding industrial revolutions, we can not only under-
stand better the scope and significance of the current revolution, but also seek 
out the wisdom of thinkers writing during those previous revolutions. And 
if we choose to speak of the digital transformation as the “Fourth Industrial 
Revolution,” we can not only examine historical parallels, but also study how 
institutions coped with societal turmoil and restructuring. 
5. Industrialization and Reformist Institutionalism
To distill an essential learning without oversimplifying historical comple-
xity, we will focus on a key figure in a key moment which can stand as an 
illustrative exemplar of reformist institutionalism: Abraham Lincoln in the 
1830s. Lincoln’s presidency is most often associated with abolitionism, and 
25 Klaus Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond,” World 
Economic Forum, January 14, 2016, accessed Februar 20, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/01/thefourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/.
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rightly so, since his leadership was vital in realizing the end of slavery th-
rough the institutions of government. Yet, abolitionism was not the only mo-
vement propelled to new heights during Lincoln’s period of influence. He also 
presided over an important peak in the unfolding of the industrialization of 
North America. A look at the socio-historical backdrop of Lincoln’s political 
thinking reveals a time of significant upheaval with a wealth of political, eth-
nic and religious conflict, and a viral founder’s spirit. Both social conflict and 
the founder’s spirit provide insight into the labor pains of an emerging new 
world built on the foundations of inherited institutions.
To give a sense of the social landscape setting the stage for Lincoln’s leaders-
hip, I will give a simple and selective list of a few key events in the early years 
of Lincoln’s intellectual formation. The telegraph was invented and patented 
by Samuel Morse in 1837, enabling leaders to communicate swiftly over vast 
distances and speeding up decision-making significantly. Women were ad-
vancing socially, with Mount Holyoke Seminary founded in 1837, Kentucky 
passing a law permitting female school attendance in 1838, and Mississippi 
allowing women to own property in 1839. The steamship was invented and 
the Great Western built to connect England and the United States. The Great 
Western and the Sirius arrived in New York as the first steam passenger ships 
to cross the Atlantic in April of 1838. The steam revolution fueled not only 
the rise of steamships, but also the railroad, with the Wilmington line com-
pleted in 1840 as the world’s longest railroad at the time.
Abolitionism was on the rise, with Texas abolishing the slave trade in 1836, 
the Institute for Colored Youth opening as the first institution of higher 
education for black students, and abolitionist Frederick Douglass escaping 
slavery in 1838. Simultaneously, significant territorial conflict was raging: 
The siege and battle of the Alamo, as well as the Texas Revolution took place 
in 1836, and Canada was disrupted by a rebellion in 1838. The 1820s and 30s 
were a time of religious innovation as well, with the Second Great Awakening 
at its height and rapidly rising membership amongst Baptists and Methodis-
ts. Romanticism, emotionalism, supernaturalism, and a rejection of the deist 
and rationalist tendencies in the founder’s generation characterized religious 
and political thought. Religious innovation sparked identity conflicts with 
Missouri issuing the Extermination Order against the Mormons in 1838 and 
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the mob killing of Joseph Smith in Illinois in 1844. Ethnic tensions mount in 
Boston between Irish and Yankees in 1837. The Trail of Tears and the Pota-
watomi Trail of Death kill several thousand Native Americans in 1838.
A vast number of educational institutions open during this time: Mar-
shall College, Emory College are founded in 1836, and DePauw University 
and Knox College in 1837. Duke University opens in 1838, the University 
of Missouri, Longwood University, Baltimore City College, Virginia Military 
Institute and Episcopal High School in 1839. Fordham University opens in 
1841 and Willamette, Wesleyan University, University of Notre Dame, Mili-
tary College of South Carolina, Cumberland University, Hollins University, 
Villanova University, as well as Indiana University Bloomington and Indiana 
University’s Maurer School of Law are founded in 1842.
It is also the time of a political founder’s spirit. Wisconsin is admitted as the 
25th United States state and the city of Houston is founded in 1836. Chicago 
receives a city charter and Michigan is admitted as the 26th state in 1837. The 
Iowa Territory including today’s Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota 
and Iowa is established in in 1838 and the city of Dallas is founded in 1841. 
All this took place during a time of significant economic challenge. After the 
founding of the Democratic party in 1828, voices calling for a protection and 
rebirth of an agrarian society rally behind Andrew Jackson who as President 
contributed to the failing land speculation economy with the Specie Circular 
in 1836, eventually leading to the 1837 Panic with banks failing and record 
level unemployment.
This period also sees innovation in weapons technology with Samuel Colt 
receiving a patent for the Colt revolver in 1836. The first numbered United 
States patent is granted providing new order to the patenting system. The 
technological innovation coincides with intellectual innovation, illustrated 
by the emblematic founding of the Transcendental Club in Cambridge in 
1836. The effect of the industrial revolution and the spirit of technological 
and intellectual innovation is not just prevalent in the United States. It also 
plays out on the European continent with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
developing the thought leading to the publication of their Communist Ma-
nifesto in 1848.
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In the 1840s, Danish philosopher Sören Kierkegaard observes that the 
social dynamics are changing dramatically. In the words of biographer Jo-
akim Garff: “Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of his era is postmodern, long before 
being postmodern became fashionable.”26 For Kierkegaard, the comfort of 
the self-righteous citizen is emblematic for the “collapse of the vertical, the 
breakdown of formerly solid religious and political authorities” — the midd-
le, center, medium, average and mediocre “is everywhere now.” In contrast to 
the revolutionary period in which existing authorities were faced with vocal 
and conscious opposition, the time of his writing is marked by a “gradual un-
dermining of the legitimacy of institutions and the substance of symbols.”27 
While Kierkegaard diagnoses a confused alienation and comfortable 
estrangement that comes with the new leveling of a formerly hierarchical so-
ciety and allows for new forms of mass theater and group psychosis, he also 
embraces the new religious immediacy possible for the bourgeois individual: 
“Considered on its own, the decomposition of fixed authorities and ordinan-
ces is a catastrophe, because its absence creates an awkward social tingle. But 
it also holds the possibility that the singular human can act directly geared 
towards God, now that it has made itself free of institutional, and especial-
ly ecclesial embrace.”28 This is the ambivalence of the postmodern world in 
Kierkegaard’s view: Either the individual manages to become his or her own 
self without the “safety net secured by superordinate institutions”29 — or he 
or she becomes obsessed with a new form of fear-driven envy: “the fear of su-
perordinate authorities has been replaced by the fear of being different from 
the others“ which Kierkegaard describes as a fear of “not being an average 
human.” Garff summarizes it as follows: “Put bluntly, conformism has taken 
the place of authority, respect has turned into envy, and what used to be a fear 
of God has become a fear of men.”30 
A few years before Kierkegaard was describing the Danish bourgeoisie and 
its nascent postmodern life, Abraham Lincoln had already discovered the is-
sue of institutions as one of the key questions of his time. A look at Lincoln’s 
26 Cf. Joakim Garff, Sören Kierkegaard (München: dtv, 2005), 563.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 566.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 564.
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writing shows that questions about the future of faltering institutions have 
not only surfaced during the recent digital transformation, but have been 
a continuing thread in modern discourse for centuries. Lincoln’s entire en-
gagement in public life was shaped by it significantly. In his Lyceum Address, 
delivered in 1838, the 28-year old Lincoln points out the significance of ins-
titutions, especially during the conflict-ridden debates on slavery: “We find 
ourselves under the government of a system of political institutions, condu-
cing more essentially to the ends of civil and religious liberty, than any of 
which the history of former times tells us.”31 
U.S. citizens, Lincoln says, are “legal inheritors of these fundamental bles-
sings.” For Lincoln, the issue of institutions, is also a matter of intergeneratio-
nal cooperation in projects that no single individual can achieve in the course 
of one lifetime: “We toiled not in the acquirement or establishment of them 
— they are a legacy bequeathed us, by a once hardy, brave, and patriotic, but 
now lamented and departed race of ancestors.” Lincoln asks his compatriots 
to transmit this “political edifice of liberty and equal rights” in a state “un-
profaned by the foot of an invader; … undecayed by the lapse of time and 
untorn by usurpation, to the latest generation that fate shall permit the world 
to know.” This, Lincoln proclaims, stands as a “task of gratitude to our fathers, 
justice to ourselves, duty to posterity, and love for our species in general, all 
imperatively require us faithfully to perform.”32 
Nearly two centuries after the transformative debates on slavery in Ame-
rica, democratic institutions today are undergoing significant changes once 
again. These changes include both the populist challenge to the establish-
ments of representative democracies and the digital transformation of the 
public sphere. What are the conditions for the possibility of public institu-
tions? Have they changed, and if so: how? What might be the future of public 
institutions? These are the questions that this study is designed to address.
31 Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the Young 
Men‘s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, delivered January 27, 1838, accessed February 3, 
2017, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln1/1:130?rgn=div1;view=fulltext;q1=Ly-
ceum. 
 Print version: Abraham Lincoln, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln Vol. I, edited by Roy 
P. Basler, Marion Dolores Pratt and Lloyd A. Dunlap (New Brunswick:Rutgers University 
Press, 1953), 108.
32 Ibid.
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D. What I Can Develop Here 
__________
It is not possible to develop a comprehensive ethics of institutions in a mas-
ter’s thesis. Such a project requires massive efforts to ground and stabilize 
the general argument if it does not want to deteriorate into whiny nostalgia. 
It is also not possible to develop a comprehensive analysis of the normative 
foundations built into many of our popular technologies, or provide a com-
prehensive media ethics to guide the use thereof. I will limit myself to a clari-
fication of how institutions have been thought of, and how they might adapt 
to their transformed environments — with specific regard to the ongoing 
transformation of the public sphere. In order to get at the heart of this trans-
formation I will spend significant time on the analysis of the most prevalent 
ethical pathologies of the digital technology in use in liberal democracies.
The goal of this study is to provide an overview of general concepts of and 
current challenges to public institutions created or enforced by the transfor-
mation of the public sphere through digital technology, and to demonstrate 
persuasively that this new “structural transformation of the public sphere”33 
has significant implications for Public Theology, political philosophy and so-
cial theory in the conception of the public sphere and public institutions. In a 
spirit of “impossible necessity,”34 I will, therefore, survey existing definitions 
of institutions and develop my own (II), before sketching out challenges for 
institutions in terms of three main trends: network architectures, persona-
lized individuality, and automated workflows (III). I will then examine the 
definitions and transformations of the public sphere (IV), and reflect on in-
tercontextuality as a criterium for publicity (V). I will then discuss why theo-
logy should engage the issue and how Public Theology is equipped for these 
challenges (VI). And finally, I will explore how we might refine and reboot 
our institutions in the midst of this (VII).
33 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). Originally published as 
Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie 
der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Neuwied: Luchterhand-Verlag, 1962).
34  Cf. Thomas Schlegel, Theologie als unmögliche Notwendigkeit: Der Theologiebegriff Karl 
Barths in seiner Genese (1914-1932) (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2007).
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II. Definitions
28
A. How Institutions Constitute Social Reality 
_________
Dave Elder-Vass observes that all sociology is based on the idea that “there 
are social factors that influence our behavior.”35 As an example he cites Karl 
Marx: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, 
on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”36 As 
another example, Elder-Vass quotes Emile Durkheim, who argued that “the 
individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely col-
lective reality.”37 What this collective reality looks like exactly, remains cont-
entious: “there is widespread disagreement about what social structure really 
is and how it could affect us.”38 
One of the philosophers who have given their views of what actually cons-
titutes social structure is John Searle. In his nineties classic The Construction 
of Social Reality he draws on speech act theory to develop “a general theory 
of the ontology of social facts and social institutions” in order to properly 
analyze the “constitutive rules of human institutions”.39 Searle distinguishes 
between brute physical facts and social facts, most of which he considers ins-
titutional facts. To clarify his distinction he gives a practical example: Sitting 
in a café, he orders a beer. The waiter brings it, Searle drinks it, puts money 
on the table and leaves. What seems like a simple, everyday transaction is 
actually rich with the “metaphysical burden of social reality“.40 This burden 
requires philosophy, not science, he thinks, for there is “no physical-chemical 
description” that adequately defines the words “restaurant”, “waiter”, “money” 
or even “chair” or “table”, despite the fact that all of these words describe 
“physical phenomena”. Hence, it is philosophy that can adequately analyze 
the “huge, invisible ontology” at play in the restaurant.41
35 Dave Elder-Vass, The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency 
(Cambridge: Univ. Press, 2010), 1.
36 As cited by: ibid.
37 As cited in: ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: The Penguin Press, 1995), xi.
40 Ibid., 1.
41 Ibid., 3.
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The ontology goes as follows: The waiter never owned the beer he brought 
to the table. Employed by the restaurant, the waiter’s task is simply to bring 
the beer to the table. The restaurant itself is owned by a person or a group 
cooperating to run an organization that is housed in a few rooms and pro-
vides food and beverages in exchange for monetary compensation. To guide 
choices, the restaurant provides a list of the available food and beverages. 
And even if the customer never sees the menu he or she is required to pay 
the price listed there. The restaurant owner has obtained a license from the 
local community organized through government and is thereby “subject to a 
thousand rules and regulations I know nothing about.”42 The list could go on 
and on. 
Searle suggests that even though the description of this invisible ontology 
is intended to be as neutral as possible, every rich description of it “automati-
cally introduces normative criteria of assessment.”43 We perceive a difference 
between a competent or incompetent waiter, an honest or dishonest partner, 
a rude or polite host, tasty or flat beer, elegant or ugly restaurants, and so on. 
The perception is immediately loaded with assessment criteria that go far 
beyond the strictly neutral reconstruction science attempts to provide. From 
this simple scene already we can make out ethics, critique and judgment as 
part of every-day life in the objective social reality, be the observed moment 
ever so trivial. The consequence is enormous: a purely mathematical descrip-
tion of a process like the one in the restaurant will always fail to describe the 
rich ontology of the complex overall process, the environment and setting, 
and even the specific transaction itself.
42 Ibid., 4.
43 Ibid.
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B. How Institutions Have Been Described 
_________
Seumas Miller points out that the term “social institution” is “somewhat un-
clear both in ordinary language and in the philosophical literature.” Cont-
emporary sociology, Miller argues, is “somewhat more consistent in its use 
of the term.” In his view, the typical use of the word “institution” in socio-
logy is to describe “complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as 
governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business 
corporations, and legal systems.”44 As an example for this observation he cites 
Jonathan Turner’s definition: “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values 
lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable 
patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in produ-
cing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining 
viable societal structures within a given environment.”45 Miller also cites the 
summary by Anthony Giddens: “Institutions by definition are the more en-
during features of social life.”46 
In his article for Religion Past and Present, Wilhelm Berger acknowledges 
institutions as both “a central concept of sociology” and of “a philosophy that 
seeks to investigate its own institutional conditions.” However, the concept, in 
Berger’s view, “defies any precise definition: it can refer to social circumstan-
ces that manifest themselves in such differing forms as family or bureaucracy 
or in such divergent phenomena as hospitality and slavery.” Because of the 
ambiguity, Berger prefers to use the concept of institution as “a designati-
on for central social-scientific issues, namely: social stability, communicative 
and social commitment, authority and legitimacy.”47 It will become apparent 
in this thesis that Berger’s definition is still far too broad to adequately grasp 
44 Seumas Miller, „Social Institutions,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, February 8, 2011, accessed December 17 2016, https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/social-institutions/.
45 Jonathan Turner, The Institutional Order (New York: Longman, 1997), 6.
46 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
47 Günter Kehrer, Wilhelm Berger, Peter Heintel and Eilert Herms, “Institution,” Religion Past 
and Present, 4th edition, accessed December 17, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-
5888_rpp_COM_10462.
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many of the contemporary challenges facing the institutional structure of 
liberal democracies. The key trends identified in this study — network ar-
chitectures, individualized personality, automated workflows — are insuffi-
ciently described as more or less stability, higher or lower commitment, lots 
and little authority. But since these trends do have implications for all of the 
above, Berger’s “institutions” can serve as parameters to help identify the 
consequences of the trends, even though my use of the term “institution” 
differs significantly from Berger’s.
Before providing the definition of institution used in this study, I will ex-
amine the background and history of “institution” and related words. Whi-
le the survey below might appear eclectic and lengthy, it is albeit necessary 
because it provides material for the theoretical chapters of this inquiry. In her 
entry in the Encyclopædia Britannica, Sharon Gilad limits her definition to 
the political function of institutions and defines them as a “a set of formal ru-
les (including constitutions), informal norms, or shared understandings that 
constrain and prescribe political actors’ interactions with one another.” Ins-
titutions, she writes, have always been a major subject in the social sciences: 
“Beginning in the 1980s, their importance was reinforced with the emergen-
ce of the methodological approach known as new institutionalism … inclu-
ding rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, normative 
institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism.”48 The renewed interest in 
institutions in the 1980s, and the relative lack of it up until then, is illustrated 
by the fact that the 1962 edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, published 
decades before the resurgence, has a gap between the entries on “instinct” 
and “instrument” — the concept of institution appeared unworthy of its own 
entry at the time of publication.49 The phenomenon is not limited to English 
publications. The 1877 edition of Grimm’s Deutsches Wörterbuch also omits 
the word “institution.”50 While it does appear in earlier juridical and theo-
logical encyclopedias, the word had not yet reached the popular audience it 
enjoys today.
48 Sharon Gilad, “institution,” Encyclopædia Britannica, December 28, 2015, accessed 
December 17, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/institution.
49 Cf. William Benton, ed., Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. 12 (Chicago, London, Toronto: 
Encyclopædia Britannica Ltd, 1962), 436.
50 Cf. Moriz Heyne, ed., Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, vol. 
4/2 (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1877), 2146.
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One of the early 20th century encyclopedias that do, however, mention the 
concept and treat it at length is the 1908 edition of Meyers Großes Konversa-
tions-Lexikon. It provides an entry on “institutions” and discusses multiple 
concepts surrounding it. The institor is described as the executive employed 
by the owner of a business. The word later also described one who has recei-
ved authority to act on behalf of the owner.51 This Latin word already had 
the connotation of delegated authority and the task of coordination. Similar-
ly, the verb institute is described as “to arrange, inform, instruct.” The same 
entry mentions the noun institution as “arrangement, particularly pertaining 
to the state.”52 The noun institute is defined as “arrangement” or “establish-
ment” - Einrichtung or Anstalt - and is introduced as “a word that receives the 
widest application in modern life” and is used “in the life of business, science 
and pedagogy” in particular.53 The term institution itself is introduced as a 
popular concept for legal systems in the era of classical Roman jurisprudence. 
The entry describes institutions as instructions or teachings in Roman law, 
and briefly sketches how Justinian’s institutions of law were the standard text 
for medieval legal exegesis.54 
The 1970 edition of the Brockhaus encyclopedia situates the didactical me-
aning of the concept in the word institute which is defined primarily as a 
“locus of teaching and/or research.”55 The word institutions is now under-
stood as “general arrangements present in all societies and parts of society 
such as social relations, layers, reign, but also ways of thinking, languages, 
commandments and prohibitions.”56 Institutions are present where “complex 
behavior between humans is meant to be ordered, regulated, and brought 
into a durable form.” Amongst their most important characteristics are, the-
51 “Institor,” Meyers Großes Konversationslexikon, vol. 9, 6th edition (Leipzig, Wien: Biblio-
graphisches Institut, 1908), 874.
52 “instituieren,” ibid., 874. The original: “Institution, Einrichtung, besonders staatliche”.
53 “Institut,” ibid., 874. The original: “ein Wort, das im modernen Leben die weiteste Anwen-
dung findet. Man spricht besonders von Instituten im gewerblichen, wissenschaftlichen 
und pädagogischen Leben.”
54 “Institutionen,” ibid., 875.
55  “Institut,” Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, vol. 9, 17th edition (Wiesbaden: F.A. Brockhaus, 
1970), 153.
56 “Institutionen,” ibid., 156. The original German: “allgemeine, in allen Gesellschaften und 
Gesellschaftsbereichen anzutreffende Einrichtungen wie soziale Beziehungen, Schich-
tung, Herrschaft, aber auch Denkweisen, Sprachen, Gebote und Verbote.”
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refore, “relative temporal consistency that follows a specific structure, and has 
a cultural pattern guiding the collaboration of its parts, as well as normative 
guidelines designed to guide human action.”57 
The 1977 edition of the Duden dictionary follows the same pattern. The 
term institute refers to specific didactical establishments in the sciences, and 
the term institution describes a “locus which grew from within a specific field 
for this field, is responsible for this field, has decisive weight as an arrange-
ment in society, state or church, and serves the well-being or benefit of the 
individual or the general public.”58 The rise of the paradigm of new institutio-
nalism in the 1980s explains why the 1987 edition of the Evangelisches Staats-
lexikon has one of the most extensive entries on the term institution. There, 
Wolfgang Lipp summarizes the discussion from the sixties into the eighties, 
and thereby illustrates the growing importance of the concept “institution” in 
all branches of social theory. He opens his article with a sweeping statement: 
“When one searches for what holds man and society, action and culture to-
gether, one finds institutions.” Institutions, Lipp states, are “one of the most 
important, if not the central object of sociological research.” In Lipp’s view, 
institutions describe the condition for the possibility of social being and serve 
as nodes for all social life. Institutions, for Lipp, determine “how society exists 
as a whole, how it takes shape, and how it unfolds.”59 
The 2009 edition of the Collins Cobuild dictionary uses examples: “An insti-
tution is a large important organization such as a university, church, or bank.” 
It can also be “a building where certain people are looked after, for example 
people who are mentally ill or children who have no parents.” The third use 
of the word describes “a custom or system that is considered an important or 
57 Ibid.
58 “Institution,” Duden, vol. 3 (Mannheim, Wien, Zürich: Dudenverlag 1977), 1348. The 
original German: “aus einem bestimmten Bereich erwachsene, für einen Bereich geschaf-
fene, für ihn zuständige Stelle, die als gesellschaftliche, staatliche, kirchliche Einrichtung 
Geltung besitzt, maßgebend ist, dem Wohl od. Nutzen des einzelnen od. der Allgemein-
heit dient”.
59 “Institution,” Evangelisches Staatslexikon, vol. I, 3rd edition (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 
1987), 1343. The original German: ”Wenn man danach fragt, was Mensch und Gesell-
schaft, Handeln und Kultur zusammenhält, stößt man auf Institutionen. Institutionen 
stellen einen vorrangigen, ja den zentralen Gegenstand soziologischer Forschung dar; sie 
umschreiben die Bedingungen, die soziales Dasein erst ermöglichen, sind die Knoten-
punkte, über die es läuft, und geben an, wie Gesellschaft insgesamt besteht, Gebildecha-
rakter erhält und sich entfaltet.”
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typical feature of a particular society or group, usually because it has existed 
for a long time.” The fourth use of the word describes a process: “The institu-
tion of a new system is the act of starting it or bringing it in.”60 
60 “Institution,” Collins Cobuild Advanced Dictionary (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 2009), 821.
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C. What I Mean When I Speak of Institutions 
_________
Now that we have examined a diverse set of definitions we can draw from this 
set in our theoretical analysis and the definition developed in this study. To 
prepare a meaningful analysis how institutions are challenged by the digital 
transformation, I will now clarify what I myself mean when I speak of an 
institution.
1. Interactive Dimension
With Dave Elder-Vass I want to argue that institutions are constituted th-
rough the “interactions between members of a specific type of social group” 
and can be described as “an emergent causal power of norm circles.”61 El-
der-Vass cites Geoffrey Hodgson’s definition of social structure as a similar 
approach: “Social structures are essentially groups of interacting social in-
dividuals, possibly including social positions, and with emergent properties 
resulting from this interaction.”62 This interactive dimension forms a key part 
of my own approach.
2. Regulative Dimension
With Eilert Herms I want to include the temporal dimension of and the 
need for expectability in institutions. Referencing Arnold Gehlen, he wri-
tes: “The concept of institutions … refers to the entirety of the permanent-
ly constituted and thus dependably regulated forms of (a) the interaction of 
personal systems with their social and natural environment, and (b) the the-
reby constituted social systems with their social and natural environments.”63 
Unfortunately, the English translation of Herms’ article in Religion Past and 
Present cannot not do justice to the German original in Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart. The German makes Herms’ reference to Gehlen more obvi-
ous: “Der … schließlich von Gehlen fundamentalanthropologisch gewendete 
Begriff der Institution … bez. alle auf Dauer gestellten, also zuverlässig gere-
61 Elder-Vass, The Causal Power of Social Structures, 115.
62 As cited by: ibid
63 Günter Kehrer, Wilhelm Berger, Peter Heintel and Eilert Herms, “Institution,” Religion Past 
and Present, 4th edition, accessed December 17, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-
5888_rpp_COM_10462.
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gelten Formen a) der Interaktion personaler Systeme.”64 The first major point 
Herms makes is similar to Elder-Vass in the sense that it emphasizes that 
institutions are constituted by the interactions of personal contexts. I draw 
from this in conceiving of publicity as intercontextuality. The second major 
point for Herms is that the institutional type of interaction displays a long-
term configuration (“auf Dauer gestellt”). The third major point is that this 
long-term configuration takes shape as dependable regulation. I make use of 
this by introducing concreteness and expectability into my definition of the 
specifically institutional type of coordination. 
3. Working Definition
When I speak of institutions I mean structural network architectures that 
expectably and concretely coordinate interactions of individual agents with a 
broad base of legitimacy. The concepts used in this definition call for some 
unpacking: Expectability implies the sustained existence and continuing gui-
dance of the institution beyond its founding impulse. Concreteness implies 
that I do not wish to analyze the underlying structures of our psyche that 
unconsciously coordinate our actions. I intend to speak about visible, consci-
ous forms of coordination. This also implies the use of specific designations 
and expressed structures within the institution. Interactiveness implies that I 
speak about a communicative enterprise that works to coordinate individual 
action towards a collective goal that would be impossible to achieve for the 
individual alone. Agency implies that institutions can be rejected and require 
consent through the will of those whose interactions are coordinated through 
the institution. And the legitimacy criterium distinguishes institutions from 
lower-threshold terms like organization or corporation.
64 Günter Kehrer, Wilhelm Berger, Peter Heintel and Eilert Herms, “Institution,” Religion 
in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 4th edition, accessed December 17, 2016, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_-COM_10462.
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D. What the Current Landscape Looks Like 
__________
Nicco Mele, tech entrepreneur and director of the Shorenstein Center on 
Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University, helped develop the 
digital infrastructure for Howard Dean’s presidential campaign. This infra-
structure later became a key component in electing Obama in 2008. In his 
book The End of Big Mele writes about Silicon Valley’s anti-institutional drive 
and how digital technologies undermine and erode our institutions. His in-
troduction sketches the current landscape:
“Look around you. Bloggers rather than established news outlets bre-
ak news. Upstart candidates topple establishment politicians. Civilian 
insurgencies organized on Facebook challenge conventional militaries. 
Engaged citizens pull off policy reforms independent of government bu-
reaucracies. Local musicians bypass record labels to become YouTube 
sensations. Twentysomething tech entrepreneurs working in their paja-
mas destabilize industry giants and become billionaires. Radical connec-
tivity — our breathtaking ability to send vast amounts of data instantly, 
constantly, and globally — has all but transformed politics, business, 
and culture, bringing about the upheaval of traditional, ‘big’ institutions 
and the empowerment of upstarts and renegades … The End of Big is at 
hand.”65 
Motivated by the idea of liberal tolerance, we seem to expect that the in-
stitutionson which the political model of liberal democracy rests — think 
Böckenförde-Diktum here66 — can or should be able to take all kinds of hits, 
and some might even consider them dispensable. This diagnosis is backed up 
with empirical data. The studies presented in the introduction to this study 
show a significant loss of trust in all sorts of institutions on both sides of the 
Northern Atlantic region. Public discourse in the United States makes the 
distrust in public institutions evident, but even the European context, which 
65 Nicco Mele, The End of Big. How the Internet Makes David the New Goliath (New York: St. 
Martin‘s Press, 2013), 1f.
66 The Böckenförde-Diktum is summarized best in his own words: “Der freiheitliche, sä-
kularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann.” Cf. 
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisati-
on,” in Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit, ed. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1976), 42–64.
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might be considered less prone to anti-institutionalism, is showing clear signs 
of it. A few brief figures sufficiently illustrate the trends for Germany: While 
56 percent of the overall population still lean towards trusting the national 
parliament, only 39 percent trust “European institutions.” Two thirds of the 
polled population lean towards distrusting the media, and only 29 percent 
still trust political parties.67
The “Generation What?” study conducted by the Sinus Institute shows 
that the vast majority of German citizens between the age of 18 and 34 is 
highly critical of most public institutions. 83 percent do not trust religious 
institutions and 71 percent do not trust political institutions. Interestingly, 
the majority of polled youth, is not afraid of immigration or open borders, 
but rather is afraid of nationalism and considers immigration enriching. This 
data indicates a significant generational gap: While the older generation does 
not trust institutions anymore, because they have become “weaker” in the 
wake of cultural pluralization, the younger generation is frustrated with the 
conservative drive towards homogenization, re-nationalization and forceful 
security. This generational split is illustrated by the voter shares in the 2016 
election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, resul-
ting in the country’s leaving of the European Union. Both elections show a 
generational split with the younger vote tending against Donald Trump and 
Brexit, and the older vote tending towards both.68 
We see a generational paradox: While parts of the older generations are 
expressing their frustration with the dissolution of institutional power, large 
parts of the younger generations are frustrated with the older generations’ 
desire to reclaim the old power model of institutional force, most vividly ex-
pressed in Donald Trump’s campaign to rebuild a form of national power 
that had lost significant ground in preceding decades. It is also worth noting 
that none of the final contenders Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders and Hillary 
Clinton was born after 1947, and all were already grandparents when they 
ran. The only viable young candidate was 44-year old Marco Rubio, running 
67 “Solidarität in Europa,” Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Evangelische Kirche in 
Deutschland, November 7, 2016, accessed December 15, 2016, https://www.ekd.de/
download/solidaritaet_in_europa_si_studie_ekd_2016.pdf.
68 The surge in participation by younger voters in the UK elections in June 2017 further 
corroborates this diagnosis, as the conservative party lost parliamentary seats partly due 
to the Labour trend amongst youth.
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at roughly the same age as President John F. Kennedy. The older candidate 
Donald Trump, however, managed to con stantly reference Rubio’s age by 
publicly establishing the nickname “Little Marco.”
These markers give hints in the attempt to understand the anti-institutional 
sentiment of younger generations which, according to the mentioned polls 
and electoral data, differ significantly from their grandparents’ generation in 
hopes and fears. A working conclusion might be that younger generations 
currently do not feel represented well by the institutions of public life. Their 
disengagement then does not mean a fundamental disregard for institutions 
as such, but for the personnel exerting power in existing institutions. This 
disregard for the publicly visible personnel seems to translate into an expres-
sed willingness to challenge the institutions themselves: 40 percent of the pol-
led youth in the “Generation What?” study say they would even participate 
in an attempt to overthrow those in power.69 While it is highly questionable 
that these 40 percent would actually follow through on the statement, it is a 
strong statement nonetheless: “This result indicates a massive loss of trust in 
the established forces and structures.”70 It is therefore safe to conclude that 
institutions are under attack from all political sides and age groups with dif-
fering and at times even contrary motives.
Considering the basic “freedom-ensuring institutions”71 dispensable 
amounts to “kicking away the ladder”72 that enabled the rough, but success-
ful venture towards political peace, societal stability, public discourse, and 
rule of law. This thesis serves to defend the case that we must protect the 
institutional nature of our societies, in order to maintain peace, freedom and 
prosperity which, so often, we take for granted. It does so by drawing from 
69 With this in mind, it makes sense that Bernie Sanders with his call to “political revolution” 
was the most successful final contender in activating young parts of the electorate for his 
campaign.
70 “Generation What? 2016: Abschlussbericht Deutschland,” Sinus-Institut, November 11, 
2016, accessed December 15, 2016, http://www.br.de/presse/inhalt/pressedossiers/gene-
ration-what/generation-whatendergebnisse-102.html. The original: “massiven Vertrau-
ensverlust in die etablierten Kräfte und Strukturen.”
71 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 11. The German term is “freiheitsverbürgende In-
stitutionen”. He also uses it in later work: Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit: Grundriß 
einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013).
72 Cf. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspec-
tive (London, New York: Anthem Press, 2003).
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both German and American sources, since the political cultures are similar 
and connected enough to group some of the basic trends identified by the 
Freedom House report cited earlier.
The heuristic diagnosis I examine below is drawn from Mele’s End of Big in 
which he soberly states: “Our old institutions … simply aren’t up to the task; 
they’re not designed for the networked world.”73 For Mele, this is a worrying 
realization, especially as it applies to the state: “Our institutions of govern-
ment are based on the consent of the governed. If people lose faith in gover-
nment while relying on emerging technology to provide some alternatives, 
our existing government will lose its legitimacy.”74 The ultimate danger, in his 
view, is brutal,  but familiar: the looming threat of civil war. Mele’s goal, the-
refore, is to “reimagine our big institutions so that they actually work again”.75 
Many consciously institutional philosophies are linked to the idea that our 
institutions are always to be renewed. Innovation is considered necessary to 
keep the institution relevant and alive. We could call this a reformist stance. 
We find the reformist stance not just in the Reformation theology of the six-
teenth century, but also in contemporary trends like Civic Tech — the appro-
ach of using digital technology to make public institutions more effective 
and user-centric. The transformations introduced by the U.S. Digital Service 
and the government agency 18f in the United States, the Government Digital 
Service in the United Kingdom, and similar teams in Singapore and other 
countries are the institutional outgrowths of this movement in the executive 
branch of government. Many of the projects conducted by these digital units 
are met with enthusiasm, since they provide hope for renewed legitimacy 
amongst those who believe in helpful coordination of collective action th-
rough institutional arrangements of government.
There are good reasons for both caring about institutions and greeting Ci-
vic Tech with hope. In order for institutions to keep or regain legitimacy in 
societies used to efficient digital service delivery, they need the skill of digital 
engineers who can make the use of public services more accessible, user-cen-
tric, inclusive, transparent and reliable. And this is relevant to far more than 
just the Western world. Institutions are at the core of all large-scale develop-
73 Mele, The End of Big, 120.
74 Ibid., 130.
75 Ibid., 133.
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ment projects — whether in developing, developed, or post-industrial service 
economies. This case is made by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in 
their 2012 study Why Nations Fail, in which they use an example from Korea: 
“The economic disaster of North Korea, which led to the starvation of mil-
lions, when placed against the South Korean economic success, is striking: 
neither culture nor geography nor ignorance can explain the divergent paths 
of North and South Korea.” Hence: “We have to look at institutions for an 
answer.” They conclude: “Countries differ in their economic success because 
of their different institutions, the rules influencing how the economy works, 
and the incentives that motive people.”76 The key criterium Acemoglu and 
Robinson identify for these institutions in the book is inclusivity.
76 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prospe-
rity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 73.
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III. Challenges
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A. Trend #1: Network Architecture 
_________
Whoever spends time in the tech world, and especially the start-up version 
of it, will come across a number of buzzwords mandatory for everyone who 
wants to passively participate in the field or actively contribute on its fron-
tiers.77 Conversations include concepts like “best practices,” “permissionless 
innovation,” “neuronal networks,” “agile development,” “user centricity,” “dis-
tributed computing,” “innovating from the edges,” and many more. Since the-
se conversations gained traction and popular appeal in the tech sector one 
might be seduced into thinking that their significance is limited to precisely 
that sector. This, I argue, would be a grave mistake since the concepts speak 
to much larger conversations about how we choose to coordinate our actions, 
and even what it means to be human.
The conversation on what it means to be human and how we choose to 
coordinate our actions is only slowly emerging in the industry of digital tech-
nology. It has gained traction since the debate around the role of digital tools 
and platforms in the U.S. presidential election in 2016, and finds expression 
in a public conversation that technologist, developer and industry blogger 
Anil Dash had with journalist Krista Tippett after the election. Tippett calls 
Dash “an early, vocal activist for moral imagination in the digital sphere” re-
flecting “arguably the most powerful industry in human history.” Dash pro-
vides perspective on the incremental, but transformative changes facilitated 
through the novel interplay of humans and machines: “We’re still sounding 
our way through this incorporation of technology.” Dash calls on the tech in-
dustry to drop the myth of neutrality in the development of digital tools and 
platforms, and encourages the industry to embrace their role as moral agents 
77 Cf. Shem Magnezi, “Fuck You Startup World,” Medium, October 11, 2016, accessed Oc-
tober 17, 2016, https://medium.com/@shemag8/fuck-you-startup-world-ab6cc72fad0e#.
t3sbgd574.
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and participants in the wider society: “We fancy ourselves outlaws while we 
shape laws, and consider ourselves disruptive without sufficient considerati-
on for the people and institutions we disrupt.”78 
Dash gives an example from his own developer experience for how choices 
about the design of digital products are of moral significance. When develo-
ping early versions of blogging and social media tools, Dash and his team re-
alized that the size of the input box in the user interface actually significantly 
impacts the length of the blog posts users created. If the box was bigger, the 
texts were longer. If the box was smaller, the texts were shorter. Dash came 
to realize in practice backed up with hard user data, that the decisions made 
about the design of the platform had significant impact on how the tools were 
used by writers to share their craft. As part of this wider moral reckoning 
in the tech industry, Dash points towards the need for professional societies 
for the tech sector, holding the practicing developers to a societal standard 
like in medicine and law. He also proposes the incorporation of ethics cur-
riculums into computer science programs at all universities. And as part of 
the realization of responsibility and the rejection of a cult of neutrality, Dash 
encourages a conversation on the history of the discipline and its practice. He 
criticizes that computer science in particular is “radically anti-historical” and 
follows the idea that “there is nothing before now.”79 
As a result of this anti-historical sentiment, the historical dependency on 
other disciplines is out of the focus of the computer science discipline. So 
today computing and theology are evidently not seen as natural partners. But 
this was not always the case. The historical perspective shows that the oppo-
site is true: Without theology there would, in fact, be no computing — or at 
least not information technology in the way we know it. It was the German 
theologian and philosopher Gottfried Leibniz who laid the foundations for 
modern computing by distinguishing between God and Not-God. Without 
God, he thought, there would be no thing. Hence: God was 1 and Nothing 
was 0. Convinced that true cognition is based on calculation, or in today’s 
language: is computational, he developed his “dual system” as a language 
more stable and functional than natural speech. Leibniz also realized that we 
78 Anil Dash, “Tech’s Moral Reckoning,” On Being with Krista Tippett, January 12, 2017, 
accessed July 16, 2017, https://www.onbeing.org/programs/anil-dash-techs-moral-recko-
ning/.
79 Cf. ibid.
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can assign a characteristic number to every thing in the world. He himself 
interpreted it as God’s way of pointing towards a much deeper mystery of 
which arithmetics was but a mere shadow. Assigning numbers to things in 
order to coordinate action has become an everyday principle for all of us to-
day. No Amazon, no Google, no bureaucracy, no car tag would exist without 
the fundamental principle of assigning characteristic numbers to things.
The Leibniz anecdotes show that, consciously or unconsciously, our theo-
logical and philosophical concepts have had and continue to have a decisive 
impact on how all other thought unfolds. This is rather obvious in the field of 
institutions. The discussions on computational networks in digital technolo-
gy, for instance, closely resemble the conversations on institutional arrange-
ments in political philosophy. That is why I will briefly examine the concept 
of “network architecture” to give language to significant changes in our lived 
philosophy of institutions. I will use the concept of “network architecture” 
as starting point and hermeneutical lens for some of the other concepts sur-
rounding it.
Network architecture, as it is commonly understood, means the structural 
design of a communication network. This is what you will find on Wikipedia: 
Network architectures are the “framework for the … network’s physical com-
ponents and their functional organization and configuration, its operational 
principles and procedures as well as data formats used.” Network architecture 
can also mean a “broad plan that specifies everything necessary for two ap-
plication programs on different networks on an Internet to be able to work 
together effectively.”80 These criteria apply not only to the mapping of data 
packages in servers and cables, but to all communication networks and social 
life amongst human beings.
The concept of network architecture used in IT provides a sensibility for 
how thoroughly “networkized” our concept of coordinated action has be-
come. Western liberal democracies rarely still ground their institutions in 
metaphysical spirit like Hegel, or in supernatural charisma like many Protes-
tant churches have in the past and still do today, including (Neo-)Pentecostal, 
Charismatic and Prosperity Gospel, as well as many evangelical churches all 
around the globe. They also rarely ground their institutions in an abstract 
80 “Network architecture,” Wikipedia, accessed October 17, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Network_architecture.
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argument from authoritative succession like the Catholic Church still does 
today. Why? Because through a complex historical convergence of medie-
val mysticism, pietistic moralism, rationalist logics, market economics, bu-
reaucratic proceduralism, and political contract theory, liberal democracies 
arrived at a conception of institutions as structural network architectures that 
expectably and concretely coordinate interactions of individual agents with a 
broad base of legitimacy.
What I call the networkization of institutions can be illustrated with the of 
rise social media, the most illuminating example for “networkization.” They 
mark the convergence of the network trend discussed above with the trend 
towards personalized individuality discussed below. Bharat Anand calls this 
the “democratization of media.”81 The numbers he provides to illustrate the 
diversification of distribution channels are staggering: About 300,000 books 
are published by traditional publishing companies in the United States each 
year, while just under three million are brought to the market by “nontraditi-
onal ones.” What was a collection of “barely a dozen” television networks just 
forty years ago, is now an array of 900 channels. Almost one million musici-
ans publish a song and about 90 million websites are built each year.82 
The rise of decentralized digital distribution networks in the form of so-
cial networks means that virtually “everyone is a media company today.”83 
The sheer “proliferation of alternatives and product clutter”84 through digi-
tal content on social networks is impressive: “Nearly 72 hours of video are 
uploaded to YouTube, 3 million pieces of content shared by Facebook users, 
and 230,000 new photos posted on Instagram — every minute.” What Anand 
considers “perhaps the most sobering statistic: five exabytes (or 1 billion bil-
lion bytes) of content were created between the birth of the world and 2003. 
In 2013, five exabytes of content were created every day.”85 
81 Anand, The Content Trap, xxiii.
82 Ibid., xxiv.
83 Ibid., xi.
84 Ibid., xxiii.
85 Ibid., xxiv.
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This jungle of content shows the extent of self-expression possible through 
decentralized networks. But it also creates two problems for publishers: “the 
problem of getting noticed” and “the problem of getting paid.”86 To face 
this, traditional news media has resorted to ever more catchy headlines and 
click-baiting through teaser text that plays into the prejudice of the user in 
order to bait him or her into clicking and consuming the content posted on 
the linked website, thus helping the publisher sustain its operation through 
advertising revenue. While some lament the lack of sustainable business mo-
dels for quality journalism online and in social networks particularly, others 
rejoice in the new opportunities created by the overall growth in traffic and 
media consumption online.
Personalized micro-targeting was invented and helped publishers reach 
their target audience in the content jungle of the world wide web. Facebook 
and other networks successfully monetized their companies by including ad 
services that allow for more effective ad spending towards the group that fits 
the purpose of the ad — using user data like age, gender, location, and other 
markers. Publishers tried to maintain connection to their target audience th-
rough this tool, and thereby had the traditional form of a somewhat generic, 
but limited public consuming the publishers content through certain televisi-
on programs or news platforms in mind. But soon the micro-targeting tools 
became less of a navigation tool navigating the content jungle through the 
creation of a limited public, and more of a division tool fracturing the former 
cohesion of the public and, in effect, segregating the universe of the web into 
a multiverse of the personalized experience of the individual consumer. The 
“problem of getting noticed” and “the problem of getting paid” had a sig-
nificant hand in destroying the generic public sphere of the modern world, 
ushering in the era of postmodern workflows in media production.
Concerning its effect on institutions, the overall trends are not only driven 
by the recent changes in the workflows of publishers or news producers. Cen-
turies of changing background practices had already slowly altered the way 
the official institutional practices are thought of. Hence, to understand our 
shift in institutional thinking, we cannot simply read and analyze a specific 
text on institutions from a given time period. To understand it we need to 
consider the slow, but vast impact of larger cultural processes that seep into 
86 Ibid.
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and change our conception of institutions without much conscious choice. 
One might turn to the analysis of philosophical paradigm shifts like the ones 
presented in the introduction. Or, like Ha-Joon Chang, one might analyze 
and compare practical transformations like the invention of the washing ma-
chine and compare it to the digital revolution today.87 One might examine 
the broader socio-economic trends like globalization and liberalization, or 
the significant cultural shifts like the cult of individual authenticity emerging 
from romanticism. One might also critically evaluate the po litical impact of 
the abuse of office, or various other forms of institutional violence and failu-
res, like the Watergate scandal, state-sanctioned segregation and apartheid, 
the history of slavery, colonialism, and genocide, or the most extreme cases 
like the Holocaust and the planetary scale of ecological destruction.
Illustrative of how many of these different approaches are fused in practi-
cal politics is the 2006 book Applebee’s America. Co-written by the political 
director of the Clinton White House Douglas Sosnik, advisor to Bush Jr. Mat-
thew Dowd and journalist Ron Fournier, the book sketches a path for leaders 
to connect with Americans in politics, business and religion. The authors 
identify gut values connections in the form of community and authenticity as 
the key to successful leadership. The desire for community and authenticity 
is traced to various failures of institutions in both the public and private sec-
tor: “From the Vietnam War, Watergate, Iran-contra, and President Clinton’s 
impeachment to runaway deficits, soaring health care costs, and Hurricane 
Katrina, voters have been fed a steady diet of corruption and incompetence 
in government. Business scandals at the turn of the millennium soured the 
public on corporate America. The unseemly excesses of TV evangelism, the 
Catholic Church’s sex abuse scandals, and wrongdoing at several charitable 
organizations challenged the public’s faith in private institutions.” The authors 
conclude with a simple deduction: “Americans don’t expect their leaders to 
be perfect, but they want them to be perfectly frank: to acknowledge their 
mistakes, promise to fix the problem, and then actually fix it.”88 
87 Chang warns against naively repeating commonplace ideas like the notion of the internet 
as the most significant technological change in history. He argues that the washing machi-
ne, in fact, changed life more significantly than the internet. Cf. Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things 
They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism (London: Penguin Books, 2011). 31–40.
88 Douglas B. Sosnik, Matthew J. Dowd, Ron Fournier, Applebee’s America: How Success-
ful Political, Business, and Religious Leaders Connect with the New American Community 
(New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), 15.
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This conclusion was drawn by political strategists in 2006, before Twitter 
was launched, Facebook’s newsfeed published, Instagram was started and 
Snapchat existed. The dark side of algorithmic personalization and disse-
mination of disinformation had not yet come to the surface. The strategists, 
therefore, have a fairly positive assessment of connectivity, stating that Ame-
ricans “are better educated and better informed than in the past, which helps 
them spot a phony.”89 Since 2006, the radicalization of connectivity and the 
digital revolution have radically altered the structure and texture of the public 
sphere. The 2007 launch of the first generation iPhone introduced a new mo-
bile touchpad that was more than a phone: it was a pocket computer capable 
of tasks only achievable with room-filling machines just a few decades earlier. 
It made the flow of breaking news constant, it made the attention for events 
immediate, and made communication instant and serves as a daily dose of 
endorphins through apps designed like slot machines.90 These technological 
changes significantly impacted the conditions for the possibility of responsi-
ve, yet stable public institutions.
Since a thorough analysis of the changing background practices that alter 
the official processes of institutions goes beyond what this study can achieve, 
and also faces severe methodological challenges, it must suffice to conclude: 
The technological transformations made possible a radical form of connec-
tivity that both empowers and renders vulnerable the individual subject and 
embeds it in large systems of connection. This changes the conditions for the 
possibility of public institutions in a way that can be characterized as “net-
workization.” This “networkization” of the practice, structures and legitimacy 
of institutions profoundly challenges the institutions conceived of and for-
merly sustained by philosophical metaphysics, revelation theology, and the 
argument from traditional authority.
89 Ibid.
90 Anderson Cooper, “What is ‘brain hacking’? Tech insiders on why you should care,” 
CBS 60 Minutes, April 9, 2017, accessed July 16, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
brain-hacking-tech-insiders-60-minutes/.
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B. Trend #2: Personalized Individuality 
_________
Most academics are familiar with lament about modernity in some form or 
another. We have read about the Nazi critique of modern art, or explored 
Martin Heidegger’s critique of the “rootless, technology-obsessed, confor-
mist society, out of touch with the fundamental rhythms of Being.”91 I do not 
wish to participate in Heidegger’s pessimism. In fact, I wish to oppose it dia-
metrically. At least part of his analysis, however, is arguably accurate. We are 
certainly obsessed with technology, we do certainly search for roots, and one 
might well argue that the desire for personalized individuality has become 
our new conformism.
Popular culture reflects the desire for personalized individuality in mani-
fold ways: through expressively non-conformist postmodernism, through 
rougharound-the-edges hipster culture, through digital self-branding and 
biographical self-management. A wonderful example for this is Susan Chrit-
ton’s popular book Personal Branding for Dummies, helping you to “distin-
guish yourself with an authentic personal brand”, to “build a strong online 
identity to showcase your brand” and to “evaluate and evolve your personal 
brand over time”.92 Beautiful, is it not?
We can also see the cult of personalized identity by analyzing the direction 
that social media technology is headed. The selfie application Snapchat is do-
minating tech media and has journalists producing headlines like The Social 
Media Messiah, Geek—God—Gary, and Gary Saw That It Was Good about an 
expert who pre dicted Snapchat’s rise a few years ago.93 Whereas most hum-
ans had never even seen a detailed mirror reflection of themselves up until a 
few centuries ago, our lives are now flooded with images of ourselves, and we 
reinforce this through technology every day.
91 David J. Rosner, “Anti-Modernism and Discourses of Melancholy,” E-rea 4:1 (2006), ac-
cessed October 17, 2016, http://erea.revues.org/596.
92 Susan Chritton, Personal Branding For Dummies (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2014).
93 Stefan Dörner, ed., “The Social Media Messiah,” t3n-Magazin, August 23, 2016, accessed 
October 17, 2016, http://t3n.de/magazin/t3n-nr-45-social-media-messias/.
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The personalized individuality trend is also visible in our general media 
consumption. Algorithms determine what we want to hear and produce a 
news feed to our liking. Google created a built-in fact check tool to combat 
its unintended consequences on their news site.94 Facebook has rolled out a 
similar feature. At the same time, buzzwords like “consumer centricity” and 
“user needs” are everywhere in the tech sector and create aggressive compe-
tition for the most customizable, personalized user experience on the web.
And the digital market is growing: Recent data from the Pew Research 
Center shows that “only two in ten U.S. adults often get news from print 
newspapers,” down from 27% in 2013. Broken by age, the data makes future 
developments looks even more drastic: “Only 5% of 18- to 29-year-olds often 
get news from a print newspaper”. Compared to print, nearly twice as many 
adults often get news online from websites, apps or social media.95 Studies in 
Germany show a similar trend towards online news consumption on mobile 
devices with social media as one of the important news sources, especially for 
younger users.96
The introduction of algorithms to personalize news feeds has turned social 
networks into feeds for our natural confirmation bias — with devastating 
effects for partisan debate and political culture. Media research has come to 
describe this as echo chambers, information cocoons or filter bubbles: “The 
wide availability of user-provided content in online social media facilitates 
the aggregation of people around common interests, worldviews, and nar-
ratives.” Social media has become a fruitful environment for “rapid dissemi-
nation of unsubstantiated rumors and conspiracy theories that often elicit 
94 Richard Gingras, “Labeling fact-check articles in Google News,” Google Blog, October 
13, 2016, accessed October 17, 2017, https://blog.google/topics/journalism-news/labe-
ling-fact-check-articles-google-news/.
95 “The Modern News Consumer,” Pew Research Center, July 7, 2016, accessed October 19, 
2016, http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/pathways-to-news/.
96 “ARD/ZDF-Onlinestudie 2016: 84 Prozent der Deutschen sind online – mobile Geräte 
sowie Audios und Videos mit steigender Nutzung,” ARD and ZDF, October 12, 2016, 
accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.ard-zdf-onlinestudie.de.
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rapid, large, but naive social responses.” Selective exposure to content drives 
“content diffusion” and generates “homogeneous clusters” that are appropri-
ately describes as “echo chambers.”97
The trend towards personalized individuality also pervades religion, as Ro-
bert Wuthnow has reconstructed in his paradigmatic 1998 study After Hea-
ven. He describes the rise of a “seeker spirituality” which inspires “individuals 
to go beyond established religious institutions”.98 To illustrate the anti-insti-
tutional effect of this trend, Wuthnow quotes Coleman McGregor: “I value 
the institution, but as my relationship with God has become more important 
subjectively and objectively, I’ve been drawn more into that and drawn less 
to the institution.”99
Anti-institutionalism does not mean that religion writ large is declining. 
Rather, as Friedrich-Wilhelm Graf has argued, we see more religious syn-
cretism.100 Leigh Eric Schmidt reminds us that this trend is not new. It has 
prominently influenced American religiosity since the nineteenth century.101 
One of the long-term impacts is described by Wuthnow as the rise of indi-
vidualist mysticism: “The supernatural remains a mysterious force, not so-
mething that is revealed in an authoritative text or institution.”102 Wuthnow 
cites the poet Wendell Berry to illustrate what he means. For Berry, institu-
97 Michela Del Vicario et al., “The spreading of misinformation online,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 113:3 (2016): 554–559, accessed October 19, 2016, http://
www.pnas.org/content/113/3/554.full.
98 Cf. Robert Wuthnow, After Heaven. Spirituality in America Since the 1950s (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1998). Citation taken from: “After Hea-
ven,” University of California Press, accessed October 17, 2016. http://www.ucpress.edu/
book.php?isbn=9780520222281.
99 Wuthnow, After Heaven, 182.
100 Outside of Central Europe religion is booming in many places. Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm 
Graf, Götter global: Wie die Welt zum Supermarkt der Religionen wird (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2014). See also: Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, Die Wiederkehr der Götter: Religion in der 
modernen Kultur (München: C.H. Beck, 2007).
101 Cf. Leigh Eric Schmidt, Restless Souls: The Making of American Spirituality (New York, 
NY: HarperCollins, 2005). In Europe, a more institutional version of this can be studied 
in German Romanticism, especially in Friedrich Schleiermacher. Some years later, Sören 
Kierkegaard attacks the Danish state church with an anti-institutional, individualistic re-
ligious philosophy that shares features with 19th century American discourse.
102 Wuthnow, After Heaven, 134.
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tional religion is nothing but a “hodgepodge of funds, properties, projects 
and offices, all urgently requiring economic support” which might, in fact, be 
“contrary to some of the principles of religion itself.”103
103  As cited in: Wuthnow, After Heaven, 182.
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C. Trend #3: Automated Workflows 
_________
The third challenge I want to bring into focus is the growing importance of 
automated workflows. Much of traditional human work has become that of 
automated machines like industrial robots. This does not only mean that 
many forms of traditional labour are obsolete, it also means that human 
hands in more contested fields of work have challenging new competitors: 
robots and computers. In many cases the computer can do the same job, 
but better: Amazon deploys robots to stock warehouses more efficiently.104 
Militaries develop drones to detect and detonate land mines more safely.105 
Pharmacy robots reduce errors in drug  preparation.106 Self-driving cars and 
trucks are in the final stage of development or already on the roads in the 
United States.107 Amazon is testing a cashier-less supermarket.108 And ATMs 
have long replaced bank tellers around the globe.
The effectiveness and perfection of robots in specialized deployment puts 
humanled bureaucracies and, therefore, many societal institutions in a tough 
spot. Many of the simpler processes in these institutions might well be hand-
led more efficiently, more promptly, and more transparently than human-run 
bureaucracies prone to subjectivity and human error. While bureaucracies 
are reluctant to automate many of their workflows, most, if not all repetitive 
tasks and workflows are being automated if the tasks put human workers at 
104  Kim Bhasin and Patrick Clark, “How Amazon Triggered a Robot Arms Race,” Bloom-
berg, June 29, 2016, accessed October 17, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar-
ticles/2016-06-29/how-amazon-triggered-a-robot-arms-race.
105  James Vincent, “This drone can detect and detonate land mines,” The Verge, July 19, 2016, 
accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.theverge.com/2016/7/19/12222104/landmine-de-
tecting-drone-mine-kafondrone.
106  “New UCSF Robotic Pharmacy Aims to Improve Patient Safety,” University of Califor-
nia San Francisco, March 7, 2011, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.ucsf.edu/
news/2011/03/9510/new-ucsf-roboticpharmacy-aims-improve-patient-safety.
107  Ryan Beene, “Automakers Want to Test More Self-Driving Cars on U.S. Roads,” Bloom-
berg Technology, June 14, 2017, accessed June 16, 2017, http://origin-www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-06-14/automakers-want-to-test-more-self-driving-cars-on-u-s-
roads.
108  Leena Rao, “Amazon Go Debuts as a New Grocery Store Without Checkout Lines,” Fortu-
ne, December 05, 2016, accessed June 16, 2017, http://fortune.com/2016/12/05/ama-
zon-go-store/.
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risk in some way. New advances in robotics and the consistent increase in 
computing capacity poses the question: Why not just automate everything 
where possible, whether it reduces risk or not? What if a robot is just far more 
effective and convenient than its human equivalent? Is the robot not useful to 
employ even in low-risk environments?
It is obvious that this new frontier of automation is challenging many of 
the workers within institutions. The key question for this study is whether it 
challenges not just a specific type of administrative employee in an institu-
tion, but the institution itself. In the case of journalism, the answer is yes: If 
algorithms can select the relevant news on their own (they clearly cannot - 
but we live as though they could),109 why would we still need a strong media 
institution like a newspaper with a broad base of legitimacy in the local or 
national community? If robots can now edit and even write articles all by 
themselves,110 why would we need the traditional media institution? Of cour-
se, if algorithms challenge traditional institutions organized around human 
judgment, the institutional nature of social reality does not disappear. The 
institutional investments simply change towards technology firms that wri-
te the algorithms challenging traditional institutions. Critical theorists have 
warned that this dynamic might usher in an even greater expansion of “digi-
109  This critique is voiced across the political spectrum of publishers. Robert Thomson, CEO 
of Fox News parent company News Corp. mounted heavy critique on Google, Amazon 
and Facebook at London Tech Week in June 2017: “Algorithmic alchemy is redefining 
our commercial and social experiences, turning base matter into noble metals. But like 
the alchemists of old, algorithms are also a charlatan’s charter, allowing claims of pure 
science when human intervention is clearly doctoring results to suit either commercial 
imperatives or political agendas. And there is the enduring contradiction between the 
claimed sophistication of, say, Google’s ability to target audiences and track tastes for 
advertisers, and its inability to identify the tasteless, the terroristic, the perverted and 
the pirated. As the over-alliterative title to this short address suggests, it is profit before 
provenance and probity. […] The distortions of distribution have contributed to polari-
zation.” Cf. Robert Thomson, “News Corp. CEO: The Almighty Algorithm - ‘fake news’ 
and other consequences of Google, Amazon and Facebook‘s relentless focus on quantity 
over quality,” Fox News, June 15, 2017, accessed June 16, 2017, http://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/2017/06/15/news-corp-ceo-almightyalgorithm-fake-news-and-other-conse-
quences-google-amazon-and-facebooks-relentless-focus-on-quantityover-quality.html.
110  Celeste LeCompte, “Automation in the Newsroom: How algorithms are helping repor-
ters expand coverage, engage audiences, and respond to breaking news,” Nieman Reports, 
September 1, 2015, accessed June 16, 2017, http://niemanreports.org/articles/automati-
on-in-the-newsroom/.
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tal feudalism” in which a few big online platforms provide space and oppor-
tunities for users and producers of all sorts, but also constrain and dominate 
the digital land owned by those few platforms.111
Whatever your ethical evaluation of this development, the struggle bet-
ween man and machine is in full force, and the struggle affects our institu-
tions, if only because it makes much of the human labor done in institutions 
look outdated, ineffective, slow and prone to error. 
1. Competition of Man and Machine
How did man and machine end up in this competition? One of the answers 
lies in how we have historically conceived the institutions through which we 
coordinate our actions. To understand the origins of the dilemma we have 
to go back to the seventeenth century and examine how the Enlightenment 
thinkers who developed the blueprints for many of the foundational institu-
tions of modern society thought about these institutions. They did so under 
a rationalist paradigm with the ideal of a well-functioning machine. It is, th-
erefore, no coincidence that computers are taking over our administrative 
systems or routinely make human administration skills look inferior. Rather, 
it is a strictly logical consequence of the founding DNA we gave to our insti-
tutional arrangements in the early modern era.
I will illustrate and ground this claim with the help of a milestone pub-
lication of Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a 
Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, first published in 1651.112 In the Le-
111  Sascha Meinrath, James Losey, Victor Pickard, Anthony DeRosa, Evgeny Morozov and 
Nicco Mele are some of the exponents of such a theory. Cf. Nicco Mele, The End of Big, 
119. See also Sascha D. Meinrath, James W. Losey, Victor W. Pickard, “Digital Feudalism: 
Enclosures and Erasures from Digital Rights Management to the Digital Divide,” Comm-
Law Conspectus 19:2 (2011), 423—479. http://scholarship.law.edu/commlaw/vol19/
iss2/6. For De Rosa’s contribution, see his blog post from early 2011: Anthony De Rosa, 
“The death of platforms,” January 17, 2011, accessed July 16, 2017, http://soupsoup.tum-
blr.com/post/2800255638/the-death-of-platforms. For Morozov’s contribution see Evge-
ny Morozov, “ Tech titans are busy privatising our data. When Facebook and Google fi-
nally destroy the competition, a new age of feudalism will arrive,” April 24, 2016, accessed 
July 16, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/ 24/the-new-feu-
dalism-silicon-valley-overlords-advertising-necessary-evil. Also see Morozov’s forthco-
ming book: Evgeny Morozov, Freedom as a Service: The New Digital Feudalism and the 
Future of the City (London: Macmillan Publishers, 2019).
112  All following citations are taken from the Cambridge edition: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1991).
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viathan, Hobbes develops his proposal for how the people should expectably 
and concretely coordinate their interactions with a broad base of legitimacy. He 
does so by explaining with which natural rights the individual is endowed, 
which of those an individual is most prone to protect, which of the rights the 
individual must hand to a higher power to secure all other individual rights, 
and how this higher authority should be generated through the covenant of 
the people. He calls this authority the Commonwealth of subjects and so-
vereign, run by a person or assembly endowed with sovereign powers by the 
subjects.
This marks a huge step from government instituted as a temporal sovereign 
by the ultimately sovereign ecclesial power towards the proceduralist argu-
ment of democratic contract theory made popular about a century and a half 
later. Hobbes himself, though, makes clear that he does not have a truly con-
tractual agreement with a sole base in free will in mind: “This is more than 
Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unitie [sic!] of them all, in one and the same 
Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as 
if every man should say to every man, I Authorize and give up my Right of Go-
verning my self, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that 
thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.”113 
Hobbes sees strong and stable government as the only path to lasting pe-
ace. The circumstances for him were quite different from a post-Holocaust 
awareness of the horrific violence which extended through all branches of the 
state apparatus during the Nazi regime. Hobbes’ view, in contrast, is defined 
by the experience of religious civil war and has high hopes for a strong sover-
eign state which, in his view, might actually have the strength to pacify the 
violent forces. The process of uniting “the Multitude … in one Person” Ho-
bbes calls “Common-Wealth, in latine Civitas. This is the Generation of that 
great Leviathan, or rather … of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the 
Immortal God, our peace and defence.”114 
The language used in this famous passage can be characterized as orga-
nic. He speaks of the Leviathan, the great sea monster in the Old Testament. 
Threatening as it might appear, it is a living organism. And since the condi-
tion for mortality is life, the description of the state as a “Mortal God” also 
113  Hobbes, Leviathan, 120.
114  Ibid.
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points towards a living organism. This organism, however, is given the ideal 
of the automated workflow, as he explains in the introduction. The art of sta-
te-making, as Hobbes conceives it, closely resembles the art of engineering: 
“For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some 
principal part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that 
move themselves less by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have artificiall 
life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; 
and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such 
as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall 
and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great 
Leviathan called a Common-Wealth, or State.”115 
These words show how much hope Hobbes laid into automation as a mode 
of praxis for society’s foundational institutions. The smoothly and harmoni-
ously running watch served as a metaphor for the Commonwealth as Hobbes 
imagined it, all nerves and joints working in sync, the limbs and heart joining 
into a wonderful symphony brought forth by the composer. The mechanisms 
of the watch gained prominence as a metaphor for both nature and the design 
of social systems through the popularization of deistic concepts. Deism po-
sits that God created the universe but does not interfere with its mechanics. 
Hence, there is no room for supernatural intervention, which distinguishes 
Deism-influenced social theories and natural sciences from their orthodox 
Christian equivalents. Ernst Troeltsch describes Deism as the attempt to find 
an “general, universally applicable truth standard, that is accessible to everyo-
ne and serves as a basis to which one can come back to from competing reli-
gions, from which one can evaluate the value and legitimacy of immediately 
revealed claims of revelation, and which is congruent with the metaphysical 
115  Ibid., 9. The application of mechanical language to political philosophy is not just appa-
rent in Thomas Hobbes’ writings, but also in the works of Adam Smith, and was heavily 
influenced by the success of Isaac Newton. Smith considers Newton’s findings “the grea-
test discovery that ever was made by man, the discovery of an immense chain of the most 
important and sublime truths, all closely connected together, by one capital fact, of the 
reality of which we have daily experience.” Newton’s system, Smith writes, “now prevails 
over all opposition, and has advanced to the acquisition of the most universal empire that 
was ever established in philosophy. His principles, it must be acknowledged, have a degree 
of firmness and solidity that we should in vain look for in any other system. The most 
sceptical [sic!] cannot avoid feeling this.” Cf. Adam Smith, Glasgow Edition of the Works 
and Correspondence of Adam Smith Vol. 3: Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. 
Wightman, J. C. Bryce, and I. S. Ross (Oxford: Univ. Press, 1980), 98.
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results of the new sciences.”116 Given his excruciating experience with vio-
lently competing religions during the religious civil war in England, Hobbes’ 
hopes for the deist metaphors become very plausible. 
Today, Hobbes’ imaginative metaphor has produced actual machines that 
compute faster and more reliably than humans in many of our everyday con-
texts. This is where much of the contemporary man vs. machine dilemma 
comes from. Just like the Leibniz example, our examination of the Leviathan 
shows that the machines in use today are derived from the very same ratio-
nalist logics that defined how we chose to expectably and concretely coordinate 
our interactions with a broad base of legitimacy through the nation state in the 
early modern era.
116  The German original: „allgemeine, überall gleiche, jedermann erkennbare religiöse Nor-
malwahrheit zu suchen, auf die man von den konkurrierenden einzelnen Religionen 
zurückgehen kann, von der aus Wert und Recht der unmittelbar sich gebenden Offen-
barungsansprüche sich prüfen läßt, und die mit den metaphysischen Ergebnissen der 
neuen Wissenschaften übereinstimmt.” Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, Der Deismus, in Gesammelte 
Schriften Vol. IV, by Ernst Troeltsch (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1925), 431.
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IV. Public Sphere
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A. How the Public Has Been Defined 
__________
One of the key arguments running through this thesis is that institutions 
need to learn how to adapt and regenerate in order to remain institutions 
under chang ing circumstances. For institutions with a broad reach and im-
pact beyond a specific interest group, these circumstances are shaped by the 
parameters of the public sphere they find themselves embedded in. So before 
I approach the specifics of how the public sphere has been changed through 
changes in media and communications, I will clarify what the concept of pu-
blic sphere — or Öffentlichkeit — actually entails. What is public is often intu-
itively obvious to the interested individual, yet when pressed to find a defini-
tive definition, one realizes the ephemeral nature of the term. Metaphorically 
speaking, when decisively grasped, the term tends to evaporate into thin air.
To provide insight into the broad and sometimes contradictory nature of 
common definitions, I will survey existing definitions given in German and 
English lexicons and encyclopedias, at times with specializations on matters 
of church or state, as well as in dictionaries meant for a general audience. 
While the selection will presumably appear eclectic, or even arbitrary, it is 
nonetheless necessary to provide a general landscape of existing definitions 
that we can return to in our discussion of the intercontextual understanding 
of the public, and in our analysis of the ethical pathologies introduced by the 
digital revolution.
Some encyclopedias define specific aspects of the public sphere, by explai-
ning public opinion, public law, or public service.117 Others provide extensive 
reflections on the public’s importance, but never actually define the word. 
In its article on Öffentlichkeit, the Evangelisches Lexikon für Theologie und 
Gemeinde states that Öffentlichkeit “belongs to the Being of the church. The 
gospel obliges the church to break out again and again of its role as a special 
societal group, and to seek out the public sphere with its message and its ser-
117  Cf. “Institution,” Evangelisches Staatslexikon, 2266ff.
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vice for the people.”118 Here we see how a dictionary geared towards practical 
use is less concerned with an abstract definition of the concept, but rather 
provides advice on how to act in the public as a context for action.
1. Dimension of Institutions
Other encyclopedias, like the twentieth century editions of Religion Past 
and Present avoid the concept altogether.119 This changes in the third edi-
tion, published in 2003. There, Rainer Preul writes: “No modern theory of 
society can manage without the multilayered concept” of the public sphere. 
Quoting Wolfgang Huber, Preul defines the public as “a sociological category 
that needs to be determined on the basis of institutional and interaction the-
ories”120 and concerns “that dimension of all social institutions and life pro-
cesses in which the joint interests and needs, rights and duties of a society’s 
members are addressed.”121 With Huber’s definition in mind, Preul considers 
the concept of the public “intimately linked to conceptions of the common 
good and to the concrete framework in organizations, administrative bodies, 
economic forces, cultural institutions, and religious communities.” Drawing 
from media studies and communication science, Preul remarks, that the pub-
lic’s “character is shaped above all by the nature of the media that are available 
to a society … and by the political circumstances that determine the condi-
tions and possibilities of access to information and participation in public 
communication processes.”122 
118  “Öffentlichkeit, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit,” Evangelisches Lexikon für Theologie und Gemeinde, 
vol. 3, ed. Helmut Burkhardt and Uwe Swarat (Wuppertal, Zürich: R. Brockhaus Verlag, 
1994), 1466.
119  Cf. Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 2nd edition, ed. Hermann Gunkel and 
Leopold Scharnack (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1930), 672. The same is true for the third 
edition: Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3rd edition, ed. Hans von Campen-
hausen, Erich Dinkler, Gerhard, Gloege and Knud E. Logstrup (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1960), 1613.
120 “Public,” Religion Past and Present, 4th edition, ed. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, 
Bernd Janowski, and Eberhard Jüngel (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2011), 532. Originally pu-
blished as: “Öffentlichkeit,” Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 4th edition, ed. 
Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski and Eberhard Jüngel (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 489ff.
121 Wolfgang Huber, Kirche und Öffentlichkeit (Stuttgart: Forschungen und Berichte der 
Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft 28, 1973), 45. Preul’s translation.
122  “Public,” Religion Past and Present, 533.
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While most German theological encyclopedias only pick up the topic af-
ter Wolfgang Huber’s Kirche und Öffentlichkeit in 1973, dictionaries aiming 
towards use beyond the Church had treated the topic long before that. The 
dictionary created by the Grimm brothers, published in 1889, already pro-
vides many of the core ideas used in contemporary definitions. The Grimm 
dictionary is also used by Huber in his own writing on the matter. Less focu-
sed on etymology, but with an even more extensive reflection on the meaning 
of Öffentlichkeit, the Meyers lexicon publishes its take on the term in 1908. 
It focuses on the rule of law, internal rules in the military and constitutional 
matters, and links the discourse on the public to the discourse on freedom 
when it states: “In the publicness of negotiations on important civil rights, 
modern constitutional life sees a meaningful guarantee of popular sovereig-
nty in general.”
2. Dimension of Opinion
It is noteworthy that the Meyers definition was published a full decade be-
fore Germany officially became a democracy as the Weimar Republic. Yet, the 
entry states confidently: “Just like the people in constitutional states is entitled 
to the unmediated right of participation in the most important governmental 
actions through its elected people’s representatives, the right of critique and 
public review respecting the negotiations of the parliamentary body shall not 
be abridged.”123 Interestingly, the lexicon does not provide a direct definition 
of the adjective “public”, but instead provides articles on public opinion, pu-
blic order, public peace, public belief, public war, public office and public law 
in a manner similar to the 1987 Evangelisches Staatslexikon. Foreshadowing 
some of the later discussions on the public, the Meyers lexicon defines “public 
opinion” as “the view held by the people on a matter of public life at a certain 
point in time.”124 
123  “Öffentlichkeit,” Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon, vol. 14, 6th edition (Leipzig, 
Wien: Bibliographisches Institut, 1908), 916. The original German: “Das moderne Ver-
fassungsleben erblickt in der Ö. der Verhandlungen, die wichtige staatsbürgerliche Rechte 
betreffen, eine bedeutungsvolle Garantie der Volksfreiheit überhaupt. Wie dem Volk in 
den konstitutionellen Staatswesen ein unmittelbares Recht der Mitwirkung bei den wich-
tigsten Regierungshandlungen durch seine erwählten Volksvertreter zusteht, so soll ihm 
auch das Recht der Kritik und der öffentlichen Kontrolle gegenüber den Verhandlungen 
der parlamentarischen Körperschaft unverkürzt sein.”
124  “Öffentliche Meinung,” Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon, 915. The original German: 
“die zu einer gewissen Zeit im Volk herrschende Ansicht über eine Angelegenheit des 
öffentlichen Lebens.”
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This definition operates with a homogenous conception of the people 
(Volk) as a monolithic block with one unified popular will and opinion. The 
postmodern condition of pluralistic societies undermines this understanding 
of both public opinion and the people as one unified whole. But the definition 
also draws out the challenge for contemporary societies: How can the public 
in a liberal democracy be understood when many of its discourses are seg-
regated and brand-managed through the bubbles of certain media outlets or 
personalizing newsfeed algorithms on social networks? Is there a way that we 
can define the public as a whole and wholesome concept without falling into 
shallow definitions using the lowest common denominators, or using naively 
broad strokes like the one “public opinion” of the one singular Volk?
3. Dimension of Access 
Before we move to the discourse on solutions for the postmodern discourse 
between contextualism and universalism, it is helpful to explore other defini-
tions of the public sphere, publicness, or publicity. The German word Öffent-
lichkeit carries connotations of all three, and hence can provide us with many 
of the conceptual shades needed for a holistic discussion of what constitutes 
the public. The 1971 edition of Brockhaus picks up the issue of access, defi-
ning Öffentlichkeit as “the accessibility of events or the possibility to perceive 
processes for an unlimited circle of persons” which includes the possibility 
to perceive “the circle itself.” Brockhaus remarks that press freedom created 
new publicity in state life, and that “modern state technology, including de-
mocracy’s technology, provides various means to exclude the public from de-
cisive procedures.”125 
The article on Öffentlichkeit in the 1889 edition of Grimm Deutsches Wör-
terbuch remarks that the noun was derived from the adjective offentlich as 
late as the 18th century and now means “that which is public or happens pu-
blicly.”126 The detailed etymologies of öffentlich reference many sources from 
amongst the theologians of the Reformation and the poets and playwrights 
125  “Öffentlichkeit,” Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, vol. 13, 17th edition (Wiesbaden: F.A. Brock-
haus, 1971), 681. 126 “
126  “Öffentlichkeit,” Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, vol. 4/2, 
ed. Moriz Heyne (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1877), 1183.
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of Romanticism. Hence, we can date the transitional moments in the shaping 
of the concept of the public in Germany to the early 16th century and the late 
18th century.
4. Dimension of Transparency
The Grimm dictionary gives background on the genesis of the adjective 
“public” and goes far beyond the political and sociological meanings domi-
nant in the modern state. It defines as many as six different dimensions of the 
term: 
1. Public means “generally comprehensible or known, clear, revealed.”127 
2. Public means “without holding back, sincere.”128 
3. Public means “not secret, but being and happening in front of the eyes 
of all, so that it can be seen, heard (read) and known by everyone.”129 
4. Public also serves as a synonym for “open,” used for instance for bars 
and restaurants open to the public — in contemporary English fit-
tingly: “pubs” — or prostitutes which the dictionary cites as “those who 
surrender themselves to everyone.”130 
5. Public also means the “opposite of private, not for individuals, but for 
many, or meant for, owned by or induced through the whole audien-
ce.”131 
6. Public also means “particularly a large civic society … or a country, in 
reference to, owned by or induced through the state.”132 
127  “öffentlich,” Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, 1180. The 
German original: “allgemein verständlich oder bekannt, deutlich, offenbar.” The article 
cites Martin Luther as an example for the early modern use: “es ist ein öffentlich wunder, 
darum sagt er, dass es gott gethan habe.” And: “aus diesem allen ist klar und öffentlich.” 
Similarly, Philipp Melanchthon: “so ist offentlich, das die regenten schuldig sind, schulen 
anzurichten.”
128  Ibid. The German original: “ohne rückhalt, aufrichtig.”
129  Ibid. The German original: “nicht geheim, sondern vor aller augen seiend und gesche-
hend, so dasz es jedermann sehen, hören (lesen) und wissen kann.”
130  Ibid., 1181. The original German: “öffentliche dirnen, huren, die sich jedermann preisge-
ben.”
131 Ibid. The original German: “gegensatz zu privat, nicht für einzelne, sondern für viele oder 
für das ganze publikum bestimmt, darauf bezüglich, von ihm ausgehend oder ihm eigen.”
132  Ibid. The original German: “besonders eine grosze bürgerliche gesellschaft … oder ein 
land, den staat betreffend, darauf bezüglich oder davon ausgehend, ihm eigen.”
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5. Dimension of Service
This last dimension of the term, mentioned by Grimm’s dictionary, is cor-
roborated in the Staatslexikon: “The word Öffentlichkeit was derived from 
the adjective ‘öffentlich’ in the second half of the 18th century” and became 
“a key political-sociological concept during the 19th century.”133 The Deut-
sches Rechtswörterbuch documents the development and diversity of the term 
öffentlich in different German dialects in detail. The citations range from 
“openlice” (in 1027) to “offenlichen” (in 1235) to “uffinlichin” (in 1360) to “of-
fentlichin” (in 1392) to “apenlicke” (around 1426-40) to “öffentlich” (around 
1500). From 1500 on there is still an astonishing variety of spellings, but the 
contemporary spelling öffentlich surfaces ever more often. The definition gi-
ven by this legal dictionary rests on accessibility. It distinguishes “in public” 
as “free, accessible for everyone, without limitation” from “for the public” in 
the sense of “open to the general public, meant for the general community.” 
The definition also mentions public as “known (opposite of secret)” and “in 
the interest of the general society.”134 
So this  definition puts a stronger emphasis on the service beyond a specific 
interest or a powerful group of a select few, and introduces a notion of the 
common good to the concept.
6. Dimension of Scale
The German Duden dictionary defines the public as an “sphere of human 
beings, seen as a unit, in which something is (or has become) generally known 
and is accessible to all.”135 We find similar definitions in the English language. 
The Webster‘s New Collegiate Dictionary defines the public as 
1. “a place accessible or visible to the public,” 
2. “the people as a whole,” and 
133  “Öffentlichkeit,” Staatslexikon, vol. 4, 7th edition, ed. Görres-Gesellschaft (Freiburg, Basel, 
Wien: Herder, 1988), 138f.
134  ‘öffentlich’, Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch, ed. Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
269ff. Electronically available at https://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/~cd2/drw/.
135  “Öffentlichkeit,” Duden, vol. 5 (Mannheim, Wien, Zürich: Dudenverlag, 1980), 1913. The 
original: “als Gesamtheit gesehener Bereich von Menschen, in welchem etwas allgemein 
bekannt u. allen zugänglich ist.”
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3. “a group of people having common interests or characteristics” or even 
“the group at which a particular activity or enterprise aims.”136
This definition shows the huge variety of meanings and the ephemeral na-
ture of the concept mentioned above. The Webster definition illustrates the 
internal contradictions of the contemporary discourse on the public: Is it 
simply a specific target group of more than one person — as the third part 
of this definition implies? Or is the public indeed some larger collective “as a 
whole” beyond narrow interest groups?
7. Dimension of Impact
The Webster dictionary traces the adjective “public” back to the French 
“publique” and the Latin “publicus” and ultimately “populus,” meaning “the 
people.” As part of six dimensions of the word, it defines “public” as 
1. “of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a nation 
or state.” So beyond the notions of general knowledge and general ac-
cess which feature prominently in the German definitions, the English 
definition adds a notion of general impact. The Webster dictionary also 
includes everything “of or relating to the government” and “of, relating 
to, or being in the service of the community or nation.” The second 
dimension is public as 
2. “of or relating to mankind in general” and relates it to “universal” and 
“general, popular.” The third dimension puts “public” in relation to 
“social” and mentions the public-private distinction and introduces a 
business definition that is lacking in many German articles: 
3. “of or relating to business of community interests as opposed to private 
affairs.” The fourth dimension adds a “humanitarian” perspective: 
4. “devoted to the general or national welfare.” The fifth dimension brings 
in the familiar focus on open access as found in the Duden and defines 
“public” as 
5. “accessible to or shared by all members of the community,” but then 
again brings in an economic dimension lacking in German definitions 
by adding the stock market to the picture: “capitalized in shares that 
136  “2public,” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, ed. Henry Bosley Woolf et al. (Springfield, 
MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1977), 932.
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can be freely traded on the open market.” And finally, the sixth defi-
nition of the word relays the epistemic dimension found frequently in 
the German definitions: 
6. “exposed to general view: open,” as well as “wellknown, prominent” 
and “perceptible.”137 
8. Dimension of Knowledge
In comparison, the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary limits itself to 
two general meanings: general concern and general knowledge. The dictio-
nary defines the adjective “public” as 
1. “of or concerning people in general,” as well as “provided, esp by cen-
tral or local government, for the use of people in general” and “of, or 
engaged in the affairs, entertainment, service, etc of the people.” It then 
goes on to define “public” in epistemic terms: 
2. “open or known to people in general.”138 The Oxford dictionary’s defi-
nition of the noun “public” reiterates the internal contradiction of the 
English word, since the public is both “the community in general” and 
“part of a community having a particular interest in common.”139 
After World War II, it was political liberalism that picked up the issue of 
the public sphere and attempted to provide both historical context and phi-
losophical definitions of the concept. In the contemporary discourses in 
political philosophy, legal theory, social science, and the study of religion, 
political liberalism forms the foil for much of the discourse. John Rawls 
conception of the public as a space for civic reasoning and Jürgen Haber-
mas’ conception of the public as civil networks of rational communicati-
on arguably present the most prominent positions in this discourse. Both 
philosophers rely strongly on a concept of public reason that understands 
the public primarily as the space for citizens to give each other reasons for 
policy choices or universal issues of political behavior.
137  “1public’” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 932.
138  “public,” Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, ed. A. P. Cowie, 4th edition (Oxford: 
Univ. Press, 1989), 1008.
139  Ibid.
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This idealistic, rationalistic component of political liberalism has made it 
vulnerable to attacks from contextualists. Indeed, the postmodern relati-
vity of reason is not easily compatible with a universalist definition of the 
public as a space for reasoning. Rawls and Habermas are committed to a 
proceduralist notion of deliberative democracy, and primarily define the 
public through the political process of democratic societies. We will ex-
plore the relationship of the public and political reasoning in a deliberative 
democracy after a discussion of the digital transformation of the public 
sphere, providing hints towards an update of Habermas’ famous study The 
Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society.140 
140  Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Originally: Habermas, 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.
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B. How Technology Has Changed the Public Sphere 
_________
Every technological change on record has brought excesses and abuses along 
with the constructive use it was famed for. The printing press, for instance, 
has not only be applied toward goals like education or information, but also 
for propaganda and distortion. The same holds true for all fundamental tools 
of communication like gestures, language, paper writing, the printing press, 
the telegraph, pager, and fax machine. Virtually all communication tech-
nologies have developed ethical pathologies at some point in their use and 
existence, including those produced in the digital revolution. The following 
sub-chapters explore three of these pathologies: the myth of neutral techno-
logy, the emergence of new forms of digital segregation, and the unintended 
consequence of converging public and private realms of life.
1. The Myth of Neutral Technology
While the digital economy is indeed marked by decentralized production, 
individualized publishing, and personalized distribution, there is a parado-
xical trend towards a select few massive-scale platforms with a near-to-mo-
nopoly power in the algorithmic organization and daily maintenance of the 
decentralized, individualized and personalized stream of content: YouTube, 
Facebook, Apple, Google, Amazon, to a lesser extent Twitter, Microsoft and 
Yahoo, and several Chinese companies for the massive market in Asia. Nicco 
Mele calls these select businesses the Even Bigger platforms: “The presence 
of YouTube alerts us to another curious — and disturbing — aspect of the 
death of Big Fun. While small artists and production companies are going 
direct, the technology is paradoxically creating some things that are Even 
Bigger — the platforms like YouTube that all of us use to bootstrap our ideas, 
companies, candidacies, and local governments.”141 
141  Mele, The End of Big, 116.
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a) Normativity of Aggregation
Mele points out that while over a hundred video-sharing websites are avai-
lable: “YouTube dominates.”142 The key to understanding this paradoxical de-
velopment is to realize the power of aggregation in a decentralized media 
world: With the way “platforms aggregate power,” these Even Bigger plat-
forms “produce the Rise of Small” by facilitating the “End of Big.” As “the 
world’s single largest media source” YouTube wield enormous power and 
“can exert influence over which videos get featured on the YouTube home 
page or category subpages.” While Facebook still frequently attempts to work 
with human editorial partners, YouTube and its sister company Google tend 
to “default toward editorial decisions made by algorithm rather than by peo-
ple.”143 So even when they attempt to be neutral and technology-focused, in-
stead of normative and opinionated, platforms like YouTube exert massive 
influence and are deep in the business of applying ethical norms through 
the design of their algorithms. So the enormous power of traditional movie 
studios, for instance, has not gone back to the individual content publishers 
entirely, but has been partially transferred to other big power aggregation 
platforms like the “single largest online video source” YouTube.144 
Another vivid example for the power of Even Bigger platforms is Face-
book’s newsfeed algorithm. While the exact formula is opaque to most, the-
re are some dynamics identifiable even to the average user. These dynamics 
become especially visible when Even Bigger companies clash. With the in-
creased bandwidth on mobile devices, videos become an attractive content 
for consumption, and thus make it an attractive asset for companies relying 
on ad revenue as their main source of income. Youtube and Facebook are, 
therefore, struggling for an edge against the competitor in the distribution of 
video content on social media. Because Facebook wants to replace YouTube 
as the biggest video platform online, the newsfeed algorithm treats YouTube 
videos as links, which ranks them as low priority in the newsfeed calculati-
on. YouTube videos are therefore under-performing on Facebook compared 
to native video publication on Facebook. The company wants to sway users, 
142  Ibid.
143  Ibid., 117.
144  Ibid.
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especially professional publishers and media outlets, to upload their video 
content to Facebook directly. Then, in contrast, the video is ranked high in 
the newsfeed algorithm and over-performs in reach on Facebook.
This example demonstrates how much knowledge of the company senti-
ments, goals and policies is necessary to be consistently successful on an Even 
Bigger platform. So much so, that some commentators are using the idea of 
digital feudalism to describe our time, in which the emotional and philoso-
phical state of the absolutist ruler — in today’s tech world the CEO and his 
or her board — as well as company feuds with powerful adversaries directly 
define daily rules of social life for millions of citizens. If, in this environment, 
small and less professional, but nonetheless democratically vital civil society 
organizations like churches, non-profit organizations, or local broadcasters 
lack the knowledge of algorithmic detail, then their voices will simply not be 
heard in public on Facebook — seemingly “a neutral platform for communi-
cation and collaboration” once described by its founder Mark Zuckerberg as 
a mere “utility” similar to a phone company.145 
b) Normativity of Amateurism
Zuckerberg’s brand of neutrality, which amounts to little more than a blan-
ket refusal of responsibility, stands in contrast to the vision developed by 
John Dewey who considered the production and distribution of news “a fun-
damentally political and ethical enterprise” and acknowledged “that publis-
hers [have] to handle their immense responsibility with great care.”146 While 
Facebook is not a producer of news itself, the platform serves as one of the 
most important distributors of news, and therefore falls under the same cate-
gory of “immense responsibility” as any other distributor of information in a 
liberal democracy. In fact, the network’s responsibility is further amplified by 
the fact that the news distributed on social media is presented to consumers 
by their peers, thus increasing the legitimacy of this news for the individual 
consumer: We consider our “friends and family … more likely to know what’s 
145 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding From You (London: Penguin 
Books, 2011), 36.
146  Ibid., 58.
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important and relevant to us than some newspaper editor in Manhattan.”147 
Facebook turns amateurs into navigators,  and that is a decisively political act 
with massive normative implications.
Facebook as “a network of amateur curators” produces an unusually high 
trust in the displayed news for the individual user, but brings two significant 
dangers. Firstly, “the average person’s Facebook friends will be much more 
like that person than a general-interest news source.” This is further amplified 
by the fact that “our physical communities are becoming more homogeneous 
as well” and that “we generally know people who live near us.” Secondly, “per-
sonalization filters will get better and better at overlaying themselves on in-
dividuals’ recommendations.” Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm, for instance, 
generally rewards engagement with more visibility and personalizes accor-
ding to the measured engagement with posts and contents. Filters like Google 
Reader’s Sort by Magic feature helping users “manage streams of posts from 
blogs” explicitly attempts to distinguish between “pieces of content you inter-
act with” in order to “sift one from another” according to engagement. Ap-
plied to social media streams: If a user likes his or her friend’s sports photos, 
but not his political posts, the algorithm can distinguish between the two and 
allow the user to see only the friend’s sports post without having to face the 
differing and inconvenient political viewpoint.148 
c) Normativity of Distribution
Up until the debate around social media’s influence on the 2016 presidenti-
al elections in the United States and possible manipulation through targeted 
false news campaigns, the tech industry was able to more or less successfully 
market its products as neutral tools. But technology, like all other human ac-
tivity, is never neutral. Normative foundations are integral to any production 
or design process. They define the interest leading our individual explorations 
of reality (erkenntnisleitendes Interesse) as Jürgen Habermas describes in his 
epistemological study Erkenntnis und Interesse. Aside from the normative di-
mension of every invention and production, there is an evidently normative 
dimension to the practical decisions carried out by algorithms every day. As 
Anil Dash points out, “you are brokering attention” as a tech company.149 And 
147 Ibid., 66.
148  Ibid., 67.
149  Dash, Tech’s Moral Reckoning.
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the myth of neutral algorithmic distribution has already caused significant 
distress in the democratic process, since “something that draws more attenti-
on and has more emotional appeal will be more successful and more lucrative 
[even if] some of the things that are most attention-getting aren’t true.”150 
This poses a dramatic threat to the liberal democratic order. As Habermas 
explains, “post-truth democracy” is no democracy at all, since constitutional 
democracy is an “epistemically demanding, fundamentally truth-sensitive 
form of government” built on a “deliberative form of politics.”151 
If a seemingly neutral platform like Facebook changes its algorithms or 
otherwise has decisive impact on the structure of knowledge aggregation and 
information distribution, then it is steeped in matters of truth and truth-sen-
sitive democracy, and far beyond any claim to neutrality. After the evident 
influence of false information spread through Facebook to millions of peo-
ple in the 2016 U.S. election, the company announced a number of measu-
res against “the worst of the worst”152 and acknowledged its responsibility 
beyond claims to neutrality. Initially, Mark Zuckerberg had called the claim 
that fake news distributed on Facebook influenced the election “a pretty cra-
zy idea.”153 About a month later, Zuckerberg changed his mind, though, and 
shared his thoughts on Facebook’s responsibility in a public post on the net-
work: “Facebook is a new kind of platform different from anything before it. I 
think of Facebook as a technology company, but I recognize we have a greater 
responsibility than just building technology that information flows through.” 
150  Ibid.
151  Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in der Öffentlichkeit. Kognitive Voraussetzungen für den ‘öf-
fentlichen Vernunftgebrauch’ religiöser und säkularer Bürger,” in Zwischen Naturalismus 
und Religion, ed. Jürgen Habermas, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2013), 150f. 
The original German quotes: The constitutional state is an “epistemisch anspruchsvolle, 
gewissermaßen wahrheitsempfindliche Regierungsform” since it relies on a “deliberative 
Form von Politik.”
152  Adam Mosseri, “News Feed FYI: Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News,” Facebook Newsroom, 
December 15, 2016, accessed February 3, 2017, http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/
news-feed-fyi-addressing-hoaxes-and-fake-news/.
153 Casey Newton, “Zuckerberg: the idea that fake news on Facebook influenced the election 
is ‘crazy’,” The Verge, November 10, 2016, accessed February 3, 2017, http://www.theverge.
com/2016/11/10/13594558/mark-zuckerberg-election-fake-news-trump. Zuckerberg’s 
argument cannot be reduced to a protective instinct for his company. His key point was 
about empathy: “I do think there is a certain profound lack of empathy in asserting that 
the only reason someone could have voted the way they did is they saw some fake news 
… If you believe that, then I don’t think you have internalized the message the Trump 
supporters are trying to send in this election.”
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Despite the fact that Facebook is still not a traditional publisher creating 
media content itself, Zuckerberg recognized that the company is “more than 
just a distributor of news.” Zuckerberg called Facebook a “new kind of plat-
form for public discourse” and acknowledged that Facebook has a “new kind 
of responsibility to enable people to have the most meaningful conversations, 
and to build a space where people can be informed.”154 
In summary, it is safe to say that Zuckerberg now accepts the normative 
standard of accountability beyond the mere technical deliberations, even if 
primarily driven by public pressure and not proactive conviction. How this 
new normative dimension of technology is to be filled with life and practice 
remains vague, but Zuckerberg’s post on December 15th 2016 nonetheless 
marks a significant departure from the cult of neutral tech that had domina-
ted the early years of the rising sector. And from the vantage point of political 
philosophy with the paradigm of deliberative democracy in mind, neutral 
technology is indeed a myth worth busting. A widespread awareness of the 
shortcomings of the neutrality doctrine is necessary for both the sustenance 
of a “truth-sensitive form of government” and a culture of democratic ac-
countability in the emerging institutions in the technology industry.155 
d) Normativity of Education
The responsibility of technology providers is not limited to algorithmic 
distribution of information. It is relevant for all forms of radical connectivi-
ty solutions. The stories provided by the tech industry’s marketing agencies 
cannot be the only source of interpretation of social networking technolo-
gy, since the tech industry’s marketing experts — sometimes called “digital 
evangelists” — are paid to skew this interpretation towards the company’s 
business interests. Dash provides a corporate example for Twitter: “I got to 
154 Mark Zuckerberg, public post on Facebook, December 15, 2016, accessed February 3, 
2017, https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103338789106661
155  I use the term “institution” deliberately for companies like Facebook and Google, becau-
se the massive scale of use and trust that users put in the services of the companies far 
outweigh the criticism, which underscores the impression that the two companies have 
a significant excess of legitimacy over other corporations. However, there is an urgent 
need for more research on whether or not these corporations fulfill the requirements for 
the concept “institution.” Unfortunately, this goes beyond what is possible here. Similar 
studies could be conducted for “global institutions” that, despite claims to comprehen-
siveness, continue to lack legitimacy and power to coordinate in the daily practice of 
nominally represented citizens around the globe.
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watch Twitter from before its public launch. I know the founders and a lot 
of the leadership very well, [and] they were very vocal about their role in 
Arab Spring.” This public ownership Twitter took for events made possible 
through social media, however, was short-lived: “They were very vocal about 
how everybody in Tahrir Square is using Twitter. And when they at least no-
minally liked the results, then Twitter was taking the credit. And when they 
don’t like the results, Twitter [suddenly] is a neutral tool. Right?”156 
Dash points out, that he is not “pointing fingers” since he has “been that 
guy” himself. He also notes that the responsible CEOs are “not bad people 
doing bad things” but rather “good people doing bad things.” Dash does, ho-
wever, call for more accountability in terms of the ethical impact of digital 
products. Two core ideas are brought forward by Dash: a professional society 
for the tech industry and an ethical curriculum in computer science pro-
grams. If you look at every other professional discipline and somebody who 
goes to law school, business school, journalism school or medical school, 
Dash says, you will see that “every single one of those disciplines has a pro-
fessional society that sets standards. And if you don’t meet them, you can be 
disbarred. You can lose your medical license. There’s an expectation about 
what you’re supposed to do.”157 
The other observation you will make, according to Dash, is that “in the 
educational process, there’s an extensive ethical curriculum.” This kind of ins-
titutionalized self-reflection is lacking in the tech industry. Just like medicine 
goes “back to Hippocrates” or law studies century-old “English common law” 
computer science, he says, needs to develop both a historical and an ethical 
consciousness. At this point, Dash states, “there is zero ethical curriculum.” A 
computer science student in “a top-of-the-line” program can get “the highest 
credential computer science degree from the most august institutions with 
essentially having had zero ethics training.” With a hint of cynicism, Dash 
remarks that “that is, in fact, the most likely path to getting funded as a suc-
cessful startup in Silicon Valley.”158 
156  Dash, “Tech’s Moral Reckoning.”
157  Ibid.
158  Ibid.
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2. The Rise of a New Digital Segregation
The story of human segregation is long. Racial segregation in the United 
States and Apartheid in South Africa are only two of the more recent ex-
amples, and the effects of implicit segregation are still evident in both coun-
tries.159 However much progress liberal democracies have made towards truly 
inclusive societies by extending democratic rights from educated, heterose-
xual, caucasian males to all “created equal,”160 many forms of segregation re-
main in place. The prevalence of a segregative structure in the analog modes 
of society has become increasingly visible in the digital modes as well. The 
much-discussed phenomenon of the “filter bubble” puts visual language to a 
new form of digital segregation: interest bubbles that more or less consciously 
narrow communicative horizons and information sources through persona-
lized digital media.
a) Cass Sunstein’s Contribution
1. Dynamic of Convenience   
This type of digital segregation is fueled by the market dynamic to 
produce evermore convenient products and services that produce 
ever-more ad revenue through the extension of the average retention 
rate on a digital platform capable of running advertisement effectively. 
The social network Facebook, the search engine Google, the streaming 
service Netflix, the online retailer Amazon, and providers of smart-
phone application like Snapchat and Instagram are amongst the most 
effective at retaining customers on their sites through personalization.
2. Dynamic of Confirmation  
One of the basic concepts of modern psychology, the confirmation 
bias, explains why users tend to stay on a site longer if their pre-exis-
ting preferences are reinforced throughout their digital user experien-
ce: “Consuming information that conforms to our ideas of the world 
is easy and pleasurable; consuming information that challenges us to 
159  For a case study of post-segregation United States cf. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim 
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New Press, 2012). 
For a case study of post-apartheid South Africa cf. John Pilger, “Apartheid Did Not Die” in 
John Pilger, Freedom Next Time (London: Black Swan, 2007). 239—350.
160  As the 1776 Declaration of Independence states: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unali-
enable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”
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think in news or question our assumptions is frustrating and difficult.” 
This leads to the tendency of “partisans of one political stripe … not to 
consume the media of another.” But as a result, “an information environ-
ment built on click signals will favor content that supports our existing 
notions about the world over content that challenges them.”161  
What digital service providers consider a win-win situation — the user 
experiences becomes a more targeted and convenient service, while 
the company’s revenue increases — might actually be a lose-lose situa-
tion, since the trend of personalization creates a “bubble republic” that 
might lose its democratic structure because of it. The first to promi-
nently name this danger was law professor Cass Sunstein in his book 
Republic.com, which he later published in an updated version as Repu-
blic.com 2.0. The book’s preface opens with a normative note of protest: 
“In a democracy, people do not live in echo chambers or information 
cocoons. They see and hear a wide range of topics and ideas. They do 
so even if they did not, and would not, choose to see and to hear those 
topics and those ideas in advance.” Sunstein continues: “These claims 
raise serious questions about certain uses of new technologies, abo-
ve all the Internet, and about the astonishing growth in the power to 
choose.” Therefore, he warns emphatically: “Members of a democratic 
public will not do well if they are unable to appreciate the views of their 
fellow citizens.”162
3. Dynamic of Hermeneutic Segregation  
Citing James Madison, Sunstein names a contrasting vision: a “yiel-
ding and accommodating spirit” that sustains freedom and democratic 
self-government.163 The topic of his book is “the question of fragmen-
tation and the risk of polarization” through which “like-minded peo-
ple speak or listen mostly to one another” and “sort themselves into 
enclaves in which their own views and commitments are constantly 
reaffirmed.”164 The purpose of the book, therefore, is to “explore some 
of the preconditions of democratic self-government and to show how 
161 Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 88.
162  Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton: Univ. Press, 2007), xi.
163  Ibid., xii.
164 Ibid.
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unrestricted free choice might undermine those preconditions.”165 
Articulating two core arguments of philosophical pragmatism, Sun-
stein names two preconditions: “First, people should be exposed to 
materials that they would not have chosen in advance. Unplanned, 
unanticipated encounters are central to democracy itself.”166 And: “Se-
cond, many or most citizens should have a range of common experi-
ences. Without shared experiences, a heterogeneous society will have 
a much more difficult time in addressing social problems.”167  
Sunstein’s main worry about personalization is the kind of herme-
neutic shift that takes place when “the power to filter is unlimited” and 
“people can decide, in advance and with perfect accuracy, what they 
will and will not encounter.” While the dynamic itself is not fundamen-
tally new, the digital tools at disposal fundamentally change the extent 
of hermeneutic segregation, because citizens “can design something 
very much like a communications universe of their own choosing.”168 
Given his pragmatist commitments, Sunstein sees the fundamentals 
of democracy under threat because of this. These commitments are 
best expressed in John Dewey’s words from The Public and Its Prob-
lems: “The important consideration is that opportunity be given ideas 
to speak and to become the possession of the multitude. The essential 
need is the improvement of the methods and constitution of debate, 
discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.” Sunstein 
publishes this passage as an opening quote to his book, and dramati-
cally contrasts it with a marketing question from Google News: “No 
one can read all the news that’s published every day, so why not set up 
your page to show you the stories that best represent your interests?”169
Dynamic of Polarization  
Our filters are becoming so powerful, Nicco Mele suggests, that they 
“cause us to physically sort ourselves into like-minded groups.” This, he 
says, bears the risk of “becoming trapped in an individual world without 
shared cultural space.” The effect is dramatic: “the Big Community we 
165 Ibid., xiii.
166  Ibid., 5.
167  Ibid., 6.
168  Ibid., 3.
169  Cf. Eli Pariser’s similar arrangement: Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 4
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once shared as a country is fast disappearing, with implications for de-
mocracy and social cohesion.”170 This trend is fueled by a basic human 
dynamic described by journalist Bill Bishop in his 2009 book The Big 
Sort: “Mixed company moderates; like minded company polarizes. He-
terogeneous communities restrain group excesses; homogeneous com-
munities march toward extremes.”171 Bishop diagnoses an “age of politi-
cal segregation”172 in the United States: “We have built a country where 
everyone can choose the neighbors (and church and news shows) most 
compatible with his or her lifestyle and beliefs. And we are living with 
the consequences of this segregation by way of life: pockets of like-min-
ded citizens that have become so ideologically inbred that we don’t 
know, can’t understand, and can barely conceive of ‘those people’ who 
live just a few miles away.”173 What Bishop describes can be summarized 
in hermeneutic terms as the, perhaps unintended, rise of a thoroug-
hly brand-managed communications environment for the individual. 
The result of polarizing brand-managed environments are dramatic, as 
the study of “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines” by Stanford’s Shan-
to Iyengar and Princeton’s Sean Westwood describes impressively: 
“When defined in terms of social identity and affect toward coparti-
sans and opposing partisans, the polarization of the American electo-
rate has dramatically increased.” Documenting “the scope and conse-
quences of affective polarization of partisans using implicit, explicit, 
and behavioral indicators,” the study’s evidence shows “that hostile 
feelings for the opposing party are ingrained or automatic in voters’ 
minds, and that affective polarization based on party is just as strong 
as polarization based on race.” The researchers also show that “party 
cues exert powerful effects on nonpolitical judgments and behaviors.” 
The result: “Partisans discriminate against opposing partisans, doing 
so to a degree that exceeds discrimination based on race.” This trend in 
170  Mele, The End of Big, 132.
171  Cited in: Ibid., 132f.
172  Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart 
(Boston: Mariner Books, 2009), 19.
173  Ibid., 199.
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everyday life of individuals has a reciprocal effect on public life and the 
political process, because “increased partisan affect provides an incen-
tive for elites to engage in confrontation rather than cooperation.”174 
4. Dynamic of Tribalism  
To conclude our discussion of Cass Sunstein’s contribution to the dis-
course on digital segregation, we can summarize: Especially when 
linked to analog forms of segregation, the digital fragmentation of 
society described by Sunstein further exacerbates a general tenden-
cy of communitarian isolationism already observable as an economic 
rift across the United States.175 This isolationism includes the const-
ruction of gated communities,176 the use of urban planning,177 the re-
striction to selected news sources distributed through cable televisi-
on, satellite radio, social networks, and news applications on mobile 
phones, as well as the promotion of certain church denominations and 
religious networks, summer camps, publishing houses and retreats. 
Again, none of the underlying anthropological foundations regarding 
communitarian isolationism — or “political tribalism”178 — is cre-
ated by the digital transformation, but it does reinforce the dynamic 
significantly and thereby exacerbates an already challenging problem 
at the heart of radically market-based versions of liberal democracy. 
 
174  Shanto Iyengar and Sean J. Westwood, “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evi-
dence on Group Polarization,” American Journal of Political Science 59:3 (2015).
175 Cf. Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of 
America (New York: Owl Books, 2005).
176  Cf. Mele, The End of Big, 130.
177  In a study of “key actors within the emerging real estate industry, as well as housing refor-
mers and social workers, [who] helped nurture and promulgate a segregationist ideology 
and negative image of the emerging black ghetto as a pathological, dangerous and nefari-
ous place, to be avoided by whites and other ethnic groups,” Kevin Gatham points out that 
“the cultivation and development of this racial ideology was simultaneously an exercise in 
the racialization of urban space that linked race and culturally specific behavior to place 
of residence in the city.” Cf. Kevin Fox Gatham, ‘Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and 
the Origins of Racial Residential Segregation in a US City, 1900–50’, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 24, No. 3, September 2000, 617.
178  Cf. Matthew Ingram, “What’s Driving Fake News Is an Increase in Political Tribalism,” 
Fortune, January 13, 2017, accessed February 28, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/01/13/
fake-news-tribalism/.
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b) Eli Pariser’s Contribution
1. Challenge of Complexity  
Eli Pariser continued Sunstein’s work with his book The Filter Bubb-
le which updated Sunstein’s tentative intuitions with more empirical 
knowledge and stronger focus on the precise algorithmic technology 
driving the rise of the “filter bubble.” The empirical part of the study 
appeared to be more complicated than anticipated, writes Pariser in his 
introduction: “I was struck by the lengths one has to go to in order to ful-
ly see what personalization and filter bubbles do.” Pariser’s conversation 
with Jonathan McPhie, an expert on search personalization at Google, 
illustrates the challenge: McPhie “suggested that it was nearly impos-
sible to guess how the algorithms would shape the experience of any 
given user. There were simply too many variables and inputs to track.” 
So even if Google has insight in various click numbers, it is “much har-
der to say how it’s working for any one person.”179 So even while mar-
keting officials titled “digital evangelists”180 spread the “good news”181 
of technological progress for technology companies, the competence 
to truly understand, predict and analyze their products is limited even 
for some of the game-changing developers at the heart of the transfor-
mation. Despite the frequent exposition of grand competence, many of 
the exact functions of the algorithms employed remain opaque.  
While Pariser clearly builds on Sunstein’s work and mentions him 
approvingly,182 Pariser has much more practical material to work with: 
“Though concerns about personalized media have been raised for a 
decade … the theory is now rapidly becoming practice: Personalizati-
on is already much more a part of our daily experience.” Hence, we “can 
now begin to see how the filter bubble is actually working, where it’s 
179  Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 13.
180  An example for this title is Avinash Kaushik who serves as “Digital Marketing Evange-
list” for Google. Cf. Carmine Gallo, “The Digital Evangelist Leading Google‘s Storytelling 
Movement,” Forbes, September 26, 2016, accessed February 28, 2017, https://www.for-
bes.com/sites/carminegallo/2016/09/22/the-digitalevangelist-leading-googles-storytel-
ling-movement/#2c23bef96711.
181  The term evangelist derives from the Greek word εὐαγγέλιον, meaning “good news,” or 
“gospel.” The word is derived from the combination of εὐ (“good”) and ἄγγελος (“messen-
ger”).
182  Pariser refers to Republic.com when he states that “legal scholar Cass Sunstein wrote a 
smart and provocative book on the topic in 2000.” Cf. Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 13.
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falling short, and what that means for our daily lives and our society.”183 
And in contrast to Sunstein, who writes from a normative perspecti-
ve as a legal scholar, Pariser, who helped start the online community 
Avaaz.org and now serves as president of MoveOn.org, writes from the 
perspective of an activist using the internet as a means of change.  
Pariser describes the “filter bubble” as a phenomenon endangering the 
founding spirit of the internet: “Ultimately, the proponents of persona-
lization offer a vision of a custom-tailored world, every facet of which 
fits us perfectly. It’s a cozy place, populated by our favorite people and 
things and ideas. … But it comes at a cost: Making everything more 
personal, we may lose some of the traits that made the Internet so 
appealing to begin with.”184 One dimension of the cost described by 
Pariser is the hermeneutic shift explained by Sunstein. Citing a con-
versation with Stanford law professor Ryan Calo, Pariser states about 
personalization: “There are lots of ways for it to skew your perception 
of the world.”185 This hermeneutic shift is at the core of the question 
whether or not a public sphere can exist alongside personalization, if 
we consider the Webster dictionary’s sixth dimension in its definition 
of the public: “exposed to general view: open,” as well as “well-known, 
prominent” and “perceptible.”186 The epistemic quality of the public is 
picked up by the Oxford dictionary as well, when it defines the pu-
blic “open or known to people in general.”187 This epistemic quality 
of the public sphere is at the heart of political theory’s discussions of 
deliberative democracy, and urges us to reflect further on the herme-
neutic shift introduced by the filters of digital personalization.  
Using former U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s notion of the 
“known unknown” and the “unknown unknown,” Pariser elaborates 
on how the hermeneutic shift of “personalized filters can interfere with 
our ability to properly understand the world” and “alter our sense of 
the map.” The bubbles transform “known unknowns into unknown 
ones.” This becomes clear in a comparison of the filter applied by the 
183  Ibid., 13.
184  Ibid., 12.
185 Ibid., 13f.
186  Webster’s Dictionary, “1public,” 932.
187  Oxford Dictionary, “public,” 1008.
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professional news editor and the filter applied through social media 
algorithms based on click signals: “A newspaper editor isn’t doing his 
or her job properly unless to some degree the paper is representative 
of the news of the day.” So: “If you leaf through the paper, dipping into 
some articles and skipping over most of them, you at least know there 
are stories, perhaps whole sections, that you passed over.” This changes 
in the filter bubble: “You don’t see things that don’t interest you at all. 
You’re not even latently aware that there are major events and ideas 
you’re missing.”188 
2. Challenge of Creativity  
Like Sunstein, Pariser presents the cost of personalization as “both per-
sonal and cultural.” Both dimensions are driven by the fact that “the 
dynamics of our media shape what information we consume.“189 We 
encountered this concern in the definitions of the public reconstructed 
above, where we were reminded that the public’s “character is shaped 
above all by the nature of the media that are available to a society” and 
influence or determine the “access to information and participation in 
public communication processes.”190 The radical choice for the indivi-
dual consumer described by Sunstein in Republic.com 2.0 ends up limi-
ting the horizon of choices to an extent that fundamentally undermines 
the freedom to choose itself. Pariser describes the unconscious use of 
personalization filters as “a kind of invisible autopropaganda indoctri-
nating us with our own ideas, amplifying our desire for things that are 
familiar.”191 While the “societal consequences” emerging when “masses 
of people begin to live a filter-bubbled life” are severe, there are signifi-
cant personal consequences as well. For this argument, Pariser applies 
a brand of philosophical pragmatism familiar from Sunstein’s work on 
the societal consequences of personalization for democracy.  
In the filter bubble, Pariser says, there is “less room for the chan-
ce encounters that bring insight and learning.” The restriction of 
the room for unmeditated encounter impoverishes the individu-
al mind, because: “Creativity is often sparked by the collision of 
188  Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 106.
189  Ibid., 14.
190 Religion Past and Present, “Public,” 533.
191  Ibid., 15.
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ideas from different disciplines and cultures.” The probability of this 
type of experience is reduced the more personalized an individu-
al life becomes: “By definition, a world constructed from the famili-
ar is a world in which there’s nothing to learn.” Hence: “If persona-
lization is too acute, it could prevent us from coming into contact 
with the mind-blowing, preconception-shattering experiences and 
ideas that change how we think about the world and ourselves.”192 
Along similar lines, Nicco Mele cites the work of Princeton professor 
Scott Page who “methodically documents how groups made up of 
people with a lot of different backgrounds outperform groups or ‘like 
minded experts.’ According to Page, it doesn’t matter what kind of pro-
blem you are solving; diversity helps you arrive at the most efficient 
solution, faster.”193 This exact spirit is displayed by the life and work of 
above-mentioned U.S. president Abraham Lincoln who famously de-
signed his cabinet as a “team of rivals”194 with three rival Republicans 
and many former Democrats in senior positions. Lincoln‘s biographer 
Doris Kearns Goodwin summarizes: “Good leadership requires you 
to surround yourself with people of diverse perspectives who can di-
sagree with you without fear of retaliation.”195 
3. Challenge of Agency  
Returning to Pariser’s contribution to the discourse, we can observe 
that his affinity for Sunstein’s pragmatist arguments is further made evi-
dent by his implicit tribute to Sunstein in the contrasting arrangement 
of John Dewey’s words and a statement from Google. Dewey remarks: 
“Everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets 
up barriers that divide human beings into sets and cliques, into antago-
192  Ibid.
193  Mele, The End of Big, 200. Cf. Scott Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Cre-
ates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies (Princeton: Univ. Press, 2007).
194  Cf. Doris Kearn Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New 
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006). The book famously influenced Barack Obama 
in his attempt to build a “team of rivals” by keeping the Independent defense secretary 
Bob Gates who had served in several Republican administrations before. Cf. Doris Ke-
arns Goodwin. “Barack Obama and Doris Kearns Goodwin: The Ultimate Exit Inter-
view,” Vanity Fair, November 2016, accessed February 28, 2017, http://www.vanityfair.
com/news/2016/09/barack-obama-doris-kearns-goodwin-interview.
195  Cited in: Mele, The End of Big, 200. Cf. Doris Kearns Goodwin, ”The Secrets of America’s 
Great Presidents,” Parade Magazine, September 14, 2008.
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nistic sects and factions, and thereby undermines the democratic way 
of life.” While Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt remarks: “The technology 
will be so good, it will be very hard for people to watch or consume 
something that has not in some sense been tailored for them.”196 Notice 
Schmidt’s more or less unconscious use of absolute normative langua-
ge in the truth claim “technology will be good” and the apparent ease 
displayed with the statement that virtually everything will be tailored 
not by the consumer, but “for them.” This deterministic language with 
a quasi-authoritarian twist has squarely dropped the original intent to 
deliver the most choice, control and convenience for the user.  
Ulrich Wilhelm, chief executive for the German public broadcasting 
service Bayerischer Rundfunk, agrees with many of the arguments 
laid out above and emphasizes: “Democracy needs the public space, 
and this public space has changed dramatically.” Like my discussion 
of digital pathologies above, Wilhelm links this change to emerging 
technologies, which have caused the public space “to disintegrate.”197 
His empirical examples are similar to Sunstein’s, Pariser’s, and Mele’s: 
“Content is sorted according to personal preference, thus creating in-
numerable sub and counter publics. In this situation, the legislature 
cannot just give into the desires of individuals that feel comfortable 
in their filter bubbles, and proclaim: We don’t need a general public.” 
Wilhelm’s mission for the German public media is negatively informed 
by the media landscape in the United States: “If you look at countries 
in which liberal democracy is under threat, then you will usually find a 
broken public sphere. In the U.S., there is not a single media publisher 
accepted by all.” The result is not desirable for Wilhelm: “The society 
is split.”198
3. The Convergence of Public and Private
 This sub-chapter completes my discussion of ethical pathologies in the 
digital dimension of social life with an analysis of the dissolving border bet-
ween the public and the private. Drawing from an essay on the freedom of 
196  Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 47.
197  The German original: “Er ist in der Digitalisierung zerfallen.”
198  Ulrich Wilhelm, “ARD: SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit dem Intendanten des Bayerischen Rund-
funks, Ulrich Wilhelm, über die Kritik an der Rundfunkabgabe,” DER SPIEGEL 10 
(2017).
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communication by Horst Pöttker, I will show how the digital transformation 
of the public sphere brings about a new convergence of public and private, 
thus challenging the institutional ethos, legal frameworks, and political ideo-
logies that had governed the norms and guidelines in a pre-digital world. Let 
us reconsider two definitions of the public reconstructed above: Public me-
ans the “opposite of private, not for individuals, but for many, or meant for, 
owned by or induced through the whole audience.”199 And public also means 
“relating to business of community interests as opposed to private affairs.”200 
These two definitions from the Grimm’s and the Webster’s dictionaries rely 
heavily on a strong distinction of public and private and even define one in 
opposition to the other. Does this definition of the public sphere still apply? 
If it applies, is there still a public sphere?
a) Need for Distinctions
Serious doubts are appropriate given that the digital revolution brought 
“a heavy expansion of the possibility of communication” in a way that “suc-
cessively abrogates the separation of mass communication (public sphere) 
and individual communication (private sphere) which used to be grounded 
through [the available] media technology” of the time.201 Pöttker sketches a 
brief timeline of the technological multiplication of practical possibilities to 
communicate: Originally, humans used “elemental media like air and light.” 
The communication through language was “limited by sound, sight and me-
mory,” and was only possible with those present. This meant that the accor-
ding social structures remained fairly small: “families, clans, hordes, villages.” 
The emergence of what Pöttker calls “technical media” changed this funda-
mentally: “reach, amount and nature of semantic transmission between hu-
mans was extended and differentiated” by the “discovery and organizational 
unfolding” of “written text, printing press, telegraph, telephone, film, vinyl, 
199  Deutsches Wörtberuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, “öffentlich,” 1180. The 
German original: “gegensatz zu privat, nicht für einzelne, sondern für viele oder für das 
ganze publikum bestimmt, darauf bezüglich, von ihm ausgehend oder ihm eigen.”
200  Webster’s Dictionary, “1public,” 932.
201  Horst Pöttker, “Kommunikationsfreiheit im digitalen Zeitalter. Zwölf Thesen,” Communi-
catio Socialis 49:4 (2016), 347.
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radio, television” and digitally connected computers. Along with the trans-
formations of communication, the according social structures have grown in 
scope, diversity and complexity.202
With Pöttker’s timeline in mind, we can diagnose that differentiated com-
munication tools are a precondition for the complex network architectures 
of public institutions. The modern bureaucratic nation state described by 
Max Weber as the ideal type of legal and rational rule in his book Economy 
and Society is an example of a complex public institution relying heavily on 
many of the “technical media” described by Pöttker. An extreme example for 
the use of mass communications tools in the mode of “one to many” is the 
Volksempfänger — the affordable radio distributed by the National Socialists 
to communicate information and propaganda directly into as many house-
holds as possible. A less extreme and more participatory example would be 
the development of a lively newspaper industry in Western Germany after 
1945 which still remains remarkably robust compared to the market in the 
United States.
While the Volksempfänger operated with a clear “one to many” commu-
nication model, the newspaper industry already developed new formats of 
participation through the publication of letters to the editor or the inclusion 
of opinion editorials from non-staff writers. Since the pursuit of a career in 
journalism or a career covered by journalism, as well as the participation th-
rough activism, op-eds or letters to the editor was “open in principle to all 
recipients,”203 the “one to many” mass communication in its different forms 
was considered “public” communication to which “political functions were 
attached due to its relevance for all of society.”204 This form of communication 
was of decisive importance, since the “participation in mechanisms of social 
self-regulation like elections or markets” was impossible “without a sphere 
202  Ibid., 348.
203 Ibid. Measures of selection and discriminatory mechanisms were still in place. The rea-
lization of a truly accessible career paths in media, politics and other sectors with public 
dimensions, remains a work in progress even today. Cf. Meredith D. Clark, “American 
newsrooms are getting more diverse. But it’s not happening quickly enough,” Poynter, Sep-
tember 12, 2016, accessed July 16, 2017, https://www.poynter.org/2016/american-news-
rooms-are-getting-more-diverse-but-its-not-happening-quickly-enough/429850/. For 
insight into the German discussion see the following interview: Marjan Parvand, “Feh-
lende Vielfalt in deutschen Redaktionen,” Deutsche Welle, May 11, 2011, accessed July 16, 
2017, http://www.dw.com/de/fehlende-vielfalt-in-deutschen-redaktionen/a-15064640.
204 Pöttker, “Kommunikationsfreiheit im digitalen Zeitalter,” 348.
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of universally accessible information.”205 Distinguished from the evidently 
“public” communication was “immediate interpersonal communication” in 
the mode of “between one and one” or “one and few” in the case of intimate 
small groups with limited access. The latter can be described as “private” or 
“intimate” communication. The spheral separation was enforced by the ap-
plied media technology and never had to be intentionally created through 
“socio-cultural” provisions like legal or administrative levers.206 The distinc-
tion between public and private was simply a given, on which the institutions 
within the liberal nation state could rely for most of its existence. As de-
scribed above in the discussion of automated workflows, liberal democracy’s 
public institutions nowadays are often struggling to adapt to the new digital 
environment.They are especially challenged by the new forms, standards, 
currencies of corporate communications arising from social media techno-
logy.207 
b) Need for Standards
Social media technologies often undermine the basic distinction between 
public and private by creating quasi-public platforms that allow for a de-
gree of privacy control and retain the role and atmosphere of personal and 
private communications networks, while at the same time aiming to “give 
people a voice” and make the marginalized voices heard in public. Face-
book fits this description best, but even more public-minded networks like 
Twitter with its default public tweet setting and Instagram with its locati-
205 Ibid., 348f.
206 Ibid.
207 An example for the German church institutions was the Tempelberg controversy which 
created significant and persistent social media stir around the fact that two German bis-
hops had taken off their crosses when visiting the synagogue and mosque on the Tem-
pel Mount in Jerusalem. One of the more reflective commentaries mentioning the social 
media stir was published by theology professor Jan-Heiner Tück. Cf. Jan-Heiner Tück, 
“Anschwellendes Unbehagen: Deutsche Bischöfe ohne Kreuz auf dem Jerusalemer Tem-
pelberg,” Neue Züricher Zeitung, November 25, 2016, accessed July 16, 2017, https://
www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/zeitgeschehen/deutsche-bischoefe-ohne-kreuz-auf-dem-jerusa-
lemer-tempelberg-anschwellendes-unbehagen-ld. 130529. An example for the German 
public media institutions was the Antisemitismus-Doku controversy which caused pro-
tests on social media when ARTE decided not to air a documentary on antisemitism 
because of lacking journalistic balance. For summary and debate see Eric Gujer, ed., 
“Leserdebatte: Wie fanden Sie die umstrittene Dokumentation zum Thema Judenhass?,” 
Neue Züricher Zeitung, June 22, 2017, accessed July 16, 2017, https://www.nzz.ch/leser-
debatte/leserdebatte-wie-fanden-sie-die-umstrittenedokumentation-zum-thema-ju-
den-hass-ld.1301886.
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on tag feature and the open follow option cannot do without more private 
communication tools like their direct message features and private-account 
features.208 In Horst Pöttker’s view, this blurring of public and private com-
munication is problematic, because it erodes the public with its socially and 
at times even legally enforced standard of civil discourse: “While public, ge-
nerally accessible communication is subject to limitations due to the pro-
tection of human dignity and privacy,” private communication is often less 
controlled or monitored. Hate speech, slander and false claims can be shared 
more uninhibitedly the more private or intimate communication is.209   
Ulrich Wilhelm shares Pöttker’s concern and affirms that the “growing flood 
of distortions, half truths and lies online is a phenomenon that poses a threat 
to the cohesion of our society and democracy.” The difference to traditional 
forms of misinformation is that with non-digital forms of misinformation 
are countered with well-established legal methods to hold perpetrators ac-
countable. But if “the same happens in social networks then the victim has 
far less rights even though the violation of personal rights is more long-lived 
and a lot more consequential.” This is an unacceptable double-standard, 
which Wilhelm critiques with the illustration that surely nobody would ac-
cept that a given person is “allowed to insult someone in the subway, but 
not on the train.” Wilhelm also attacks the myth of neutrality maintained 
by many social media executives. For him, the key is the degree of publicity 
reached by a given activity on the platform. While phone companies under-
standably cannot be held responsible if the mafia organizes its criminal ac-
tivity through phone conversations, the “phone provider would indeed be 
liable for the content if it broadcasts the phone conversation publicly.”210  
Horst Pöttker generally sees the internet as an “opportunity for the creation 
of publicness.” Drawing from a German tradition that interprets freedom of 
speech somewhat differently than the American tradition Pöttker argues that 
there are “necessary limits of the freedom of communication” that need to be 
“brought to fruition” (zur Geltung bringen) in the digital realm — without, of 
course, destroying the “opportunities for the creation of publicness” (Chan-
cen für das Herstellen von Öffentlichkeit) inherent in digital technology. This, 
he thinks, can be accomplished in two ways: “Either the professional ethics 
208 Platform features change frequently. This assessment was conducted on March 2, 2017.
209 Pöttker, “Kommunikationsfreiheit im digitalen Zeitalter,” 349.
210 Wilhelm, “SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit dem Intendanten des Bayerischen Rundfunks.”
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of journalism needs to become part of general morality, or state regulation of 
journalistic media needs to be extended to network operators.”211 He is thin-
king, for instance, of privacy rights and the right to protection of integrity 
and reputation for a private person.
c) Need for Education
The convergence of public and private also confronts those without any 
conscious public ethos or training with a potentially dangerous temptation. 
Many of the social networks create the impression that their users are in a 
personal or even private environment in which it is safe to express them-
selves without the learned filter of a public ethos. Aside from the at least 
partially problematic psychological dynamics of a culture geared entirely to-
wards self-expression, a widespread lack of ability to practically navigate the 
converging public-private space on social media is evident.212 Horst Pöttker 
emphasizes the importance of the guaranteed freedom of communication, 
especially in “public communication through mass media,” since “freedom 
is given in a higher degree in private or in timate communication anyway 
and therefore needs no explicit guarantee.”213 Given that social networks like 
Facebook are not just aggregators of private space, but always contain a cer-
tain dimension of publicness, it is worth considering stronger institutional 
protections in those spaces that blur the lines between public and private.  
Horst Pöttker considers the digital revolution “an extraordinarily disruptive 
and consequential transformation in the development of media and culture” 
which triggered an “especially abrupt and far-reaching expansion and mul-
tiplication of ways and possibilities of communication.” One of the signa-
ture traits of the emerging forms of communication is that the “technologi-
cal necessity to separate private and public communication” has vanished. 
211 Pöttker, “Kommunikationsfreiheit im digitalen Zeitalter,” 347.
212 Unintended publicity of personal posts in a seemingly private network does not just occur 
for users without experience with the navigation of some form of public. Even politicians 
with ample experience in public speaking and extensive media training get caught up in 
the converging public-private space of social media, e.g. former United States represen-
tative Anthony Weiner who repeatedly and mistakingly posted private content to soci-
al media in public mode, thereby causing significant scandal and debates about media 
education.
213 Pöttker, “Kommunikationsfreiheit im digitalen Zeitalter,” 350. The matter is more compli-
cated than this, since private, intimate communication is just as prone to complex power 
relations as public communication. A thorough analysis and critique of Pöttker’s diagno-
sis, however, goes beyond the scope of this study.
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He, too, sees this change exemplified in social media: “In social networks 
communications de facto takes place without barriers to accessibility, and 
hence: publicly, yet officially in the mode of private communication without 
limitations to content.” The consequences are dramatic: “Mechanisms for the 
necessary ethical and professionalrestriction of public communication that 
were institutionalized before the digital transformation lose their efficacy and 
are turning into anachronistic relicts.”214
d) Need for Regulation
The discourses in both the United States and Germany point to the need 
for “media pedagogy” and educational efforts in this “cultural learning pro-
cess.”215 But while the U.S. debate on unintendend consequences of the digital 
revolution tends to focus on the business ethics of private companies like 
Facebook, the German discourse increasingly also gave voice to calls for ac-
countability through governmental regulation. Ulrich Wilhelm suggests that 
it is the “lawmaker’s turn” since “self-control” amongst “platform providers” 
has not shown any meaningful results: “Freedom of opinion is an extraor-
dinary good.” Yet “there are cases in which we have to consider, whether to 
hold platform providers to account alongside the creators” of hate speech and 
forged news. The penalty for breaches of the law “must hurt” providers and 
should go up to “several millions.”216
The opposing opinion has warned that heavy regulation of social networks 
run by the private sector would amount to privatizing law enforcement and 
punishing private companies for not doing a job traditionally associated with 
the public sector. While the public sector cannot hand over responsibility for 
enforcing the rule of law without calling its reason for existence into question, 
demands for public accountability of powerful companies profiting financial-
ly from running a social network are little more than ordinary, given that me-
dia companies have always been held responsible for the protection of privacy 
rights and personal rights of individuals covered by their publications.  
Initiatives by both public and private sector should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive. To adequately respond to the pathologies of a social metamorpho-
sis like the digital revolution, it will need an inclusive approach spanning 
214  Ibid., 350f.
215  Ibid., 352.
216  Wilhelm, “SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit dem Intendanten des Bayerischen Rundfunks.”
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all sectors of society. Now that the myth of ethically neutral technology is 
eroding, the resurging conversation on the professional ethics of social me-
dia companies — personified by bloggers like Anil Dash and researchers like 
Danah Boyd — can constructively compliment the public sector’s efforts to 
develop legitimate criteria for navigating the public consequences of digitally 
transformed modes of communication.
e) Need for Awareness
The fact that public discourse and private communication are blended 
in personal media streams like Facebook’s news feed, in which journalistic 
news sources are competing for attention with the photos of your best fri-
end’s vacation on Hawaii, creates the breeding ground for what Cass Sunstein 
calls “information cascades” that spread independent of their truth. Since 
most social media platforms create a personable atmosphere, users tend to 
be in a state of trust that generally carries our private life amongst friends 
and family. This state of trust, and the fact that certain information is sha-
red by our most trusted navigators in life — our friends and family — leads 
us to share information we ourselves have not fact-checked like a professio-
nal news editor is trained to. The user experience of a given post more often 
than not does not take place in the environment of a newsroom, which is 
created to function as the perfect built environment for journalistic work. 
Social media users consume these posts in everyday life situations like the 
bus stop, the restroom, a train ride, a coffee shop, a couch or a bed.  
This increasingly common environment for media consumption undermines 
or even eliminates most of the professional ethos that is traditionally attached 
to the research, fact-checking and subsequent production of news and other 
journalistic content. By sharing media content, the individual consumer in-
stantaneously becomes a distributor of news or other content — without ever 
going through the extensive training and experience that a professional editor 
still needs to go through at most established media publishers. The phenome-
non aided by the “Internet’s deprofessionalization of knowledge” gained217 
notoriety in the 2016 U.S. election through several widely publicized “fake 
news” stories. Using Cass Sunstein’s understanding of these dynamics as “in-
formation cascades” David Weinberger summarizes: the spreading of rumors 
or “fake news” online as “information cascades of false and harmful ideas … 
217  Mele, The End of Big, 202.
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that not only gain velocity from the ease with which they can be forwarded 
but gain credibility by how frequently they are forwarded.”218 While the po-
tential harm done by information cascades as “fake news” is evident, the most 
recent example of widespread false news — the 2016 presidential election 
in the United States — shows that the current impact of these manipulation 
attempts are more limited than one might think. The notion that “fake news” 
articles decisively shaped the election results has been falsified in a study run 
by Stanford University, which found that “the average American saw and re-
membered 0.92 pro-Trump fake news stories and 0.23 pro-Clinton fake news 
stories, with just over half of those who recalled seeing fake news stories be-
lieving them.” The researchers conclude that “for fake news to have changed 
the outcome of the election, a single fake article would need to have had the 
same persuasive effect as 36 television campaign ads.”219 To put it heedfully: 
This is highly unlikely. 
The results of this study, however, do not warrant analytical complacency. 
Even if the impact of false news reports were limited in this case, the struc-
tural problem remains. Applying Pariser‘s concept of the filter bubble, Mele 
points out that if information built on a specific world view hits a community 
that is susceptible to information reinforcing this specific world view, pola-
rizing information cascades are the result. This dynamic is not only relevant 
for evidently false news, but also those news that actively play into prejudice 
to earn the trust of the consumer: “Everything might technically be true but 
is manipulated to appeal to the specific person reading it.”220 This societal 
practice not only erodes the source for generating common opinions. In the 
long run, it also undermines the source for generating common facts that 
can ground a constructive debate of contrasting opinions. This demonstrates 
how news geared towards high click-rates on filtered social media platforms 
218  David Weinberger, Too Big to Know: Rethinking Knowledge Now That the Facts Aren’t the 
Facts, Experts Are Everywhere, and the Smartest Person in the Room Is the Room (New 
York: Basic Books, 2011), 117.
219  Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 31:2 (2017): 211–236, accessed February 28, 2017, http://
web.stanford.edu/%7Egentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf.
220  Mele, The End of Big, 132.
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amplify the convergence of public and private, and erode the experiential and 
epistemic basis for intercontextual discourse, thereby also eroding the (re-)
generation of the “bridging capital” described by Robert Putnam.221
Especially if the impact of false news stories remains disputed, ever-increa-
sing clarity on the terms and concepts in use is helpful. After the first wave 
of outrage  passed after the U.S. 2016 election, an appropriate weariness of 
the simplistic term “fake news” became evident, giving way to a growing dri-
ve towards distinctions. Citing the Digital News Report 2017 published by 
the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University, Laura 
Hazard Owen introduces three basic distinctions: “Definitions of ‘fake news’ 
are fraught with difficulty and respondents frequently mix up three catego-
ries: (1) news that is ‘invented’ to make money or discredit others; (2) news 
that has a basis in fact, but is ‘spun’ to suit a particular agenda; and (3) news 
that people don’t feel comfortable about or don’t agree with.”222 Claire Wardle 
introduces as many as seven distinctions in different areas and contexts: sati-
re or parody, misleading content, imposter content, fabricated content, false 
connection, false context, manipulated content.223
221  Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). For an explanation of “bridging capital” see the 
following chapter.
222  Laura Hazard Owen, “Do you trust the news, or do you trust your news? In the U.S., 
there’s a huge gap between the two,” Nieman Lab, June 23, 2017, accessed July 16, 2017, 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/06/do-you-trust-the-news-or-do-you-trust-your-news-
in-the-u-s-theres-a-huge-gap-between-thetwo/. For the full report cf. “Digital News 
Report 2017,” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, accessed July 16, 2017, ht-
tps://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Report%20
2017%20web_0.pdf?utm_source=digitalnewsreport.org&utm_medium=referral.
223  Cf. Claire Wardle, “Fake news. It’s complicated,” First Draft, February 16, 2017, accessed 
July 16, 2017, https://firstdraftnews.com/fake-news-complicated/.
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C. How We Might Rebuild the Public Sphere 
__________
It is the purpose of this chapter to introduce intercontextuality as the struc-
tural backbone of the public sphere. In contrast to many of the definitions 
reconstructed above,224 this approach focuses less on accessibility or a mass 
audience, but on that which bridges different contexts.
Without mentioning the concept of intercontextuality explicitly, Eli Pariser 
provides an account of the intercontextual constitution of the public sphere 
in The Filter Bubble. Drawing from Robert Putnam’s study Bowling Alone, Pa-
riser identifies two kinds of social capital: “in-group-oriented ‘bonding’ capi-
tal created when you attend a meeting of your college alumni” and “‘bridging’ 
capital, which is created at an event like a town meeting when people from 
lots of different backgrounds come together to meet each other.” Bridging 
capital, Pariser states, is potent: “Build more of it, and you’re more likely to 
be able to find that next job or an investor for your small business, because it 
allows you to tap into lots of different networks for help.”225 
Personalized communication bubbles in the digital realm resemble the col-
lege alumni meeting, and therefore build up “bonding capital,” while an in-
tercontextual digital communication network would resemble the town hall 
meeting, thus building up “bridging capital.” So the problematic core of the 
cult of personalization is its narrow focus on bonding capital: “Our virtual 
net-door neighbors look more and more like our real-world neighbors, and 
our real-world neighbors look more and more like us.” The narrow focus on 
bonding is problematic because it is “bridging that creates our sense of the 
‘public’ — the space where we address the problems that transcend our ni-
ches and narrow self-interests.”226 The following sub-chapters explore the po-
tential paths from a narrow focus on bonding capital toward a broader focus 
on bridging capital and interpret them in terms of the intercontextual cons-
titution of the public. The chapters sketch a theoretical framework by develo-
224  Cf. Religion Past and Present, “Public,” 533. Brockhaus Enzyklopäd ie, “Öffentlichkeit,” 
681. Staatslexikon, “Öffentlichkeit,” 138f. Webster’s Dictionary, “2public,” 932.
225  Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 17.
226  Ibid.
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ping a proposal for communicative universalism, grounding it in a decisively 
relational anthropology, introducing a communicability criterium for public 
institutions in the form of institutional multilingualism, and constructing an 
argument for deliberative democracy.
1. Communicative Universalism
Postmodern skeptics have successfully established a popular stream of aca-
demics in the humanities doubting the value and validity of various univer-
salisms. Many of the modern variants of universalist concepts of reason have 
their roots in the Enlightenment, and while postmodern thought still draws 
heavily from this post-Enlightenment tradition, it rejects absolutist or sup-
ra-contextual interpretations of it. While postmodern thought is far from a 
position of dominance in Western academia, it has extended its influence far 
beyond the confessional exponents of its own schools. Since this thesis does 
not hold space for an appropriately thorough investigation of this develop-
ment, it must suffice to postulate the diagnosis of a widespread weariness of 
universalism and, in some cases, a rejection of truth claims altogether. The 
relativist equivalent in popular culture, often occurring in conjunction with 
emotional experientialism, has led to the rise of the notions of “post-factual 
society” or “post-truth democracy” — more often than not used as a deroga-
tory term by opponents of relativism.
Given our limitations here, we cannot adequately arbitrate this conflict. But 
it is necessary to clarify the theoretical foundations of the proposed interpre-
tation of intercontextuality as the backbone of the public sphere. We can do 
so by recalling the words of Jürgen Habermas who describes democracy as 
an “epistemically demanding, fundamentally truth-sensitive form of gover-
nment” built on a “deliberative form of politics.”227 This deliberative form of 
politics always requires a certain degree of idealism, or universalism. With the 
postmodern critique of absolutist universalisms in mind, however, it is im-
portant to distinguish the communicative universalism proposed here from 
the absolutist versions of universalism. Characteristic for these versions are 
227  Habermas, “Religion in der Öffentlichkeit,” 150f. The German original: The constitutional 
state is an “epistemisch anspruchsvolle, gewissermaßen wahrheitsempfindliche Regie-
rungsform” since it necessarily relies on a “deliberative Form von Politik.”
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their assertion of universal reason abstracted from contextual experience.228 
In contrast, a more concrete concept of universalism can value contextual 
knowledge and experience without discarding the notion of truth altogether. 
This more pragmatic understanding of idealism avoids the tendency in abs-
tract universalisms to simply idolize the personal opinions of the dominant 
person with the social power to define what is reasonable.
This is necessary, because an abstract concept of reason, however much 
hard work might be invested in its development and presentation, often 
amounts to little more than a private opinion with the official badge of public 
honor announcing universal truth. Such an abstract universalism is under 
constant temptation to slide off into fanatical warfare of either the psycholo-
gical or even the physical sort, because of its inherent tendency to foster an 
aura of high stake culture clash between friends and foes. Paradoxically, an 
absolutist and abstract definition of truth often results in a dilemma similar 
to the one created by absolute relativism: Both when there are no objective 
criteria for truth and when absolutist universalisms rely on abstract asserti-
on, we find ourselves in a situation of competing truth claims without any 
possible procedures of non-violent arbitration. Both a relativist scenario and 
an absolutist scenario, therefore, have a tendency to encourage the desire for 
an authoritative arbiter of truth — usually a strongman exhibiting features of 
brute force — since they create an epistemic version of Carl Schmitt’s theory 
of decisionism based on one simple baseline: “Sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception.”229 
The exception, Schmitt writes, can never be fully codified by the existing 
legal order and is constituted by a “case of extreme peril, a danger to the 
existence of the state, or the like.” Key to his point is that the exception “can-
not be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.”230 
If this is true, then an absolutist relativism invites the strongman as the one 
who announces what qualifies as the exception and determines the course of 
228  Hegel uses the Latin origins of the word “abstract” and fills it with the meaning of “being 
pulled off from” experience. In Hegel’s vocabulary it is an almost pejorative term. Its po-
sitive opposite is “concrete” which Hegel, using the Latin roots, interprets as “growing 
together”.
229  Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, ed. Tracy B. 
Strong, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Univ. Press, 2007), 5.
230  Ibid., 6.
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action when such a case of exception is announced. And an abstract univer-
salism invites the strongman as the one who crushes all other truth claims 
and prevails against all threats of encountered contradiction and resistance. 
Both options are not desirable in the eyes of a communicative universalism 
that values contextual experience and is aware of the limitations to calculated 
predictability while contending something universally communicable as inhe-
rent to every context which — with enough dedication to the process — can 
be translated or at least tentatively related in some form of human communi-
cation, including art, music, mathematics, poetry, prose, prayer, gestures and 
other forms of bodily expression.
In contrast to abstract universalisms like the supremacist rationalism of the 
colonial period, a communicative universalism bases its executive process on 
“communicative power” and not a “conventional ‘hard’ account” of transac-
tional power of “conflicting actors.” This communicative power is described 
by Habermas as “self-limiting.”231 Wolfgang Huber relates this trait direct-
ly to the institutional design of liberal democracy, arguing that the “princi-
pal argument in favor of the democratic system of government is its ethical 
self-limitation.” Citing Kant’s famous distinction between the state’s power to 
coerce behavior and the Church’s power to influence the heart, Huber states: 
“A free and democratic state under the rule of law does not claim to control 
the morality of its citizens.”232 
Hence, communicative power is the only form of power truly suitable for 
liberal democracy, since “it influences the premises of judgment and decisi-
on making in the political system without intending to conquer the system 
itself.”233 Even though many self-proclaimed “realist” accounts would dismiss 
such an account of power as a “normative aspiration” without “relation to 
what exists” in politics, the use of communicative power in politics and other 
forms of social engagement is evident.234 Communicative action oriented to-
231  John Dryzek, André Bächtiger, Karolina Milewicz, “Toward a Deliberative Global Citi-
zens’ Assembly”, Global Policy 2:1 (2011): 39.
232 Huber, Ethics, 161.
233  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 486f.
234  Many diplomatic practices and treaty negotiations cannot be sufficiently explained with 
a merely transactional theory of power. This calls into question the validity of the term 
“realism” used to distinguish normative from transactional accounts in (international) 
politics.
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wards “reciprocal understanding, reason giving and persuasion in terms of 
collectively held norms … exists, and takes effect, even in very unlikely places 
– such as negotiations between states over security issues.”235 
In summary, the intercontextual universalism proposed here rejects ab-
stract assertions of universal reason and substitutes them with a concrete, 
communicative and inherently intersubjective version of a relational univer-
salism. With Jürgen Habermas this version of universalism recognizes the 
“paradigmatic role of communication” as its key foundation.236 Guided by 
his appropriation of the phenomenological concept of the Lebenswelt, this 
communicative universalism appreciates the embeddedness of human life in 
socially influenced life worlds, as well as the pragmatist insights into the pri-
mary influence of lived experience and language on the hermeneutic process 
of the individual and its social action.
2. Relational Anthropology
A communicative universalism which acknowledges both the “paradig-
matic role of communication” and sensitivity for truth in a “deliberative form 
of politics” is necessarily based in in “the insight that we humans are relatio-
nal beings.”237 Huber exposes the deep link of such a relational anthropology 
to the themes of communication and freedom when he points out that free-
dom of opinion “presupposes a functioning public sphere.”238 He cites Kant 
as an early exponent of a relational philosophy that recognizes the integral 
connection of deliberation and expression. In an essay on what it means to 
orient oneself in thinking Kant writes: “the external authority that snatches 
away from the people the freedom to communicate their thoughts in public” 
also deprives them of “the freedom to think.”239 
Kant draws out the epistemological dimension of communication and in-
troduces a responsible “external authority” as the institutional guarantee for 
individual freedom. Huber radicalizes Kant’s thought on the connection of 
235  Dryzek et al., “Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly,” 39.
236  Winfried Dallmayr, introduction to Materialien zu Habermas’ ‘Erkenntnis und Interesse’, 
ed. Winfried Dallmayr (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 15.
237  Huber, Ethics, 221.
238  Ibid., 86.
239  Immanuel Kant, “Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? [1786],” in Kant-Studienaus-
gabe, vol. 3, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1956), A 326.
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deliberation and expression by interpreting communication as a necessary 
precondition for deliberation: “the possibility of communicating our ideas to 
one another is an indispensable precondition for the critical examination of 
the correctness of these ideas.”240 Huber summarizes this as “a shift of per-
spective from … the individual as homo oeconomicus, the economic human, 
interested only in his or her own advantage, to the homo communicativus, the 
communicative human.” Ultimately, he concludes, “we humans are … relati-
onal and communicative beings.”241 
3. Institutional Multilingualism
As we have seen, both analytical theories of and normative ethics for in-
stitutions need to take relationality into account. Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, 
writing about the institution of the church, does this by introducing a com-
municability criterium. A key goal for institutions is to achieve the “greatest 
possible communicability in the general political and societal discourse.”242 
This is especially true for public institutions, since their constituency is not 
some narrow interest or target group, but the general public. If we understand 
the public as constituted through intercontextuality, then the communica-
bility criterium requires more than one set of communicative tools and the 
translation between the various iterations of the public comes into focus. It is 
the translation capacity between different contexts that determines an insti-
tution’s publicness. Only an institution that is able to provide intercontextual 
facilitation through a form of communicative multilingualism can be called 
a truly public institution.243 
This theoretical conclusion is not just relevant for the ethics of institutions 
in a given culture or nation state. It also has significant fallout for the institu-
tional ethos within public institutions: An institution whose communicative 
capacity is limited to a technocratic, administrative language with no tools 
240  Huber, Ethics, 86.
241  Ibid., 221.
242  Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, “Öffentliche Theologie in der Zivilgesellschaft,” in Grundtexte 
Öffentliche Theologie, ed. Florian Höhne and Frederike van Oorschot (Leipzig: Evangeli-
sche Verlagsanstalt, 2015), 215.
243  Heinrich Bedford-Strohm unintentionally limits his concept to bilateral communication 
when he uses the term Zweisprachigkeit — bilingualism — for it. Since public communi-
cation is never limited to only two participants, the term Mehrsprachigkeit — multilingu-
alism — holds more of what Bedford-Strohm describes.
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outside of this specialized language is simply not a public institution. This 
radical realization demonstrates that the theoretical framework established 
here is an instance of critical theory, since few institutions currently conside-
red “public institutions” do actually live up to the critical ideal sketched here. 
This critical ideal, however, points to space and provides direction for the 
reform and conscious evolution of existing institutions.
How does this relate to the working definition of an institution provi-
ded above? The concept of the institution as a structural network architec-
ture implies a complex communication process in the institution. A merely 
technocratic set of communicative tools might well be sufficient for most offi-
cial processes within this institution. For public institutions, this technocratic 
set of communicative tools might also be necessary to fulfill the task to expec-
tably and concretely coordinate interactions of individual agents. This expec-
tability criterium is vital, because the very concept of an institution “refers to 
the entirety of the permanently constituted and thus dependably regulated 
forms of (a) the interaction of personal systems with their social and natural 
environment, and (b) the thereby constituted social systems with their social 
and natural environments.”244 
The “dependably regulated forms of the interaction of personal systems 
with their social and natural environment” requires a language accessible to 
all with an appropriate amount of effort. Hence, parliaments communicate 
their passed laws in the form of legal language. The precision and theoretical 
grounding of specialized legal terminology might initially exclude the un-
trained reader, but provides an expectability and concreteness that honors 
the purpose of the law. In this example, accessibility for every citizen is rea-
sonably secure through guarantees like the provision of a public defender for 
the defendant in a trial at court or plain language requirements for official 
communication of state institutions. If, however, the entire parliamentary 
process — not just the legal terminology in passed laws — would be restric-
ted to a specialized set of technocratic communicative tools, then this parli-
ament does not meet the communicability criterium established above and 
would neglect or even lose its status as a truly public institution. Plain lan-
guage on websites and forms, therefore, are not just disposable add-ons for a 
given public institution, but are, rather, at the institution’s constitutive core.
244  Religion Past and Present, “Institution.”
104
The recent success of authoritarian populism in liberal democracies around 
the world can at least partially be attributed to the restriction of seemingly 
public processes to a set of technocratic communicative tools inaccessible 
to the larger public, and in instances like the regulation of the finance sector 
even the majority of parliamentarians. The issues have become so complex 
that more intercontextual translation than ever is necessary for those res-
ponsible within public institutions in order to regain some of the publicness 
that was lost to the “riptide of technocracy.”245 In the critical-theoretical fra-
mework sketched here, institutional multilingualism in the communication 
of issues and processes of relevance to the public is the key to a broad base of 
legitimacy — the final dimension of our working definition of institutions. It 
is this last dimension that determines the publicness of the institution. Put 
simply: The broader the intercontextual base and skill, the more public the 
institution.
The challenge of technocracy points to one of the key components of the 
institutional ethos in a given institution: the professional ethos fostered by 
those holding responsible positions in the institution. The fact that leaders 
of institutions are, through some form of election or appointment process, 
given their responsible position for a limited period of time alongside an en-
dowment of privileges to fulfill their tasks and duties well, illustrates how 
the ethics of institutions are closely tied in general to the field of professional 
ethics. Institutions are what John Dryzek and his colleagues consider “empo-
wered space” as distinguished from “public space.” In a slight reinterpreta-
tion of the terms I consider spaces like those associated with parliamentary 
positions or most other institutional leadership positions empowered in the 
sense that the public or a certain large constituency intentionally creates pro-
tections or rights usually not given to private persons in order to ensure the 
free exercise of responsible leadership in the given position. Examples for 
this would be the immunity and salaries of parliamentarians, who, as public 
servants, should not be beholden to specific interest groups and need to be 
protected from the interference of the executive branch to ensure the separa-
tion of power and the mutual checks and balances imposed on each branch 
of government exercising public authority.
245  Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Im Sog der Technokratie. Kleine Politische Schriften XII (Berlin: 
Suhrkamp, 2013). See also William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dic-
tators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2013).
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The fact that responsible positions in (public) institutions are endowed 
with certain additional, unique empowerments, and the resulting pertinence 
of professional ethics introduces accountability as a key feature of institutio-
nal ethics. Dryzek et. al. consider the public space that space which allows for 
“relatively unconstrained communicative action” through, for instance, the 
“transnational media, internet forums, NGOs, citizen initiatives, activist pu-
blicizing and gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and World So-
cial Forum.” While this public space can also always “feature obstructions to 
deliberation from public relations, spin, propaganda and deception,” it boasts 
a clear normative ideal of deliberative discourse and mutual recognition. In 
their specific application of the term for the field of international relations, 
Dryzek et. al. understand empowered space to feature “authority exercised by 
and in international governmental organizations, international negotiations, 
regimes and states.” Both public space and empowered space can be “delibe-
rative internally” and “deliberative in their relationships with each other” — 
especially in the “transmission [of power] from public space to empowered 
space, and the accountability of empowered space to public space.”246 Relating 
this to our discussion of communicative universalism, we can conclude that 
the accountability of public institutions and those in responsible positions 
within them includes intercontextual facilitation through the contextually 
sensitive communication we called institutional multilingualism.
4. Deliberative Democracy
A promising response to the transformation of the public sphere and the 
challenge to the institutional design of liberal democracy is the approach of 
deliberative democracy. The central insight of the concept is that the source 
of “political legitimacy is to be found in the right” and not merely in positive 
law — in Recht as opposed to Gesetz. Legitimacy, therefore, depends on the 
“opportunity and capacity of those subject to a collective decision (or their 
representatives) to participate in consequential deliberation about the decisi-
on.” Dryzek et. al. define deliberation as a “particular kind of communication, 
ideally featuring the giving of reasons and making of points in terms that can 
be accepted by other participants,” as well as “non-coercion and reflection.”247 
This conceptual significance of deliberative democracy is not limited to the 
246  Dryzek et al., “Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly,” 40.
247  Ibid., 36.
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institutional design of the political process, but has implications for all public 
institutions. Postcolonial thought might be tempted to consider the approach 
of communicative action through deliberative democracy another abstract 
universalism that has “no relation to what exists” or at least is incompatible 
with non-western concepts of communal reasoning. The opposite, however, 
is the case. Communicative action as “reciprocal understanding, reason gi-
ving and persuasion in terms of collectively held norms” is evident in virtu-
ally all cultures.248 The characteristic “palaver in some African societies,” for 
instance, is “a form of conflict resolution through dialogue, sometimes with a 
leader acting as a mediator” and “has deliberative features.” In fact, the con-
cept of communicative action resonates “far more easily” in “Confucian, Isla-
mic and many indigenous cultures” than “the adversarial politics associated 
with competitive elections” in individualistic societies. Deliberative citizen 
forums, for instance, have been established “successfully in diverse cultural 
settings, with generally similar effects on their participants.”249
Prominent examples for the field of conflict resolution and transitional ju-
stice are the Gachacha courts after the genocide in Rwanda, and the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission after the political abolition of Apartheid in 
South Africa. This renders criticism claiming that the concept of deliberati-
ve democracy is nothing but an innovative version of Western hegemonic 
thinking little more than intellectual arrogance, or even a form of sophisti-
cated culturalism aserting that such a complex concept could only resonate 
with the enlightened tradition of the West. Some distinctions are nonethe-
less appropriate. To exposit the features unique to Western political theory, 
economist Amartya Sen points out, that “democracy as voting is a western 
construct, while democracy as public reason is universal.”250 
The challenge of intercontextual facilitation is not just posed by the reali-
ties in well-established and relatively homogeneous body politics like nation 
states with a more or less consistent recent history of democracy. The dyna-
mics of globalization and the challenges of international dialogue on global 
threats renders this challenge an intercultural one. A successful intercultural 
case of intercontextual facilitation was the international conversation on hu-
248  Ibid., 39.
249  Ibid., 37.
250  Amartya Sen, “Why Democratization is not the Same as Westernization: Democracy and 
its Global Roots,” New Republic 4 (2003): 28–36.
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man rights emerging after World War II. The Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) was, eventually, signed by all major nation states and 
virtually all others, and remains the key language to appeal to in the case of 
gross violations of human dignity, despite the fact that not all states always 
adhere to the principles they signed up for.
While the success of the UDHR demonstrates the possibility of intercon-
textual facilitation across starkly different cultures, the practical commun-
cation within the institutions established for that purpose remains difficult. 
Dryzek et. al. take this into account when they point out that “cross-cultural 
deliberation may nonetheless present challenges if participants from different 
cultures have different deliberative styles.”251 Their example is the contrast 
between aggressive argumentation and a consensual or deferential style.252 
Dryzek et. al. consider the facilitator crucial “to ensure that the exercise of 
any particular style is not allowed to dominate other styles.” To develop this 
approach further, the researchers propose to draw upon “plenty of experien-
ce with cross-cultural deliberation in national settings involving immigrant 
minorities and indigenous peoples.”253
251  Dryzek et al., “Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly,” 37.
252  Cf. Diego Gambetta, “Claro! An Essay on Discursive Machismo,” in Deliberative De-
mocracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1998), 107–140.
253  Dryzek et al., “Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly,” 37.
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V. Intercontextuality
110
A. How Institutions Can Serve as Congregational Spaces 
__________
Informed by Hegelian dialectics and basic notions of Christian ecclesiology, 
one might understand institutions as concrete congregational spaces of inter-
contextual experience. An institution is not simply an aggregate of inherently 
separate contexts, but rather includes the conversational space between them. 
It is therefore a con-gregational rather than a merely ag-gregating space. The 
more institutional mainline churches, and organized religion in general, lose 
legitimacy as inclusive platforms for mediation, the more urgent deliberation 
on the general institutionality of public life becomes: What can fill the void 
and who can take over the task of providing integrating gravitational centers 
for societies in need of constant regeneration for the sources of social cohe-
sion?
The theoretical notion of institutions as “concrete congregational spaces of 
intercontextual experience” can serve as a helpful hermeneutic in practical 
issues. The development of the two major political parties in the United States 
demonstrates this: The Democratic and Republican parties have historically 
served as a space for uniting interests, not by eradicating ideological differen-
ces — in fact, a southern Democrat might have more ideological overlap with 
a northeastern Republican than with many northeastern Democrats — but by 
providing an organized space for the coordination of interaction around speci-
fic policy goals. During the twentieth and twenty-first century the expectabili-
ty and concreteness of this coordination started to break down. Today, the two 
parties are less a congregational, and more an aggregating space for fragmen-
ted ideologies forged and fueled in digital and non-digital echo chambers.254 
254  Researchers of political partisanship in the U.S. Congress conclude: “We find that despite 
short-term fluctuations, partisanship or non-cooperation in the U.S. Congress has been 
increasing exponentially for over 60 years with no sign of abating or reversing. Yet, a 
group of representatives continue to cooperate across party lines despite growing par-
tisanship.” Cf. Clio Andris et. al., “The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in 
the U.S. House of Representatives,” PLoS ONE, 10:4 (2015), accessed November 4, 2016, 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0123507.
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The Tea Party’s obstruction of intra- and inter-party cooperation is only one 
of the examples of the consequences.255
While merely aggregating spaces allow for abstract living next to each 
other, congregational spaces foster concrete living with each other. I use the 
terms abstract and concrete in a Hegelian way here, meaning that “abstract” 
refers to the subject being “pulled off ” from the object, and that “concrete” 
refers to the subject “growing together” with the object. One could also apply 
the concepts of negative unity and positive unity respectively. Another hel-
pful concept is romanticism’s notion of the “union of unity and difference” 
(Einheit von Einheit und Differenz). While a merely negative unity can only 
hold difference next to each other, positive unity can achieve a union of both 
unity and difference. Hence, it allows for both toleration of difference, and 
forging of unity. Conversational institutions, using communicative action as 
a yardstick for integrity, as well as consciously opening up congregational 
spaces of intercontextual experience, are capable of relativizing competing 
truth claims by relating different experiences to each other without denying 
the concept of truth altogether. Thereby, they allow for the expectable and 
concrete consensus around specific policy goals by building common ground 
for deliberative communication.
Institutions in contemporary liberal democracies are increasingly strug-
gling to fulfill their role as intercontextual mediators between contexts. They 
struggle to keep the existing communication channels open, and often fail 
to open up expectable and concrete frontiers of necessary conversations bet-
ween given contexts. Public Theology must take this up as a task for its theo-
logical reflection and practical participation in public life.
255  This summarizing statement needs qualification: Recently, Matt Kibbe, one of the defi-
ning thinkers of the contemporary libertarian movement in the United States, has sought 
out dialogue with thinkers from very different traditions and movements, among them 
progressive activist Heather McGee in a conversation aired on public radio. Cf. Heather 
McGee and Matt Kibbe, “Repairing the Breach,” On Being with Krista Tippett, April 6, 
2017, accessed July 16, 2017, https://onbeing.org/programs/heather-mcghee-and-matt-
kibbe-repairing-the-breach/. The context for the conversation was Citizen University’s 
annual conference in March 2017: “Citizen University National Conference: Reckoning 
and Repair in America,” Citizen University, accessed July 15, 2017, http://www.citizenuni-
versity.us/wp-content/uploads/CU-2017-program-FINAL.pdf.
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B. Why Intercontextuality Trumps Contextualism 
_________
The future of institutions matters for Public Theology, because the conditions 
for the publicness of Public Theology are impacted by the institutional arran-
gements tasked with guaranteeing the inclusivity of public deliberation on 
relevant issues. Given its normative commitments, Public Theology cannot 
remain neutral on this matter, since the erosion of institutional guarantees 
for inclusivity, as well as checks and balances in public discourse gives rise to 
a form of communicative anarchy that rewards the loudest, most aggressive 
and dramatic voice, instead of the one putting forth the strongest argument. 
Public Theology must resist this form of communicative darwinism in the 
public sphere, and must critique the survival-of-the-fittest practices in the 
digital attention economy.
Similarly, Public Theology cannot accept hegemonic institutions using 
their public authority to exclude key voices reflecting upon and interpreting 
human reality. Once again, intercontextuality comes into focus. The public in 
Public Theology simply does not allow for a purely contextualist approach, in 
which contextual experience becomes the sole authority of discourse and is 
treated like a source of mystical revelation. But while contextualism is incom-
patible with Public Theology, a contextual approach remains key for Public 
Theology, since it strives for an ever more inclusive conversation on public 
issues from diverse perspectives, thereby achieving a degree of intercontextu-
ality warranting the term public deliberation.
Every deliberation of Public Theology on public issues of its time, neces-
sarily includes a conscious deliberation on space and vantage point: Who 
deliberates in which space and in what time? But, again, since Public Theo-
logy strives for an ever more inclusive conversation, this cannot mean giving 
up truth claims or all kinds of universal conversation. Since Public Theology 
can be conceived of as a joint deliberation for the common good, it must find 
points of connection between the contextual contributions and link them th-
rough the rough and arduous process of embodied and holistic negotiation. 
It is therefore not contextualism, but intercontextuality that Public Theology 
can embrace with integrity.
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Applied to the issue of institutions, we must ask: Who makes sure everyone 
can participate and how is safe space and sufficient time for open conversati-
on guaranteed for all — and not just the few that can scream loud enough to 
win in the darwinistic battle for attention? How can skills of intercontextual 
discourse be learnt and who teaches them how and with what interest? Since 
postcolonial theory calls us to be careful in answering this question, for the 
answer to it might constitute new forms of colonial hegemony, the prime 
candidate cannot be contextualist organizations advocating for special inte-
rests (1), nor can it be specific individuals generously funding a forum (2), 
and it also cannot be the immediate community of family or tribe alone since 
natural and political segregation has led to separate experiences with rather 
juxtaposed positions and potentially antagonistic attitudes that make inter-
contextual facilitation very difficult (3).
The effects of these three shortcomings of conversational spaces can be ob-
served in Al-Malikis ethnicist policies in Iraq after the Bush invasion. It can 
be observed in some of South Africa‘s post-Apartheid discourse which strug-
gles to bridge the gaps in experience that continue to exist due to economic 
entrenchment of community segregation, and remain virtually as strong as 
during Apartheid itself. And all three shortcomings have also become visible 
in the political climate of the United States. Economically segregated com-
munities separated by urban planning struggle to speak to and understand 
each other (see Black Lives Matter), the strength of special interest has disil-
lusioned many voters and fueled support for anti-establishment politicians 
during important elections (see Trump, Cruz, Sanders), and the overpowe-
ring influence of certain individuals has caused deep anger and distrust in the 
democratic process itself (see the Koch brothers controversy after the Supre-
me Court‘s Citizens United decision).
The only possible candidate for an ever more inclusive conversation lies in 
the safe space for communication created by inclusive institutions. If Public 
Theology wants to take its publicness seriously, it can simply not ignore the 
wellbeing of institutions that open up congregational spaces of safe commu-
nication. If Herbert Spencer was right in conceiving of society “as an orga-
nism” with institutions “as its organs,”256 then the concept of intercontextuali-
ty brings into focus how these organs coordinate the action of individual cells 
256  Religion Past and Present, “Institution.”
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on one hand, and how they serve as an integral part to the societal organism 
writ large on the other hand. Intercontextuality, therefore, is at the heart of 
all social fact, which for Emile Durkheim is not a merely analytic category, 
but a “synthetic combination of individual and collective action and consci-
ousness.”257 
257  Ibid.
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C. How Institutions Arbitrate Intercontextual Conflict 
_________
The realization that all social groups develop distinct rules, norms and cul-
tures, which eventually will clash with distinct rules, norms and cultures in 
other social groups, helps clarify the practical role that institutions play in 
the arbitration of intercontextual conflict. Peter Heintel discusses this com-
municative role of institutions in his addendum to Berger’s article in Religi-
on Past and Present. Social science, he contends, has “neglected … logical 
contradiction.” By that he means the “necessary and unavoidable conflicts 
that are permanently in need of regulation” in society. Contradictions, he 
thinks, can be identified at the level of “basic existential contradictions“ and 
the “systemic-cultural-historical level.” The level of basic existential needs in-
cludes “fundamental contradictions between human beings and nature, man 
and woman, young and old, life and death.” In relative contrast, the level of 
systems, culture and history includes “contradictions that emerge at the pe-
riphery of social structures between different cultures and between different 
systems.” Heintel identifies a dialectic in these contradictions: “they are basi-
cally insoluble, although they must always be solved, because otherwise con-
certed action would be impossible.”258 
With this heuristic perspective, the central task for institutions — the ar-
bitration of insoluble conflict — appears to be an “impossible necessity.”259 
For Heintel, this does not come as a surprise. Theological and philosophical 
anthropology, he says, have shown that “the nature of the human being is 
in itself contradictory.” Heintel therefore develops a definition he considers 
“paradoxical yet adequate”: “institutions are constructions that attempt to 
provide durable answers to insoluble contradictions. The fact that this is im-
possible describes the finiteness of their authority, while the fact that this is 
258  Ibid. 
259  Cf. Schlegel, Theologie als unmögliche Notwendigkeit.
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also necessary and not a construction of illusion lends them a metahistorical 
appearance.” Durable institutions, therefore, “have always been located wit-
hin the most basic existential contradictions.”260
Heintel wants to critique an understanding of institutions that rests solely 
on rationalist proceduralism: “Institutions that exist on the basis of agree-
ments over rules of functional cooperation” are less likely to be perceived as 
real institutions, since in an agreement the relationship to the contractual 
partner appears changeable. On the contrary, the existential contradiction 
that requires constant arbitration will always call for institutional response, 
and can therefore sustain an institution beyond its founding impulse, while 
the functional cooperation can seize to be relevant, if the function served by 
the institution is no longer needed. Heintel’s approach encourages awareness 
of where intercontextuality as a form of publicity in the digital age is most 
needed: “institutions and their answers [are] constructed entities”261 and, th-
erefore, subject to a process of construction. If the process of construction 
is dominated by one particular context, interest, or group, the institution’s 
arbitration capability collapses instantly. Applying Heintel’s thought to what 
our examination of intercontextuality has brought to the fore, we can conclu-
de: The degree of arbitration capability depends on the degree of legitimacy, 
which in turn depends on the degree of inclusivity, which in turn depends on 
the degree of intercontextuality.
260  Religion Past and Present, “Institution.” The version of the quote given here is a correc-
ted translation from the original German: “Die langlebigsten Institutionen waren daher 
immer in den existentiellen Grundwidersprüchen angesiedelt.” Cf. Die Religion in Ge-
schichte und Gegenwart, “Institution,” 4th edition, ed. Hans Dieter Betz et al., accessed 
December 17, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2405-8262_rgg4_-COM_10462.
261  Ibid.
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VI. Theology
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A. Why Theology Must Engage the Issue 
_________
What can theology contribute to this conversation? Most conferences and 
conversations attempting to analyze the trends of the digital age are conduc-
ted as analytical processes that identify what is happening or predict what 
might happen in the future. Theology, with its normative commitments, adds 
a new dimension: What should be happening? The analytical process is, of 
course, a necessary condition for adequate normative reasoning. But nor-
mative reasoning goes beyond mere analysis and encourages us to practice 
agency — something that many analytical contexts would see as unscienti-
fic, arrogant and necessarily wanting. That mindset, however, is the safe path 
to either digital idolatry and naive belief in progress through technology, or 
something that could be called digital cynicism — the expressive belief that 
machines will take over, that our agency is gone, that it will all be bad and 
destructive, and life was better last year anyway. Public Theology can call us 
to a higher standard by starting a conversation on digital agency. And it can 
link the conversation on ethics in the digital spheres of human life with the 
longstanding discourse on institutions.
Eilert Herms notes that before sociological institutionalism picked up the 
issue, it was actually theology which led a discourse on the matter of insti-
tutions: “Since the middle of the 20th century, the Christian understanding 
of the social nature of the human being has been discussed by (Protestant 
as well as Catholic) theology in conjunction with a broad acceptance of the 
concept of institution.” The discussion encompassed the whole encyclopedia 
of theological disciplines, but focused particularly on practical theology, the 
history of ideas, church history, and the systematic disciplines fundamental 
theology, doctrinal theology and ethics, as well as the philosophy of religi-
on. As Herms points out, the concept was used in fundamental theology “to 
describe the social and communicative conditions that determine the cons-
titution of faith.” Doctrinal theology draws on the concept “to describe the 
created social nature of the human being and the condition of the historical 
world that emerged as a result of the Christ-event” — including matters of 
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church theory and the Christian social doctrine. And finally, ethics employs 
the concept “to distinguish between individual and socio-ethical problems, 
their comprehension, and their solution-oriented treatment.”262
262  Religion Past and Present, “Institution,” 4th edition, ed. Hans Dieter Betz et al., accessed 
December 17, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_COM_10462.
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B. How Public Theology Defines the Public Sphere 
_________
The fragmentation of the public sphere might seduce us to do away with the 
concept of the public altogether. Such an approach might use a postmodern 
digital version of Carl Schmitt’s understanding of the political as a constant 
struggle of friend and enemy, or even a non-democratic version of Thomas 
Hobbes’ response to the struggle of all against all. In both cases it could deny 
the reality of the public sphere and either denounce the appeals to it as a 
politically correct consensus cult denying the truly free play of politics or as 
an anti-institutional force that uses a dynamic interpretation of public life to 
erode the forces of the state which alone may have power to define public life.
Both options have decisionist tendencies and avoid all attempts at reconci-
liation or intercontextual conflict resolution. The Schmittian solution creates 
the anarchic opening for autocratic leadership — the one who has the power 
to declare a state of emergency which trumps all other decisions — and the 
Hobbesian solution facilitates the exclusion of all forces outside of the state’s 
institutions and power structures. Both, therefore, are impossible to reconcile 
with the commitments of liberal democracies. So in order to re-invent the 
institutions of liberal democracy, we need to find an understanding of the 
public sphere that does justice to the contextual realities of pluralism without 
destroying all bonds of intercontextual dialogue ensured by the traditional 
notion of a coherent public sphere.
With the backdrop of definitions from encyclopedias and dictionaries cited 
above, I will turn to Public Theology for inspiration on how to conceptuali-
ze the public for a pluralist society. American theologian David Tracy urges 
theology to consider the public sphere in its work and writes that “a drive 
towards the public must be present in all theologies.” Tracy states that theolo-
gians must care more for the “social realities (the actual ‘publics’) that imbue 
each and every theology” and need to explain more how the “general ‘public’ 
of all theological talk is realized into the diverse, but connected disciplines.”263 
263  David Tracy, “Eine Verteidigung des öffentlichen Charakters der Theologie,” in Grundtex-
te Öffentliche Theologie, ed. Florian Höhne and Frederike van Oorschot (Leipzig: Evange-
lische Verlagsanstalt, 2015), 38.
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Tracy focuses on three different publics: church, society and academy. All 
theology, Tracy thinks, speaks to all three publics at once, but with conscious-
ness of contextual particularity.264
This desire to raise awareness for the contextuality of public life is import-
ant, considering that other theologians have used less differentiated concepts 
of the public sphere. John de Gruchy, for instance, speaks of the one pub-
lic square when he describes post-Apartheid challenges for South African 
theology: “The transition to democracy made clear the necessity of a new 
approach to theology in the public square.”265 Using words by David Tracy, de 
Gruchy’s compatriate Dirk J. Smit answers with a call for a public theology 
that “authentically represents a particular community’s vision of reality wi-
thout rendering that vision merely private.”266 Without giving an authoritative 
answer himself, Smit lays out the contradiction: Should Public Theology start 
with a concept of the one “naked public sphere” — or should it attempt to 
speak into the various fragmented publics?267
Building on a strong concept of discourse in civil society, German theolo-
gian Heinrich Bedford-Strohm emphasizes Public Theology’s goal to com-
bine the particular resources of its own tradition with the “greatest possible 
communicability in the general political and societal discourse.”268 It is the 
interplay of universality and particularity that creates the basis for the “so-
cial cohesion” on which the “liberal state” can rest.269 Particular traditions, 
Bedford-Strohm thinks, can provide “treasures of orientation” for “pluralistic 
publics.”270 The concept of a public beyond the state is also proposed by Ame-
rican theologian Max Stackhouse. The tradition of Public Theology, as Stack-
house sees it, is best illustrated by the work of the Civil Rights Movement in 
the twentieth century. Building on the “social ethos” of the “American public” 
in the tradition of philosopher John Locke, theologian Jonathan Edwards, 
264  Cf. ibid., 39—41.
265  John W. de Gruchy, “Von Politischer zu Öffentlicher Theologie. Die Rolle der Theologie 
im öffentlichen Leben in Südafrika,” in ibid., 116.
266  Dirk J. Smit, “Das Paradigma Öffentlicher Theologie. Entstehung und Entwicklung,” in 
ibid., 130.
267  Cf. ibid., 138.
268  Bedford-Strohm, “Öffentliche Theologie in der Zivilgesellschaft,” 215.
269  Bedford-Strohm builds on Böckenförde, Rawls and Habermas here. Cf. ibid., 216ff.
270  Ibid., 216.
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the Social Gospel movement around Walter Rauschenbusch and the political 
thought of Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson, Public Theology emer-
ged as a combination of “social and ethical realism” that was well-equipped 
for the “necessary reformation of society.”271
In contrast to the popular civil religion, this kind of Public Theology did 
not celebrate “the social system and its culture,” but rather changed it. And in 
contrast to Political Theology,272 it “did neither strive for political power, nor 
did it call for radical changes with utopian visions.”273 But it was “happy with 
the humble changes” that were achieved. Public Theology, in Stackhouse’s 
conception, “was and is a reform-oriented movement” and not “conservative 
or revolutionary.” Hence, Stackhouse considers Martin Luther King Jr. one 
of the exemplars of this “activistic and optimistic kind of Public Theology.” 
This kind of Public Theology brought change not so much through “direct 
political means, but through the transformation of the institutional structure 
of society and through changes to the inherited culture.”274
Like Abraham Lincoln’s political thought, this brand of Public Theology, 
can therefore be considered an exponent of reformist institutionalism. While 
Lincoln focused on the future of political institutions, Stackhouse includes 
the non-state institutions of civil society. His approach states that the “public 
is prior to the republic” and therefore zooms in on the multi-faceted “struc-
ture of civil society.”275 Even though this kind of Public Theology emphasizes 
the socio-theoretical elements of transformation and considers “politics not a 
lord, but a limited servant of other societal institutions,” Stackhouse cautions 
that it cannot be called “antipolitical“ because of its focus on institutions. The 
institutions he mentions include “police, military, juridical institutions, me-
dical institutions, educational institutions, and infrastructure.” With its “soci-
al realism” Public Theology can recognize the necessity of political structures 
and the use of state force for their maintenance, but it also calls for ways to 
271  Max L. Stackhouse, “Zivilreligion, Politische Theologie und Öffentliche Theologie. Was 
ist der Unterschied?,” in Grundtexte Öffentliche Theologie, ed. Florian Höhne and Frederi-
ke van Oorschot (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2015), 61.
272  In contrast to philosophy and the social and legal sciences, the term Political Theology 
usually does not refer to Carl Schmitt in the context of theological discourse. It most often 
refers to theologians opposing Schmitt (i.e. Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann).
273  Ibid., 61f.
274  Ibid., 62.
275  Ibid., 63.
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“organize and control political institutions in a way that blocks them from 
embracing or dominating the whole of life.”276 Here we see the affinity of Pu-
blic Theology and liberal democracy.
Stackhouse combines this reformist institutionalism with the question of 
the universal and the particular: “We must understand how these diverse pu-
blics can be embedded into a reliable system in an increasingly complex and 
global civil society.” The key question for Public Theology becomes, therefore, 
whether the public spheres of civil society “need a political order” or whether 
they themselves constantly “reconstruct” this order. As the citations above 
and the Böckenförde reference in particular demonstrate, Bedford-Strohm 
considers the pre-political realm as the source of moral regeneration for the 
political realm of a secular state that rests on foundations it cannot guaran-
tee itself if it does not want to jeopardize its liberal structure. Stackhouse 
agrees and identifies that Public Theology considers “the structure of society 
as decisive for every area of living together.” Put differently, “Public Theology 
wants to take up a social theory of politics, while Political Theology tends to a 
political understanding of society.” The key difference is that Political Theolo-
gy considers politics “the most comprehensive institution of society and the 
primary manifestation and guaranty for public justice.” But Stackhouse warns 
that a total focus on politics as the sole power exerting “control and leadership 
of all social institutions” is too narrow, since it ignores the importance of civil 
society. Civil society, however, is especially important when politics seizes to 
be “well-meaning” and rather becomes “authoritarian or totalitarian.”277 
In summary: The inclusion of civil society in the definitions of public sphe-
res and of the institutional structures of societal life evolves monolithic con-
cepts of the public and its institutions. This supports our attempt to develop 
a dynamic understanding of an intercontextual public and a network-based 
understanding of an institution as coordinated interaction.
276  Ibid.
277  Ibid., 66.
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C. How Public Theology Can Encourage Digital Agency 
__________
If Public Theology cannot ignore the wellbeing of institutions, how can 
it contribute to the discourse on it? Public Theology, I argue, is in fact well 
equipped to stimulate the conversation, as I will summarize in nine theses.
1. Encouraging Institutional Awareness
Public Theology, because of its awareness of human incompleteness and 
the need for expectable cooperation, can help us recognize that much, if not 
all of social reality is necessarily constituted through institutional coordina-
tion of interaction in one way or another. Public Theology does not simply 
hover above all institutional arrangements as a sort of dramatic spiritualist 
or ecclesial veil to opaque secular commitments. Rather, it can actively par-
ticipate in shaping the institutional conditions for the inclusive publicness of 
theological and secular discourse. It can critically reconstruct institutional 
arrangements from a theological perspective and therefore have transforma-
tive impact on the arrangements themselves.
2. Encouraging Anthropological Reflection
Public Theology can, in principle, provide publics with contextually infor-
med anthropological guidance by translating the Bible and contextual inter-
pretations thereof into discourses that would otherwise neglect such theolo-
gical material. The work of Reinhold Niebuhr, and his push for responsible 
intervention in World War II serves as one of the many examples for this. His 
theological realism informed the work of Martin Luther King Jr. and the pre-
sidency of Barack Obama, and continues to impact and sensitize political ac-
tors for anthropological dimensions of social action. It thereby fulfills the task 
of Politikberatung and informs political discourse with otherwise neglected 
perspectives from its narrative sources.
3. Encouraging Realistic Hope
Public Theology, informed by its anthropological guidance on the abilities 
and limitations of human living, can render the theological view of human 
incompleteness helpful for the adequate conception of institutions. Most 
paradigmatic theories of institutions — like Luther’s doctrine of God‘s two 
125
regiments, Hobbes’ covenantal theory of the state, or Kant’s political theory 
and philosophical ecclesiology — build on a thoroughly realist anthropology. 
All three paradigmatic examples ultimately derive their anthropology from 
a theological framework of human incompleteness, or even depravity. Pub-
lic Theology can, therefore, expose the humanness of institutions, and hence 
their finitude. But at the same time — and this is where purely secular sources 
have their limitation — this does not mean that Public Theology must fall 
into pessimistic skepticism or even cynical nihilism about human institu-
tions. Because it has a concept of redemption, salvation, and grace, Public 
Theology can develop a theory of hope for inclusive institutions, despite their 
limitations, moral failures, and human brokenness.
4. Encouraging Glocal Discourse
Public Theology can provide a bridge between various institutional and 
cultural realms. It can express a common call across state boundaries. The 
throughly global, and at the same time thoroughly local nature of the Church 
provides glocal channels of communication between the very local and the 
very global realms of cultural life and political deliberation.
5. Encouraging Milieu-Transcendence
Public Theology can provide a milieu-transcending perspective on life. It 
can bring the political realm and ecclesial realm into conversation like no 
other academic discipline. And it brings issues of justice and personal stories 
from local experiences into the broad global conversations, as well as into the 
technocratic discourses in states and institutions around the world.
6. Encouraging Transcendent Sensibility
Public Theology carries an sensibility for transcendent reality into mate-
rialist and pragmatist conversations. It opens up the „imminent frame,” as 
Charles Taylor has called the dominant intellectual framework of the secular 
age.278 The reflection on transcendence beyond imminence can provide new 
room for thought and creativity that would otherwise be stifled by mere prag-
matism. Public Theology can bring this perspective into conversations with 
disciplines confined to the “imminent frame.” Promising seem conversations 
with those who understand institutions as a process of imminent transcen-
dence. An example for this is Peter Heintel: “Institutions that help organize 
278  Cf. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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space and time for ‘permanent reflection’ and the handling of contradictions 
are based on the possibility of self-transcendence and system-transcendence. 
In the sense of a practical and concrete enlightening, these institutions would 
draw their dignity and legitimacy from the establishing of joint reasoning as a 
permanent reflective difference. The search for “the good,” and also for public 
welfare, could thus acquire a new platform.”279 
7. Encouraging Ethical Reflection
Since it affirms that life has meaning, and that individual and collective 
agents ought to reflect their actions in terms of responsibility, Public Theo-
logy carries a reflection on the ethical yardsticks measuring individual and 
collective action into the daily discourse of the defining societal institutions. 
This includes the Church and political entities like the state, but also other 
public institutions in media, business, education, and culture. Public Theolo-
gy can introduce tools and methods of ethical evaluation that would other-
wise be lacking in these institutions, despite ethics committees and corporate 
identities.280 Public Theology can also provide an external yardstick for the 
internal evaluation in these institutions.
8. Encouraging Public Ethos
The potential contribution of Public Theology for an ethics of institutions 
therefore lies both in its advice for the ethics within institutions and its stimu-
lation to a public ethos of institutions that affirms the institutional nature of 
social reality and innovates our thinking on how legitimate and stable insti-
tutions can be built in times of individual empowerment and constant dis-
ruption.
9. Encouraging Institutional Innovation
In the spirit of ecclesia semper reformanda, Public Theology can contribu-
te to the constant renewal of the various institutional forms of the Church 
in a very targeted and participatory manner. But by opening discussions on 
the external yardsticks for internal evaluation, by stimulating a public ethos 
279  Religion Past and Present, “Institution.”
280  For a comparative case study of how the churches in Germany and South Africa do this in 
the diverse public spaces see Willem Fourie and Hendrik Meyer-Magister, “Contextuality 
and Intercontextuality in Public Theology: On the Structure of Churches’ Public Engage-
ment in South Africa and Germany,” International Journal of Public Theology 11:1 (2017): 
36–63.
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of institutions and by encouraging active institutional engagement, Public 
Theology can also help institutions writ large to find ever-more inclusive 
ways of living out their institutional purpose. This will help those dispropor-
tionally who are most marginalized by the destruction of societal institutions, 
and thereby has broad normative significance.
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VII. Responses
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Responses 
_________
With sketches of the defining trends and a discussion of Public Theology’s 
theoretical equipment in mind, this chapter concludes the study with con-
crete proposals on how to respond to the trends described. Throughout the 
chapter I apply Hegel’s definition of critique as affirmative negation. In his 
lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel writes: “Critique that leads only 
to a negative result, is a sad business. To simply limit yourself to a demonst-
ration of the vanity of a given content is vain in itself.” Rather, Hegel suggests, 
“our critique should always pro duce affirmative content.”281 Following his 
reasoning, I treat all three trends as double-edged swords calling for both 
negation and affirmation.
281  The original German reads: “Die Kritik, die auf ein nur negatives Resultat führt, ist ein 
nicht bloß trauriges Geschäft, sondern sich darauf beschränken, von einem Inhalt nur 
zu zeigen, daß er eitel ist, ist selbst ein eitles Tun, eine Bemühung der Eitelkeit. Daß wir 
einen affirmativen Gehalt zugleich in der Kritik gewinnen sollen, ist darin ausgesprochen 
wie wir jene Beweise als ein denkendes Auffassen dessen ausgesprochen haben, was die 
Erhebung des Geistes zu Gott ist.” Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Religion II (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 386.
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A. Response #1: Network Architecture 
_________
I want to point to two possible components of a critical reconstruction 
of the trend towards network architectures in institutional arrangements: the 
criteria for the deliberation of truth claims within networks and the task of 
shaping institutional networks through inclusive communication.
Firstly, network architecture should not be conflated too quickly with a 
purely consensus-based approach to truth. The mere fact that a number of 
people in a low-hierarchy network agree on something, does not make it true, 
thus calling for careful reflection on the power distribution in network-based 
settings. The core question here is whether there are external yardsticks to the 
deliberation within a network, or whether a majority decision in a network 
structure is enough to warrant truth claims. This type of question has been 
thoroughly debated in questions of political theory on issues like natural law, 
constitutionalism, democratic proceduralism and the pre-political founda-
tions of the rightsbased rule of law. Now that the more relativist strands of 
postmodern thinking are losing their grasp on many intellectuals in the wake 
of terror attacks designed to challenge the liberal-democratic approach to 
society, the questions surrounding what our yardsticks for institutional ar-
rangements and specific policy choices should be, are likely to resurface with 
full force over and over again, especially considering inter-religious dialogue 
and inter-cultural experience in increasingly heterogenous nation states.
Secondly, while we need to reconsider and reorient the specific institution 
around the founding impulse and the operating purpose given from exter-
nal sources to these institutions (for instance the constitution for political 
institutions or scriptures or creeds for ecclesial institutions), we also need 
to restructure and reshape the workflows within these institutions towards 
meeting the inclusivity criterium identified by Acemoglu and Robinson in 
Why Nations Fail. The inclusivity criterium for successful institutions points 
to the task of ensuring that the institution is communicating well internal-
ly and externally, and that it includes all relevant parts of its organizational 
branches into its communication. Thus, the investment into communicative 
action by and within the institution becomes a yardstick for the integrity of 
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the institution. This communicative action is relevant not only in the actual 
processes within the institution, but also in the individual capacity building 
through education and social interaction outside of the institution.
As Eilert Herms points out, the “social imposition of rule-compliance and 
the conditions of its being understood and accepted by all individuals influ-
ences the genesis and regeneration of institutions.” The communicative factor 
measured by the degree of acceptance achieved is of fundamental import-
ance for Herms, “since all institutions are maintained and imposed through 
the participation of individuals.” The participation of individuals presuppo-
ses “the capability of the individual to participate constructively in the ins-
titution.” For Herms, this capability is not measured by the extent of power 
and influence exerted on decisions, but by “the integration of the interest in 
life-furthering forms of community into the individuals‘ own self-interest.” 
The capability to participate constructively is not naturally given at birth, but 
is in fact “the result of one‘s individual education history, the success of which 
may be made necessary by the imposed forms of coexistence, though it is not 
sufficiently determined by the latter.”282 Thus, the capability for constructive 
participation and the educational systems leading individuals into institutio-
nal participation are amongst the key parameters determining the success or 
failures of every attempt to reform or generate institutions.283
282  Religion Past and Present, “Institution.”
283  Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, “Institution.”
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B. Response #2: Personalized Individuality 
_________
I also want to point to two possible components of a critical reconstruction 
of the trend towards personalized individuality in institutional arrangements: 
the prophetic critique of self-referential narcissism and the constructive nar-
rative of the serving nature of freedom-ensuring institutions.
Responsibly reducing and redirecting the coercive power of institutions has 
been amongst the key components of the concept of freedom-ensuring insti-
tutions. In this view, institutions are not conceived to dominate arbitrarily, 
but to serve by ensuring the freedom of its constituency through basic civil or 
universal human rights. The vital significance of individual freedom guided 
by the concept of human dignity must be protected, if liberal democracies 
want to retain their fundamental characteristics. But in order to secure indi-
vidual freedoms, there is a need for institutions underwriting these freedoms. 
Disposing of freedom-ensuring institutions in the name of individual free-
dom, therefore, is self-defeating.
An example for the self-defeating cause of dismantling institutions in the 
name of agency is the sphere of religion, which in the Western world has dis-
played increasing individualization and personalized syncretisms since the 
nineteenth century, and particularly since the 1960s. Jürgen Habermas spe-
aks of a new “awareness of what is missing”284 and Robert Wuthnow observes 
that “the breakdown of institutional support also means that spirituality at 
the personal level becomes precarious. Once carried by the rituals, activities, 
and conversations [in] the institution, it now has to be carried alone.” He quo-
tes one of his interviewees: “My personal faith journey has always been pretty 
passive in the sense that it has been fed by the institution. And now that I no 
longer have the institution feeding it, it’s kind of splat on the ground, sitting 
there without any help.”285
284  Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt, eds., Ein Bewußtsein von dem, was fehlt. Eine Diskussi-
on mit Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008).
285  Wuthnow, After Heaven, 47.
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The lack of institutional support is amplified by the dark side of selfie tech-
nology: The constant encounter of images of oneself through digital techno-
logy does not just allow for creative expression, it also puts humans at risk 
of drifting into selfreferential narcissism and constant insecurity about the 
appropriately polished brand management of the self in social spaces. With 
reference to Eli Pariser’s The Filter Bubble Nicco Mele calls this filter-bub-
ble-reinforced dynamic a “perverse kind of digital narcissism.”286  Roger 
Willemsen even sees a direct link between digital narcissim and forgery. He 
speaks of an “effort to become image-suitable and enter the world of for-
gery, seizing the opportunity to refine the self into a doppelganger of one’s 
own person.”287Willemsen asks: “The selfie, the auto-erotic multiplication, the 
existence as a branch of one’s self — is this the future of the self?”288 For most 
of human history, individuals were dependent on others to determine their 
identity. Post-modern individualism and new means of personal expression 
now allow humans to live into the illusion that identity can be created th-
rough self-referential deliberation. The pressure to find sources of identity 
and purpose is increasingly placed in the individual, and less in the collective. 
This allows for diverse creativity, but also lonely despair.
One of the thinkers who has worked on the relevance of institutions in re-
ligion is the progressive evangelical author Brian McLaren. Situated between 
a brand of religious liberalism that argues for individual rights and against 
organized religion, and a religious conservatism that honors the traditions of 
the longstanding institutional churches and advocates a strongly organized 
form of religion with strict communal discipline, Brian McLaren seeks to find 
new ways of reconciling the two by describing a form of dynamic stabilizati-
on and a vision of constantly reforming institutions: “in times of instability, 
286  Mele, The End of Big, 131.
287  Roger Willemsen, Wer Wir Waren. Zukunftsrede (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 2016), 
23f. The German original: “In der Anstrengung, selbst bilderfähig zu werden und Eintritt 
in die Welt der Fälschungen zu erlangen, wählt [der Betrachter] die Möglichkeit, sich zum 
Double der eigenen Person zu veredeln.”
288  Ibid., 24. The German original: “Das Selfie, die autoerotische Vervielfältigung, die Filia-
lexistenz - ist das die Zukunft des Ich?”
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growing numbers of people are afraid that the institutions will fail. And here‘s 
where a lot of people are surprised. I am a pro institution guy. I think institu-
tions are tremendously important.”289 
But the institutions McLaren has in mind are not self-sufficient. Institu-
tions per sé are incomplete structures that can rarely renew themselves from 
within. Arguably, McLaren puts activist words to the idea behind the Böcken-
förde-Diktum: “I just think institutions constantly need movements knocking 
at the door to challenge them to take the next step forward.” Applying this to 
the progressive Christian movement of the Emerging Church that McLaren 
helped build, he says: The Emerging Church movement “is not an anti insti-
tutional movement, but a movement of people who want to try to articulate 
some next steps forward.” McLaren contends that “institutions really matter” 
and pairs the definition of an institution with that of a movement. The inter-
play of the two he calls a “yin and a yang.” McLaren’s definition of an institu-
tion is: “an organization that preserves the gains made by past movements.” 
He pairs it with the definition of a movement: “an organization that arises to 
propose gains to current institutions.”290
As a form of dynamic stabilization, institutionalism can provide a perspec-
tive beyond the individual without drifting into totalitarian control and po-
wer play. By explicitly naming the institutional nature of social reality, it can 
sharpen our minds not just for the value of inclusive institutions, but also for 
abuse of power and ineffective workflows within institutions. The popular 
tech sector dictum of “putting user needs first” can renew our appreciation 
for the serving nature of institutions. Ecclesiologically, this can be described 
through both the Protestant paradigm of the priesthood of all believers and 
the Catholic paradigm of the universal Church as a servant of God and God’s 
people. Biblically, this can be grounded in the individual worth and dignity, 
theologically derived from the creation of all humans in God’s image. The-
oretically, it can be explained as the constitution of institutions through the 
network of those it serves. And politically, it could be encouraged by renewed 
appreciation for participatory citizenship, and other institutionally guaran-
teed forms of participation in public institutions.
289  Brian McLaren, “The Equation of Change,” On Being with Krista Tippett, March 13, 2014, 
accessed January 22, 2017, https://onbeing.org/programs/brian-mclaren-the-equati-
on-of-change/.
290  Ibid.
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C. Response #3: Automated Workflows  
_________
And I want to point to two possible components of a critical reconstruction 
of the trend towards automated workflows in institutional arrangements: the 
prophetic critique of mechanistic utilitarianism and the deliberately moral 
and constructive use of automation technology for the benefit of all humans.
In a 1951 speech on reforming the institutions of global governance, Pope 
Pius XII. criticized mechanistic interpretations of egalitarianism. While he 
emphatically endorses an “effective political world organization,” Pius warns 
against treating humans as cogwheels in a massive machine on auto-pilot. 
Pius interprets the Catholic interpretation of order as the affirmation of lively 
institutions structured through subsidiarity, “free of the engines of mechani-
stic leveling” of all partici pants and actors.291 When such language is used, 
one must pay heed to antidemocratic tendencies. If egalitarianism as such 
is the target of such criticism, it erodes the very foundations for inclusive 
institutions. If, however, such criticism is directed towards the use of hum-
ans as mere technical resources in order to fuel an automated machinery of 
institutions without true consideration of the humans involved, it is entirely 
on point. The concept of freedom-ensuring institutions is built on an anth-
ropology of dignity which Immanuel Kant famously explicated as his third 
categorical imperative: Treat yourself and others not as mere means to an 
end, but always as ends in themselves.292 
In addition to the necessary alertness we need to employ with new techno-
logies, we must also recognize the potentials in computer-based automation 
of repetitive labor. Automated workflows can indeed help institutions regain 
291  Arthur-Fridolin Utz and Joseph-Fulko Groner, eds, Aufbau und Entfaltung des gesell-
schaftlichen Lebens. Die soziale Summe Pius XII., (Freiburg: Paulusverlag, 1954), par. 3995. 
Fritz and Groner translate this passage as “Triebwerk einer mechanistischen Gleichma-
cherei.”
292  Kant writes: “Handle so, daß du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person 
eines jeden andern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst.” Cf. Im-
manuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AA IV, 429. He also writes: “Denn 
vernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem Gesetz, daß jedes derselben sich selbst und alle 
andere niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst behan-
deln solle.” Cf. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 433.
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legitimacy by creating user-friendly points of interaction in the digital de-
vices we incorporate into our daily lives. Automated workflows can take care 
of those tasks that function well without human judgment: renewing your 
driver’s license, filing your taxes, registering your vehicle and so forth. From 
the institution’s perspective, automation can free up staff in order to focus 
on what only human staff can achieve: creativity, warmth, empathy, active 
listening, critical thinking. Moreover, automation does not just substitute 
or complement human work, it will also create jobs of oversight, for which 
human judgment will remain indispensable. It appears, therefore, that new 
forms of intelligent distribution of labor will be at the core of institutional 
innovation in the near future: Robotics and specialized artificial intelligen-
ce will improve the precision, reliability and consistency of repetitive tasks, 
while humans can refocus on what only humans can do, thus enabling insti-
tutions to be more attentive, empathetic, mindful, and creative.
Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt agrees with a constructive coexistence model: 
“I’ve come to a view that humans will continue to do what we do well, and 
that computers will continue to do what they do very well, and the two will 
coexist, but in different spaces.” With their perfect memories, Schmidt says, 
computers can handle “needle-in-a-haystack problems”. Humans, on the 
other hand, are good at “judgment, emotion, and creativity.” At some point 
computers might improve at non-quantitative tasks as well, but for now “the 
separation of powers means that computers will sit around and help you.”293 
Daniel Pink argues along similar lines in A Whole New Mind, arguing that 
“the era of ‘left brain’ dominance” and the information culture it produced are 
both giving way to “a new world in which right brain’ qualities [like] inventi-
veness, empathy, [and] meaning predominate.”294
In their paper Dancing With Robots, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane 
make out three distinctly human tasks of the future: “the human labor mar-
ket will center on three kinds of work: solving unstructured problems, wor-
293  Drake Baer, “Eric Schmidt: Do What Computers Aren’t Good At,” Fast Company, Oc-
tober 7, 2017, accessed October 22, 2016, https://www.fastcompany.com/3013979/bot-
tom-line/eric-schmidt-do-what-computers-arent-good-at.
294  Cf. Daniel H. Pink, A Whole New Mind. Why Right-Brainers Will Rule the Future (New 
York: Riverhead Books, 2006). The quote is taken from the Pink’s website: “A Whole New 
Mind,” Dan H. Pink, accessed October 22, 2016, http://www.danpink.com/books/whole-
new-mind/.
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king with new information, and carrying out non-routine manual tasks.”295 
In line with Pink and Schmidt, Anya Kamenetz adds a fourth task: “Being 
human: Expressing empathy, making people feel good, taking care of others, 
being artistic and creative for the sake of creativity, expressing emotions and 
vulnerability in a relatable way, making people laugh. The human touch is 
indispensable for most jobs, and in some cases, it is the entire job. In this one, 
humans win.”296
The constructive coexistence model is not only brought forth by contem-
porary research. We can find it in Aristotle’s Politics as well. There he descri-
bes the potential of automation as something we today would call the advan-
cement of social justice and socio-economic rights. Right after his famous 
passage on the zoon politikon Aristotle writes that “every state is composed of 
households.” The head of a household “must have his tools, and of tools some 
are lifeless and others living.” The slave “belongs to the class of tools” and is “a 
live article of property.” However, “if every tool could perform its own work 
when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance, … if thus shuttles wove 
and quills played harps of themselves, master-craftsmen would have no need 
of assistants and masters no need of slaves.”297
295  Jonathan Cowan and Elaine C. Karmack, “What’s Next?,” in Dancing With Robots. Human 
Skills for Computerized Work, ed. Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane, accessed October 
22, 2016, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/714/Dancing-With-Robots.pdf.
296  Anya Kamenetz, “The Four Things People Can Still Do Better Than Computers,” Fast Com-
pany, July 19, 2013, accessed October 22, 2016, https://www.fastcompany.com/3014448/
the-four-things-people-canstill-do-better-than-computers.
297  Aristotle, “Politics,” 1253b, in Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes Vol. 21, trans. Harris Rack-
ham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), accessed October 19, 2016, http://
www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:abo:tlg,0086,035:1:1253b.
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Beyond the Bubble
Filter bubbles, echo chambers, information cocoons:  e digital revolution 
has changed the way we communicate with profound implications for how 
we participate in the space we call “the public.” Digital trends toward net-
work architectures, personalized individuality and automated work ows are 
driving a transformation of the public with signi cant impact on the institu-
tions making up this public sphere. What, then, is this “public” sphere today? 
Abstract, monolithic conceptions of the one coherent public appear outdat-
ed, since technological changes like the rise of social media, as well as the 
modern appreciation of individualism, human tendencies towards a con r-
mation bias, and the postcolonial focus on contextual experience have creat-
ed or reinforced a diverse spectrum of  ltered publics that do not ful ll the 
criteria associated with the public sphere. Can we even continue to use the 
term?
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